



AIRPOWER IN MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS (MARO)

BY

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ABSTRACT

This study examines historical airpower intervention to contribute to the urgent task of educating and managing the expectations of political and military leaders about the unique contributions and risks of airpower in a Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO). Analyzing airpower's historical effect in humanitarian interventions provides strategic options to political and military leaders on airpower capabilities and potential responses to mass atrocity situations in an effort to fill a void in doctrine and planning discussion. It also seeks to present some of the tools and risks of airpower in a MARO to provide a foundation for the planning, coordination, and execution of airpower operations in the prevention of and response to mass atrocities. By using a qualitative approach, the author attempts to answer: *1) to what extent are airpower options effective in preventing or responding to a mass atrocity situation, and, 2) what can decision-makers and military leaders today learn from MAROs in history to apply in a future MARO?* The focus of the thesis is not to advocate for or against military intervention or response in particular situations, rather it seeks to examine airpower options in a MARO to prepare the military leaders and planners for this likely tasking in the future.

Specifically, viewing historical humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and Libya through a lens focused on an airpower response to mass atrocities challenges many of the expectations, planning norms, and traditional targeting models. However, it also helps military leaders prepare for future policy guidance. Illuminating historical examples of airpower interventions will narrow MARO thinking by identifying successes, limitations, risks, and existing airpower capabilities, while matching them to operationally accepted means for conducting airpower operations that achieve the desired strategic and political effects. This study helps minimize current and future cognitive pitfalls in the development and execution of strategy, particularly when policy-makers face the daunting challenge of a MARO. Decision makers and military leaders require innovative ideas to address these dynamic situations. The thesis is focused primarily on *airpower's effects* across the spectrum of preventing and responding to mass atrocities to examine some innovative airpower concepts that address these situations and help establish a foundation for future MARO planning.

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Introduction

Joint forces today operate in an increasingly complex environment. There exist significant uncertainties and ambiguities concerning the sources of threats and the continual proliferation of new forms of crimes against humanity. The United States (US) has also witnessed a conceptual decline in the utility of the traditional theories of defense, deterrence, and coercion in the post-Cold war environment. Failing states and non-state actors are empowered by their belief in the decline in power, prestige, and influence among traditional nation states.¹ Additionally, there is an increased capacity for violence due to the proliferation of weapons, once monopolized by nations, and a will to use them. This has created a more unpredictable and dangerous security environment.

Free societies are inherently at risk and increasingly the strengths of their democratic systems and moral values are tested and even employed against them. The rise in the number of failed or failing states, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, coupled with a trend toward urbanization has placed ever-increasing numbers of civilians at risk in times of conflict.² Thus, complex conflicts having a high potential for mass atrocities has become the new norm. This complex environment, in and of itself, is not new. Today's conflicts clearly combine new actors with new technology and new or transfigured ways of war, but the old threats also remain and have to be dealt with at the same time and in the same space, stressing the resources and overloading the systems of Western militaries.³ This is something that military institutions have not explicitly dealt with in the past. As a result, Airmen in particular have found themselves relying on classical military solutions where either political capital to accept those solutions is lacking or the method does not match the objective.

Despite the abundance of US strategic guidance created for the prevention and response to mass atrocities, there has been little done to prepare decision makers and

¹ Stephen Fidler, "US Suffers Decline in Power and Prestige, Survey Reveals." *Financial Times*. September 13, 2007.

² Arab revolution began with Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria. In Africa, 27 countries were scheduled to hold Presidential, legislative or local elections throughout 2011. As much as elections can contribute to democratic progress, they are often a flashpoint for conflict. Robin Hammond, *The Failed States Index 2011*. January 3, 2011. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates> (accessed February 1, 2012).

³ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 6.

military leaders to make an informed decision on available options in a Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO). Conflict in the Balkans and Libya forced military airpower leaders to deal with this complex environment directly. These interventions produced effects that proliferated far beyond the military. It is unlikely that the 2011 MARO in Libya will be the last time the military is used to intervene in a mass atrocity situation. Decision makers and military leaders require innovative ideas to address these dynamic situations. To address these issues, the central questions of this thesis are: *1) to what extent are airpower options effective in preventing or responding to a mass atrocity situation, and, 2) what can decision-makers and military leaders today learn from MAROs in history to apply in a future MARO?*

There is no commonly accepted definition of a “mass atrocity.” Even the term “genocide,” which is specifically defined by the 1948 UN Genocide Convention and agreed to by almost every nation, is intensely disputed when applied to actual situations.⁴ In a 2010 annual Senate Select Committee on Intelligence threat assessment, the Director of National Intelligence defined “mass killing of civilians” as the “deliberate killing of at least 1,000 unarmed civilians of a particular political identity by state or state-sponsored actors in a single event or over a sustained period.”⁵ However, this definition is not shared by most in the Defense Department, State Department or non-governmental organizations (NGO) that deal with mass atrocities.⁶

Lacking such a definition, strategic guidance documents provide little help for the military strategist. Phrases such as *protection of civilians, mass murder, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass atrocity* appear in at least fourteen different joint military doctrinal publications.⁷ Presidential Study Directive – 10 (PSD-10), the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 2010 Guidance for

⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 260 III A, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 9 December 1948.

⁵ “Director of National Intelligence Emphasizes Risk in Southern Sudan and Concern for Bosnia,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum weblog, 4 February 2010, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/blog/?p=673, (accessed 23 January 2012).

⁶ In addition to the disagreement over the DNI’s (Dennis Blair) definition because it was not crafted through an official interagency process, many are anxious about prescribing a number in fear of promoting killing up to but not more than that number. Others view the figure of 1,000 as an arbitrary benchmark.

⁷ Two current and six draft joint publications (JPs) mention protection of civilians, one draft publication mentions mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, one current and three draft JPs mention genocide, and no JPs mention mass murder.

Employment of the Force (GEF), 2011 National Military Strategy, and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance all identify a US National security interest in preventing and responding to mass atrocity situations.⁸ However, none of the existing doctrinal publications provide a clear, concise, and authoritative plan for DOD entities to consult in developing a full range of non-kinetic and kinetic options for Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO).

This opens the door for unexpected interaction between policy makers, military strategists, and planners. Policy and conflict are not mutually exclusive. As military strategist Carl von Clausewitz so famously established, “war is simply the continuation of policy by other means.”⁹ In other words, policy influences warfare. Likewise, one can presume that at times, warfare influences policy. This has been the case in many MARO situations. Thus, military leaders must translate a sufficiently broad political strategy into a sound military strategy. However, when the political strategy is too vague or confusing, military planners will often fail to match operational and tactical objectives to the broader political strategic objectives. A healthy civil-military relationship creates a positive feedback loop that can help avoid this problem. If this feedback cycle breaks down, the potential exists for military leaders to create policy that is typically the responsibility of policy makers. The character of a MARO and the civilian and military relationship is particularly important in the outcome of these dynamic conflicts.

The 2010 Harvard Kennedy School Mass Atrocity Response Operation Project highlights this when it states, “At the macro level, what distinguishes a MARO and a MARO situation is the character and dynamics of the conflict and the mission’s primary objective-ending mass atrocities against civilians.”¹⁰ It defines a Mass Atrocity Response Operation as a contingency operation, specifically designed to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants.¹¹ Mass atrocity situations can quickly escalate in failing or failed states from unstable, or even seemingly stable situations following a sudden “trigger” event.

⁸ See 2010 National Security Strategy, page 48; 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, pages vi and 15; and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review , pages xii, 22, 122, 124, 128, 147.

⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 6.

¹⁰ Sarah Sewall, Sally Chin, and Dwight Raymond, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*. Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School, 2010, 25.

¹¹ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 17.

Mass atrocities can also involve non-state actors. Despite the fact that MAROs share many of the characteristics of stability operations, counterinsurgency, peace operations, and humanitarian assistance, distinctive characteristics emerge unique to MARO. If this is true, then a MARO requires unique options and planning for a military intervention.

The problem arises because of a mismatch between the most effective way to solve a MARO situation and the ways that are often chosen. Governmental intervention in atrocities and genocide often arrive too late, after opportunities for lower-cost, lower-risk, escalatory measures for prevention or early engagement are missed. By the time these issues have commanded the attention of senior policy makers, instability has often turned to conflict, the menu of options has shrunk considerably—often to either lethal force or doing nothing, and the costs of action have risen substantially. In contrast, when the mass atrocity situation first arises, there are usually many options available. Options range from economic to diplomatic interventions, and from non-lethal military actions to a total military intervention. The difficult but essential task of integrating military and civilian actions into a viable political strategy that focuses on preventing and ending humanitarian conflicts under the scrutiny of the international media is critical.¹² Political and military leaders must recognize the full range of options before they are required to recommend a course of action.

Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a national security interest and core moral responsibility of the United States. United States national security and the balance of international order is affected when masses of civilians are slaughtered, refugees flow across borders, and murderers wreak havoc on regional stability and livelihoods.¹³ America's reputation may suffer, and its ability to bring about change is constrained when it is perceived as idle in the face of mass atrocities and genocide.¹⁴ Unfortunately, history demonstrates that the systematic slaughter of civilians will not end without a concerted and coordinated effort.

The genocidal assault launched against Kosovo's civilian population in 1998-99 exemplifies this. The ethnic cleansing bore many of the hallmarks of the earlier Serb

¹² Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 4.

¹³ Presidential Study Directive-10, Creation of an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Corresponding Interagency Review, 4 August 2011, 1.

¹⁴ Presidential Study Directive-10, 1.

campaigns in Bosnia.¹⁵ The expulsion of women, children, and elderly, and the systematic targeting of the military-aged male population for mass execution, detention, and torture became a pattern in the Balkans.¹⁶ On March 24, 1999, amid questions about the No-Fly Zone (NFZ) and vague targeting and planning guidance, called a “game of pick-up” by Air Component Commander General Michael Short, the military campaign known as Operation Allied Force (OAF) began.¹⁷ It was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) second campaign in the Balkans in just four years under the auspice of a humanitarian intervention. Despite guidance and the public exclusion of ground troops, approximately two and a half months later on 10 June 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244.¹⁸ The resolution included an immediate end to violence and the rapid withdrawal of Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.

At the end of the war in Kosovo, air power advocates came out in force, claiming that OAF fulfilled the prophecies of airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell; airpower had halted a mass atrocity and won the war alone. These claims were not new. Similar advocates preached airpower’s success following the Gulf War in 1991 and again after the Bosnia air campaign in 1995. The difference this time was that the advocates were not wearing Air Force uniforms. President Clinton said Allied Force proved "that a sustained air campaign, under the right conditions, can stop an army on the ground."¹⁹ Even stronger rhetoric came from author and historian John Keegan:

There are certain dates in the history of warfare that mark real turning points. November 20, 1917 is one, when at Cambrai the tank showed that the traditional dominance of infantry, cavalry and artillery on the battlefield had been overthrown. November 11, 1940 is another when the sinking of the Italian fleet at Taranto demonstrated that the aircraft carrier and its aircraft had abolished the age-old supremacy of the battleship. Now there is a new date to fix on the calendar: June 3, 1999, when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by

¹⁵ Srebrenica in Bosnia, Racak in Kosovo

¹⁶ *NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo*, July 15, 1999. <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> (accessed January 23, 2012).

¹⁷ Scott A. Cooper, "The Politics of Airstrike." *Stanford University*. June 1, 2001. <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6156> (accessed January 23, 2012).

¹⁸ *NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo*, July 15, 1999.

¹⁹ Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Clinton: What Went Right," *The New Republic Online*, 22 January 2001, <http://www.thenewrepublic.com/012201/kaplan012201.html> (accessed, 27 January 2012).

airpower alone.²⁰

However, the rhetoric may have been too good to be true. NATO leaders originally agreed to just a 2-day air strike that excluded the possibility of a ground invasion, because they were convinced that Milosevic would comply just as he had in Bosnia four years earlier. When Milosevic refused, the air campaign was gradually escalated into an around-the clock operation. The lack of an overarching national strategy, the public exclusion of a ground invasion, reliance on traditional planning methods, political targeting restrictions, strict rules of engagement (ROE), and mission creep plagued both the lethal and non-lethal use of airpower. On June 3, 1999, Milosevic finally surrendered to NATO demands.²¹ However, a two-day air strike aimed at protecting the civilians of Kosovo evolved into a seventy-eight day air campaign that compelled thirteen of NATO's nineteen nations to contribute over 1,100 aircraft and 37,000 sorties.²² While the objective to get Milosevic to the negotiating table was accomplished, questions remained about NATO's ability to protect civilians on the ground. Many military leaders told a cautionary tale of airpower's success in the Balkans, while media and political rhetoric of airpower's victory remained strong.

In March 2011, history and airpower rhetoric once again appeared to repeat itself. Military leaders struggled with similar guidance as UNSCR 1973 recommended a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) in Libya while also authorizing "All necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack," and excluded a foreign occupation force of any form.²³ In Libya, leaders contemplated questions eerily similar to Kosovo with little guidance from the lessons learned twelve years earlier. Policy makers compounded frustratingly vague guidance on political ends with specific direction on military means and ways—just the opposite of what military planners desired. As in Kosovo, airpower's promise of a low-cost, low-risk solution contributed to the decision for a military intervention in Libya to prevent a humanitarian disaster some

²⁰ John Keegan, "Please, Mr. Blair, never take such a risk again," *London Daily Telegraph*, Issue 1472, 6 June 1999.

²¹ United States General Accounting Office, Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures, July 2001 (GAO-01-784), 3 and 19.

²² CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations p.3

²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 paragraph 4 and 6 available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement>, (accessed on 13 February 2012).

were labeling “Srebrenica on steroids.”²⁴

Comparably, both wars also began with the expectation they would be over in days or weeks, not months. Equally, the US and NATO were committed to a war while political leaders categorically excluded the possibility of sending in ground troops. Once again, a lack of an overarching national strategy, the public exclusion of a ground invasion, reliance on traditional planning methods, mission creep, and unclear political objectives resulted in a disorganized plan for the protection of civilians. Twelve years had passed and little had been done to consider solutions concerning how the military, specifically airpower, could be used to protect civilians.

Sixty-seven years since the Holocaust and thirteen years after Kosovo, the United States still lacks a comprehensive policy framework and corresponding military doctrine for preventing and responding to mass atrocities and genocide. This has left the U.S. ill prepared to engage early, proactively, and decisively in response to threats with the potential of evolving into large-scale civilian atrocities.

Scope and Structure

This thesis seeks to contribute to the urgent task of educating and managing the expectations of political and military leaders about the unique contributions and risks of airpower in a MARO. The thesis also seeks to present some of the tools and risks of airpower in a MARO to provide a foundation for the planning, coordination, and execution of airpower operations in the prevention of and response to mass atrocities. While the tools used to prevent or respond to a mass atrocity might be the same as those necessary in traditional conflict, their objectives are different. The key to a more targeted approach in a MARO lies in planning to use these tools in the context of the protection of civilians and the prevention of and response to a mass atrocity situation. Viewing a MARO through an atrocity response lens challenges many of the planning norms and traditional targeting prioritization models, but it also prepares military leaders to deal with vague policy guidance. The key to narrowing a MARO strategy lies in identifying

²⁴ During a briefing at the White House Roosevelt Room on 23 March, 2011, White House Middle East Strategist Dennis Ross said, “We were looking at ‘Srebrenica on steroids’ – the imminent possibility that up to 100,000 could be massacred, and everyone would blame us for it.” Srebrenica refers to the July 1995 massacre of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in and around the town of Srebrenica, Bosnia.

existing DoD tools and capabilities and matching them to operationally sound ways for conducting airpower operations that achieve the desired effect.

It is also important to remember that MAROs are extremely dynamic and complex operations. Prussian General Helmuth Graf von Moltke insisted that no plan survives first contact with the enemy.²⁵ He continued, “Only a layman would believe that a commander develops a plan and follows it exactly, foreseeing all developments, to its successful conclusion.”²⁶ Plans are developed against a static set of assumptions and facts, while an active opponent in the field is as intelligent and motivated as the attacker. As a result, occupying forces throughout history have been surprised by the ingenuity, resourcefulness, and effectiveness of a supposedly inferior enemy who refuses to submit. These same lessons must be applied to Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Every MARO will contain dynamic conflict, full of uncertainties and risk, but this is no reason to dismiss planning. Planning involves the critical task of analyzing the environment to frame the problem more accurately. A detailed analysis should produce clarity that can be used to exploit the problem. This clarity is fundamental to understanding the complexities in a MARO and crafting an appropriate response.

The full breadth of the international and US government economic, diplomatic, and information instruments of power are necessary for the prevention and response to a mass atrocity. The US Government response across the spectrum from instability to mass killing or genocide was previously mentioned as a policy issue that transcends the military dimension and element of power.²⁷ The military is not and should not be the only response to a mass atrocity. However, reflecting on the broad scope of these instruments of power, this thesis will focus on the range of diverse options primarily concentrating on the military. Within the military, the thesis focuses on *airpower’s effects* across the spectrum of preventing and responding to mass atrocities. The broad definition of the term *airpower* offered in this thesis implies the use of all assets in the air as well as on and below the surface that support airpower to include joint air, space, sea, and cyber power assets. The term *effects* suggests “a physical and/or behavioral state of a

²⁵ Daniel J Hughes, *Moltke On the Art of War*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 92.

²⁶ Hughes, *Moltke On the Art of War*, 92.

²⁷ Madeleine K. Albright, and William S. Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*. (Washington D.C.: The United States Holocaust Museum, 2008), 83.

system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.”²⁸ The ability to achieve a desired effect in an individual operating environment based on the precise employment of specific capabilities. These ideas will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.

In addition, allowing unarmed civilians to be massacred is internationally unacceptable, but the method to deal with mass atrocities is highly debated. Although the thesis will present reasons why MARO is in the United States’ national interest, it is not within the scope of the thesis to settle political disputes about whether a military intervention is appropriate or not. The focus of the thesis is not to advocate for or against military intervention or response in particular situations; rather it seeks to examine airpower options in a MARO to prepare the military for this likely possibility.

Method

The thesis will use a qualitative approach to identify airpower’s effectiveness in MARO situations and strategies. Since a solution to the widespread problem of mass atrocity appears to be embedded in the combination of national policy and military schema, the thesis will examine historical case studies using a framework presented in Madeleine Albright and William Cohen’s Book *Preventing Genocide*. The framework offers a five-phase spectrum in the “process of violence” beginning with the breakdown of the social contract and progressing through political uncertainty, group mobilization, killing begins, and finally mass killings.²⁹ Breaking down the escalatory process of violence into five distinctive phases allows for a detailed analysis of airpower’s effect within this escalatory process to gain leverage across the spectrum of violence. This will determine the historical political and military effectiveness of airpower in a MARO. As decision-makers and military leaders draw on their own images of conflict, it is important to examine how desired effects match airpower options.

²⁸ United States Joint Publication (JP) 5.0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011, xxi.

²⁹ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

Despite the many contrasts between the political requirements and expectations of past military intervention, there is one undeniably congruent aspect that links the following conflicts – each employed airpower in some form. The Balkan conflicts during the 1990s (Operations DELIBERATE & ALLIED FORCE) and the recent Libyan operation in 2011 (Operations ODYSSEY DAWN & UNIFIED PROTECTOR) each provide an opportunity to examine the application of airpower in essentially a MARO from a historical vantage within the established framework. Each conflict offers unique challenges such as vastly different geographies and varying degrees of political involvement that add depth to the analysis.

Despite the abundance of US strategic guidance created for the prevention and response to mass atrocities, little has been done to prepare decision makers and military leaders to make an informed decision on available options in a MARO. To this end it is necessary to examine the following additional questions: What are the effects desired and expectations held by decision makers in a MARO? What are the benefits, limitations, and risk associated with a MARO? How can MARO be incorporated into the existing airpower organization?

Roadmap

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 is devoted to an exploration of various thoughts to provide some background on the legitimacy, strategic guidance, and military response definitions of a humanitarian intervention to protect civilians. The concept of a Responsibility to Protect, R2P for short, has been a recurring theme in the international debate since the late 1990's. R2P argues that the central issue of states' authority is not the "right to intervene" of any state, but the "responsibility to protect."³⁰ The R2P concept introduces some of the commonly accepted international notions on sovereignty, the protection of civilians, and humanitarian intervention. From a US perspective, we will review existing strategic guidance, policy directives, and documents to examine the relevancy and importance the US places on the prevention and response to mass atrocities. Next, the Harvard Kennedy School's military planning handbook on Mass Atrocity Response Operations defines

³⁰ UN High-Level Panel on Threats, *Challenges and Change in 2004, A More Secure World*, 56.

MARO and other important terms that are used throughout the thesis. We review these definitions in conjunction with accepted military doctrinal terms to contrast conventional operations with MAROs and present unique distinctions to build a foundation for strategic analysis. Finally, armed with these concepts, we undertake three historical case studies using a framework across the *process of violence* from instability and the breakdown of the state “social contract” to mass killing.³¹ The chapter ends by setting up a transition to the historical case studies with concepts on how the character of airpower in what essentially are Mass Atrocity Response Operations is uniquely different from other alternative means in conflict. The subsequent three chapters explore three distinctive historical case studies.

Chapter 2

The Balkans taught the international community that they could not condemn mass atrocities while simultaneously preaching non-intervention and expect to achieve anything substantial. Throughout the decade, diplomacy—and the *threat* of force—had failed to halt mass atrocities. The disjointed approach to a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) in Bosnia was riddled with compromise and uncertainty that contributed to the massacre at Srebrenica. Chapter 2 applies our framework across the “process of violence” to analyze the airpower options and effects in the Bosnia conflict. Beginning with a discussion on No-Fly Zones, we examine some of the complexities involved in the political crafting and military interpretation of strategic guidance. This is especially important because a misinterpretation of political strategic guidance by the military can lead to outcomes vastly different than expected. Using interviews with political officials, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and military leaders and planners as well as secondary historical sources we will determine the expectations and desired effects during the Bosnia.

Early calls for intervention to protect civilians in Libya were bolstered by airpower rhetoric describing the past successes of the international community to halt violence against civilians.³² The events of Srebrenica were consistently framed as

³¹ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

³² Hussein Ibish, “Act Now,” *Foreign Policy*, 24 February 2011.

justification for the protection of Benghazi. In the end, a comparison to Libya determines how airpower rhetoric, expectations, and mission creep, play in the political and military calculus of a MARO.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 continues the focus on historical case studies but concentrates on Kosovo and airpower targeting. In Kosovo, there was a clarity and will to intervene militarily from the start, and while operations set a precedent for decisive, forceful intervention against perpetrators of mass atrocities, it was far from perfect. Restricted targeting and vague political guidance played a significant role in the outcome. Beginning with a discussion on John Warden's five-ring systems model, we focus on the targeting aspects of Operation Allied Force to determine if its effects matched the desired endstates. In the end, a comparison to Libya determines similarities and differences in airpower targeting. This assessment provides a useful comparison of airpower's evolution from Kosovo to Libya and provides evidence that suggests the late application of decisive force against the fifth ring of Warden's model generated a strategic error.

Chapter 4

A synthesis of the three case studies provides some valuable insights into the changing character a MARO that sets the foundation for further analysis. Additionally, airpower's ability to meet the expectations of decision makers, and identify other areas where the promise of airpower fails to deliver, plays a significant role in the political calculus of an intervention. There is inherent risk in airpower's perceived low cost, historical success, and ability to protect civilians, particularly in the absence of a ground force. Furthermore, airpower planning norms and targeting models are also challenged when dealing with the specific operational environment of a MARO. The trend of limited military assets and intelligence will likely be the norm in future MAROs. This trend must be accounted for to give greater options to military planners and to decrease the risk calculus for political leaders. Finally, an investigation reveals the significance of timing and the level and type of force of an intervention requires within the "process of violence." The findings may demand a reevaluation of some of the inherited airpower assumptions that led to many of the difficulties in past mass atrocity situations.

Conclusion

The final section briefly discusses the broader implications of humanitarian intervention explored within the context of the current political climate. The thesis concludes with an application of these findings in an assessment of potential MARO operations in Syria to inform policy-makers of the critical benefits, limitations, and risk of airpower options as they make decisions concerning future interventions.



Chapter 1

The MARO Environment: A Foundation for Intervention

We—even we here—hold the power, and bear the responsibility.

—Abraham Lincoln

In the past two decades, international policy analysts have emotionally debated humanitarian intervention to protect civilians and prevent or stop mass atrocities. A steady progression of this international policy at the highest levels began in the 1990s when President William Clinton tasked the US military to carry out several “humanitarian interventions.”¹ In 2004 the UN Secretary General’s high-level panel formulated and promoted a revolutionary concept that when states do not conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet internationally recognized standards, other states have a right to intervene.² This idea evolved from a 2001 International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report proclaiming the “responsibility to protect.”³ In 2005, President George W. Bush agreed to the concept of the “responsibility to protect.” The revolutionary wave that rolled across the Middle East and North Africa, fueled by the Arab Spring that began in late 2010, compelled President Obama to take action.⁴ President Barack Obama deployed airpower to intervene in a potential mass atrocity situation, both through preventative measures and specific diplomatic and military action culminating in the 2011 US and NATO intervention in Libya. He essentially authorized a Mass Atrocity Response Operation prior to actual atrocities with the goal of “protection of civilians in Libya” following Qaddafi’s threats of “no mercy or compassion” for defiant Libyans.⁵ As 2012 continues, the effects of the Arab Spring continue to produce bloodshed in Syria, as the international community proposes condemnation, but not yet intervention.

¹ Primarily the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo) and Somalia. President Bush began the Somalian intervention, but President Clinton sent troops back when the UN mission went awry.

² Alex J Bellamy, *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect* (New York: Routledge, 2011) 21.

³ Bellamy, *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect*, 9.

⁴ *Tropic Post*, “Middle East Revolt” 11 February 2011. <http://www.tropicpost.com/middle-east-in-revolt/>. (accessed 16 February 2012). The Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that began in Tunisia on 18 December 2010 and spread to Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria.

⁵ *New York Times*, “Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears” 17 March 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18libya.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 16 February 2012). Statement of President Barack Obama, 18 March 2011, in a speech following the beginning of Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya.

In this new environment, countries would seek to master, control, and prevent violence; uphold international norms; and focus on preventing and ending conflicts started by others, preserving the status quo rather than initiating wars themselves as an instrument of policy.⁶ French strategist, Army Brigadier-General Loup Francart, described this environment in his book *Maitriser La Violence: Une Option Straegique*.

He argued that in the twenty-first century, forces would primarily be required to intervene in extremely complex conditions of state failure and in humanitarian or peacekeeping environments, where law and order were compromised and state institutional frameworks were lacking. Such forces would have to uphold the law of armed conflict (such as the Geneva Conventions) in the face of adversaries who ignored it, and Western countries would be seeking to control or end violence rather than, as in traditional warfare, to achieve policy ends through violence. This approach could be considered a “counterwar strategy,” where the key threat to be mastered would be the conflict environment itself, rather than a particular armed enemy.⁷

Today’s complex and dynamic conflict combines new actors with new technology and new motivations that lead to a high potential for mass atrocities. A growing movement proposes it is in US national and global international interest to address potential and ongoing mass atrocity situations throughout the world. However, before addressing this, it is critical to first understand the underpinning of this movement, the US strategic guidance relating to mass atrocities, and some of the fundamental definitions and the nature of Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Providing a historical background of this new environment builds context critical to understanding the strategic significance and importance of Mass Atrocity Response Operations in the future.

The unipolar world following the end of the Cold War, the wars in Iraq and the Balkans, the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the “war on terror” and operations in Libya have all had a strong impact on the public perceptions of war and the stability of the international system. These wars, and future conflict trends, contrast with earlier wars in terms of their goals, methods, and how they are financed. Recent conflict tends to be more intrastate than interstate and affected by globalization, while gruesome violence is used to create

⁶ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 4-5.

⁷ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 4-5.

fear, as civilians become the main target of war.⁸

The effects of globalization—the technology-enabled process of improved communications and transportation that enables the freer movement of goods, people, money, technology, ideas, and culture across and within international borders—have prompted this change in the role of force in the international balance of power.⁹ Mary Kaldor, Director of the Center for the Study of Global Governance at London’s School of Economics, argues that globalization, by its very openness, has created unprecedented access to its tools such as the internet, cellphones, satellite communications, and electronic funds transfer, easing international movement and trade. This has prompted the global proliferation of low-cost, high-lethality individual weapon systems which, combined with access to other tools, leads to perceived power.¹⁰ In short, the environment where Cold war superpowers shaped their rivalry in the form of proxy conflict in failing states evolved as globalization changed the character of the conflict area, strengthening some actors, weakening others, and altering the conditions of the conflict.¹¹

The humanitarian disasters and mass atrocities that accompanied the wars in the Balkans and Rwanda prompted debate and a reorientation of the role of force in the international system.¹² Additional wars in the 1990’s saw an increase in the targeting of civilians fueling further debate about the role of force in conflict. The realist might say mass atrocities are morally reprehensible but not inherently a threat to a state’s national interest. However, the refugee problem can become a legitimate threat to traditional ideals of national security through regional escalation of conflict and instability. The mass migration of refugees that results from mass atrocity situations is a threat to surrounding sovereign nations and is therefore inherently escalatory. It can provoke the

⁸ Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 7.

⁹ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 8.

¹⁰ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 9.

¹¹ Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 7.

¹² BBC News, “Rwanda: How the genocide happened” 17 May 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13431486> (accessed 16 February 2012). The Rwandan Genocide was the 1994 mass murder of an estimated 800,000 people in the small East African nation of Rwanda under the watch of the United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) Balkan atrocities are covered in Chapter 2 and 3.

spread of conflict, sometimes very rapidly, from a state to a regional level.¹³ Suddenly, a state's internal conflict, previously described as a civil war and therefore outside the authority of the international community, becomes a threat to regional stability. This effectively produces conflict that creates significant interest to states that are otherwise uninvolved. Through cross-border sovereignty, security disputes, and mass migrations, civil strife can quickly become a problem on the international stage, making mass atrocities a realistic threat to national security.¹⁴

Thomas Weiss's work, *Humanitarian Intervention*, provides an overview of the recent evolution in international norms that these changes initiated, allowing for the use of a collective military force to protect civilians. New perceptions in thinking about state sovereignty and human rights became evident when UN secretary-general Kofi Annan raised the issue in a controversial opinion piece in *The Economist* and in his opening address to the General Assembly on 20 September 1999.¹⁵ He juxtaposed two concepts of sovereignty: the first oriented around states and the second oriented around people.

Annan offered an evolution to Thomas Hobbes' and classical Westphalian concept of sovereignty, arguing that sovereignty was not becoming less relevant, but that it was the people's sovereignty rather than the concept of sovereignty in customary law that contributes to the power of the state.¹⁶ In other words, the right to sovereignty could only be claimed when the human rights of a state's individuals were protected, and legitimate justification of international intervention for humanitarian reasons could now be based on this revised concept of sovereignty. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) followed this logic with a groundbreaking report in 2001, which specified that state sovereignty implied the responsibility to protect

¹³ Spencer Baraki, "The New Humanitarian Precedent: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Libyan Intervention of 2011," *The Lyceum*, Alberta, September 2011 4-5.

¹⁴ Spencer Baraki, "The New Humanitarian Precedent: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Libyan Intervention of 2011, *The Lyceum*, Alberta, September 2011 4-5.

¹⁵ Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*. (Malden: Polity Press, 2007) 96. Following the Thirty Years War, a European religious conflict that embroiled much of the continent, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the notion of territorial sovereignty as a norm of noninterference in the affairs of other nations, so-called Westphalian sovereignty, even though the actual treaty itself reaffirmed the multiple levels of sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire. This resulted as a natural extension of the older principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (Whose realm, his religion), leaving the Roman Catholic Church with little ability to interfere with the internal affairs of many European states.

¹⁶ Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 96-97.

(R2P).¹⁷ This view was inspired by the desire to repair the UN's reputation from an inability to react to the atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo. The shift in terminology from 'humanitarian intervention' to R2P was endorsed by the 2005 World Summit.

In September 2005, a high-level plenary meeting of the 60th session of the General Assembly with over 160 heads of state and government in attendance, including the US, committed to R2P and gave a clear and unambiguous acceptance of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.¹⁸ Each participating state declared a willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the United Nations Security Council, when peaceful means proved inadequate and national authorities were clearly failing to do so.¹⁹

This was a significant evolution in the norms of the international system, prophesizing a new global paradigm. The new global norms produced a growing emphasis on the moral and ethical duties of a state's "responsibility to protect" not only on their own territory, but also on the sovereign territories of other states. Within this new environment, the use of force for the sake of justice was now accepted and in the self-interest of the state to maintain international stability.

The strategy of undertaking collective action to preserve the peace was not new, but it was a paradigm shift because the global community no longer had a bipolar alliance system to constrain the behavior of smaller weak states.²⁰ When individual states fail to fulfill their R2P through all necessary means, to include the use of force, their legitimacy in the international system is diminished. Subsequently, the institutions that stand at the center of global force management, such as the UN and NATO, bolster the credibility of this new global paradigm by demonstrating standing planning processes, command procedures, and capabilities to execute force affecting the international order.²¹

On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*. The Secretary General's report set the tone

¹⁷ Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 1.

¹⁸ Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 89.

¹⁹ World Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 2005, Paragraphs 138 and 139

²⁰ T. V. Paul, Patrick M Morgan, and James J. Writz, *Complex Deterrence*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009) 17.

²¹ T. V. Paul, Patrick M Morgan, and James J. Writz, *Complex Deterrence*, 324.

for debate and proposed a terminological framework for understanding the Responsibility to Protect by implementing a three-pillar approach.²² Pillar one stresses that States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.²³ Pillar two addresses the commitment of the international community to provide assistance to states in building capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist those that are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.²⁴ Pillar three focuses on the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity when a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations.²⁵

The R2P concept articulates an underlying theme. The international community, writ large, realistically believes it can create a strategy that offers a considerably greater ability to combat mass atrocities through assigning responsibility, offering assistance, and taking timely and decisive action. Although this thesis is primarily concerned with the timely and decisive actions described in pillar three of the R2P concept, a better understanding of the R2P concept in its entirety supports the reader's comprehension and scope of the international response. The balance of political capital has slowly been shifting away from traditional state existentialism and toward a more human-centric approach to security. In this environment, creating the above-mentioned strategy requires concerted thought and coordinated actions beginning at the international level. R2P is a major step in this process. The next step involves the production of strategic guidance defining why intervention or Mass Atrocity Response Operations are in a nation's national interest and guiding political and military leaders toward a viable solution. Many of the current official US strategic documents already present a commitment to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. The next section will take a detailed look at some of this guidance.

²² Report of the UN Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility To Protect*, 12 January 2009.

²³ Report of the UN Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility To Protect*, 12 January 2009 Sect II.

²⁴ Report of the UN Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility To Protect*, 12 January 2009 Sect III.

²⁵ Report of the UN Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility To Protect*, 12 January 2009 Sect IV.

Strategic Guidance

One of the most important tools for military preparedness is national policy, plans, doctrine, and training. The importance of preventing and stopping mass atrocities is already discussed in many of the key US strategic documents, but there is still much to clarify. Under the Peacekeeping and Armed Conflict section of Chapter III—Advancing Our Interests—the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) provides clear policy guidance on preventing mass atrocities. The US acknowledged its commitment to R2P and preventing genocide and mass atrocities:

The United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect.” In so doing, we recognized the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders. The United States is committed to working with its allies, and to strengthening its own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. In the event that prevention fails, the United States will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and, in certain instances, military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.²⁶

Issued by the White House, and among the most important US strategic documents, the National Security Strategy not only confirms US security interest and commitment to prevent and respond, but it outlines a mobilization of its power to enforce the R2P up to and including military means.

In early August 2011, the Obama administration once again showed its commitment to atrocity prevention by mandating the creation of a standing Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) under the presidential study directive 10 (PSD-10). It described the necessity of a whole-of-government approach to mass atrocity prevention and response.²⁷

By institutionalizing the coordination of atrocity prevention, the US

²⁶ United States National Security Strategy, May 2010, 48.

²⁷ Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, (4 August 2011) PSD-10.

ensures that its national security apparatus recognizes and is responsive to early indicators of potential atrocities, departments and agencies develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response strategies in a manner that allows “red flags” and dissent to be raised to decision makers, that we increase the capacity and develop doctrine for our foreign service, armed services, development professionals, and other actors to engage in the full spectrum of smart prevention activities, and that we are optimally positioned to work with our allies in order to ensure that the burdens of atrocity prevention and response are appropriately shared.²⁸

Although these documents identify the US national interest of preventing and responding to mass atrocity situations, they do not provide military strategy themselves.

Another official document with strategic relevance is the 2011 US National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS is issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and delivered to the Secretary of Defense. It briefly outlines the strategic aims that the military will use to advance the enduring US national interests articulated in the National Security Strategy.²⁹ After describing the security environment in which military forces will operate, the NMS report specifies the US national military objectives (ends), operational concepts (ways), and capabilities (means) of the strategy.³⁰

Despite the robust R2P commitment outlined in the 2010 NSS and the direction to use it as guidance, the 2011 National Military Strategy contains very little to specify ends, ways, and means in a MARO. In fact, the words responsibility to protect, mass atrocity, or genocide do not even exist in the document. Perhaps it will take time for these terms to coalesce into strategic guidance, but this highlights a potential problem in the process of turning political expectations into military effects. The 2011 NMS does, however, acknowledge the deeply intertwined US interests with the security and stability of the broader international system and describes its commitment to “reduce the security threat to innocent civilians.”³¹

Similar guidance in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report states that the US must be prepared to respond in support of US national interests, including

²⁸ Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, (4 August 2011) PSD-10.

²⁹ Chairmen, JCS Admiral Michael G. Mullen, US National Military Strategy, 8 February 2011, purpose statement.

³⁰ Chairmen, JCS Admiral Michael G. Mullen, US National Military Strategy, 8 February 2011, purpose statement.

³¹ United States National Military Strategy, 8 February 2011, 10, 12.

“preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.”³² The QDR charts future directions for improving military forces under capability-based planning for a wide variety of situations and is also used as a guide for the NMS.

The 2010 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) takes the previous guidance one step further. In recent years, there has been a flood of documents providing strategic guidance to combatant commanders and their staffs. Since the varied products were released independent of each other, one could characterize the coherency of the collective strategic guidance as less than optimal. Recognizing the inefficiencies of the existing practice of strategic guidance dissemination, DOD consolidated and integrated five separate guidance documents into a single strategic directive, now known as *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF).³³

This classified document provides general planning guidance to combatant commanders for development of campaign and contingency plans. One of the global end states listed in the document declares, “Innocent civilians and vulnerable populations are protected from the threat of mass atrocities or genocide, and foreign authorities are adequately supported to prevent mass atrocities and to mitigate the consequences of catastrophic events.”³⁴ In addition, general planning guidance under “Civilian Protection” directs,

Plans will identify and assess potential significant human rights and civilian protection concerns that could be impacted by USG [United States Government] and/or partner operations. Plan to minimize and mitigate the negative consequences of such operations to civilian populations. Combatant commanders should identify and monitor indications and warnings of potential mass atrocities occurring within their AORs [areas of responsibility]. Planners shall consider the likelihood of, and potential for, executing operations to prevent mass atrocities.³⁵

The 2010 GEF also tasks Combatant Commands to develop priority intelligence

³² United States Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 1 February 2010, vi.

³³ Patrick C. Sweeney, “A Primer for: *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), the *Adaptive Planning and Execution* (APEX) System, and *Global Force Management* (GFM),” (The US Naval War College, 29 July 2011) 1.

³⁴ Guidance for Employment of the Force (U), 2010. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified and quoted from the unclassified Memorandum For the Chief, Joint Staff J-7/JEDD, “Proposed Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations, 5 October 2011.

³⁵ Guidance for Employment of the Force (U), 2010, 5 October 2011.

requirements (PIR) in order to monitor and assess potential mass atrocity situations that may require intervention.³⁶ The GEF provides some useful guidance to begin the planning process; however, it still lacks a comprehensive explanation of the distinctions of a MARO and the differences essential in planning guidance for combatant commanders.

Additional strategic guidance originates from the Department of State. Former Clinton Administration cabinet members Madeleine Albright and William Cohen led a task force that recommended President Obama adopt an American version of the “Responsibility to Protect” that emphasized early prevention, early warning, preventative diplomacy and military action as a last resort. Their report largely echoed the 2001 ICISS R2P report, but went further, detailing gaps in military guidance, planning and doctrine in operations to halt mass atrocities. Despite President George W. Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy calling for military options to stop genocide, the task force “found no clear evidence of corresponding high-level or internal military follow-on guidance to prepare for such a situation, such as within corresponding defense planning scenarios or planning directed either by the Joint Staff or led by the regional commands.”³⁷ In general, this still holds true today; however, one group of individuals set out to change that situation.

Former deputy assistant secretary of defense for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, Sarah Sewall, criticized the Albright/Cohen report, arguing that it focused too much on prevention, but still advocated for similar changes in military guidance and doctrine to prepare forces for a future humanitarian crisis.³⁸ Sewall, in partnership with colleagues Sally Chin, Dwight Raymond, and officers representing the Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, produced a handbook advocating for adoption of MARO as a core mission for the military to organize, train and equip.³⁹ One of the key goals of the handbook was to “develop a widely shared understanding of the specific and unique aspects of mass atrocities and genocide and to

³⁶ Guidance for Employment of the Force (U), 2010, 5 October 2011.

³⁷ Albright and Cohen., *Preventing Genocide*, 78.

³⁸ Sarah Sewall, “From Prevention to Response,” in *Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington: World Peace Foundation, 2010) 159-174.

³⁹ Sarah Sewall, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Author of MARO Handbook, (address, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

create a common military approach to addressing these challenges.”⁴⁰

Gaps remain in the strategic understanding of the challenges that genocide and mass atrocities pose. For example, developing appropriate ways to anticipate and address civilian protection with respect to safe areas, NFZs, intelligence collection, target selection, and appropriate use of force.⁴¹ Missing is the guidance that directs the DOD to identify which tasks may be useful or critical, how these tasks should be organized into a coherent strategy to achieve the specific objective, and the requirements for resourcing the mission.⁴² Joint Capstone Doctrine JP 3-0 issued in 2011 and Army Capstone Document, FM 3-0 issued in 2008 (Change 1 issued 2011) provides adequate guidance at the operational level to accomplish most missions related to the prevention and response to mass atrocities on the ground. Neither document mentions “mass atrocities” but tasks required by forces in a MARO such as the maintenance of safe areas, provision of humanitarian aid, and traditional combat operations are woven into these documents. However, none of these documents offer specific tactics, techniques, or procedures regarding the protection of affected civilians in conflict or how to identify and prosecute perpetrators of mass atrocity from an airpower perspective. Despite the limited discussion of exclusion (No-Fly) zones in Air Force doctrine, airpower doctrine is severely lacking in the explanation of its role in the protection of civilians.

The Joint Peace Operations Publication JP 3-07.3 will soon include a new appendix introducing MARO as a concept into Joint Doctrine; however, the draft appendix is still very ground centric. If airpower is likely to be the first and most commonly used tool in a MARO, then it follows that these issues must be addressed.

This brief review of official US strategic documents demonstrates the concerns posed by mass atrocity situations are officially acknowledged. However, Albright, Cohen, and Sewall all argue that the need for responsive capabilities and coordination to implement such a strategy has not yet been articulated.⁴³ A great deal of time and effort has been devoted to preparing strategic frameworks for defense and security planning,

⁴⁰ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 9.

⁴¹ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 79.

⁴² Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 79.

⁴³ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, and Sarah Sewall, “From Prevention to Response,” in *Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington: World Peace Foundation, 2010), 159-174.

and therefore, many of the basic ingredients for a Mass Atrocity Response Operations strategy already exist. The task is to bring political and military leaders together to comprehend the distinctions of a MARO, create a broader understanding of what atrocity response operations might require, and present options to deal with them in the future if directed to act. History, doctrine, and the 2010 MARO Military Planning Handbook define some of the fundamental terms that serve as a foundation for Mass Atrocity Response Operations discussion, planning, and execution. In order to create a dialogue for strategic political and military agreement, it is critical to speak the same language.

Definitions and the Lexicon of Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)

While every situation of mass killing is unique and requires a tailored response, some common themes and distinctions have important implications for political and military planning and execution during an intervention.⁴⁴ Developing a common lexicon within MARO discussions facilitates a better comprehension of these distinctions and implications that can facilitate advance planning and training for future options and operations. Some common terms applied in past US interventions involving loss of civilian life or mass suffering are: genocide, mass murder, extermination, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The loss of life was the result of either purposeful violence or the willful neglect of basic needs. Often the aim of an atrocity is “ethnic cleansing” through killing, rape or displacement, though the victim group may be targeted because of religious or other characteristics. For purposes of this thesis, we further develop the character and definitions of Mass Atrocity Response Operations. We start by defining an atrocity as an *implicitly or explicitly political, direct, and deliberate violent action resulting in the death of noncombatant civilians*.⁴⁵

The victims’ status as noncombatant civilians is a critical element of virtually all conceptions of an atrocity. “Any unarmed individual who is not a member of a professional or guerrilla military group and who does not actively participate in hostilities by intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or property” defines a

⁴⁴ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 7.

⁴⁵ Jay Ulfelder, and Philip Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*. Data Collection Report, (Lawarence: Political Instability Task Force, 2009) 3.

non-combatant.⁴⁶ The conception of noncombatant civilians, however, does not include individuals killed while engaged in acts of violent crime, such as rioting, brawling, or looting.⁴⁷ Nor do atrocities depend on the racial, ethnic, religious, or political status of the victims, despite the justification of the perpetrators—only their status as noncombatants.⁴⁸

Building on these definitions, the MARO Military Planning Handbook defines a Mass Atrocity Response Operation as, “a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants.” The identification of the involvement of a state or non-state as the perpetrator is one of the most critical elements in determining strategic guidance and military objectives. A “state perpetrator” explicitly identifies the perpetrators as employees of a state agency such as members of the armed forces, the police, other official security forces, or any other government agency of the state in which the event occurred.⁴⁹ “Non-state, state sanctioned perpetrators” are identified as members of a non-state organization or group with purported state support or state sanction.⁵⁰ “Non-State, non-state sanctioned perpetrators” are identified as members of a non-state organization or group where there is no claim of state support or sanction for their actions.⁵¹ The ability to intervene in a situation where a non-state perpetrator can be isolated from the state makes the latter a much easier situation to handle. A complete definition is not without distinctions.

The MARO military planning handbook offers three separate distinctions from similar established military missions, such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Peace Operations, and Counterinsurgency through differences. First, unlike traditional warfare between enemy and friendly forces, a MARO has a multiparty

⁴⁶ Ulfelder and Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*, 3.

⁴⁷ Ulfelder and Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*, 3.

⁴⁸ Ulfelder and Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*, 3.

⁴⁹ Ulfelder and Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*, 12.

⁵⁰ Ulfelder and Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*, 12.

⁵¹ Ulfelder and Schrodt, *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook*, 12.

dynamic between the perpetrators, the victims, the intervener and other interested actors such as bystanders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or media.⁵² These complex interactions complicate planning and operations, making them difficult to predict.⁵³ Second, there is an illusion of impartiality, where the intervener's stated goal of protecting civilians is interpreted by the perpetrator as an alliance with the victims in an internal conflict and perceived as anything but impartial.⁵⁴ Finally, the creation of an asymmetry of timelines, where mass killing can quickly intensify and expand while the international community's typical slow response to intervene creates an escalatory dynamic that is unique to a MARO.⁵⁵

The complexity of a globalized environment, the difficulty in predicting the onset of mass atrocities, and the unintended consequences of military intervention highlight the necessity for prior planning and preparation for a Mass Atrocity Response Operation. Because it is in a perpetrator's interest to quickly execute a mass atrocity before the international community can respond, the typical escalatory attempts at economic and diplomatic options, although not without merit, may come too late to save lives. A MARO, particularly a "preventive" response, is likely to require rapid and adaptive planning and decision-making. The rapid escalation of mass atrocities suggests the importance of speed over mass, putting a premium on highly mobile forces such as transport, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, and lethal force options.⁵⁶ Within the realm of the military, there is no power better suited for speed in a MARO than airpower. Airpower offers speed over mass, but it also offers the "power of witness."⁵⁷ The shameful nature of mass atrocities suggests the potential to deter violence against civilians by simply letting the perpetrator know the world is watching them through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). In addition to this deterrent effect, an early political request for the "power of witness" also offers intelligence that could be critical to identifying the perpetrators from victims if violence continues to escalate.

⁵² Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 17.

⁵³ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 17.

⁵⁴ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 17-18.

⁵⁵ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 18.

⁵⁶ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 18.

⁵⁷ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 18.

Subsequently, one of the most important questions related to MARO planning is the political expectations of the intervening force. Do political leaders expect the intervening force to simply stop the killing and provide whatever emergency assistance it can until a relative stability, legitimacy, and social contract has been restored?⁵⁸ Or is the force expected to sustain its efforts beyond the cessation of the killing, to include regime change, the provision of services, and the restoration of governance?⁵⁹ These are perhaps the two most critical questions decision makers must ask themselves prior to offering strategic guidance to their military leaders. There are significant challenges for either approach, yet the choice makes an enormous difference for airpower's planning and targeting in a MARO.

As a prelude to the historical case studies, it is important to understand the analytical framework used to provide consistent examination throughout the three studies selected. The following method brings uniformity in an effort to compare the findings with the most recent MARO in Libya.

Historical Case Study Framework

All conflict is unique to and shaped by its specific context. There is no such thing as a “standard” Mass Atrocity Response Operation. This means that there is no standard set of metrics, benchmarks, or operational tasks that apply to all MAROs. Although the nature of war is timeless, its character changes because perpetrators of mass atrocity are not limited to specific means or methods, but instead they make the best of the available tools they have to suit their environment.

The *nature* of war has not changed since the days of classic theorists Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Clausewitz wrote, “All wars are things of the same nature.”⁶⁰ On the first page of *On War* Clausewitz says, “War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”⁶¹ “War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”⁶² If the nature of war has not changed, its character has. Webster’s definition of nature refers to a “thing’s essence” or essential qualities.⁶³ The nature of war refers to constant, universal, and inherent

⁵⁸ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 19.

⁵⁹ Sewall, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, 19.

⁶⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 90, 606.

⁶¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

⁶² Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

⁶³ Merriam Webster Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com> (accessed 16 Apr 2012).

qualities that ultimately define war throughout the ages, such as violence, chance, luck, friction, and uncertainty. Hence, the nature of war is timeless regardless of the changes in the political environment, the cause of a war, or technological advances.⁶⁴ The character of war refers to those transitory, circumstantial, and adaptive features that account for the different periods of warfare.⁶⁵ Primarily sociopolitical and historical conditions or technological advances determine these features within a certain era or conflict.

In this sense, the nature of warfare is different from its character.⁶⁶ The character of war, or rather its style, is a constantly changing phenomenon. For example, conflict in a MARO is clearly different from that in World War II. However, during actual conflict, many policy makers and military planners perceive they are confronting a single phenomenon instead of a series of intertwined problems that evolve the character of the conflict over time. By analyzing a “MARO-like” case using hindsight, one can see lessons from a completely different perspective. The historical MARO case studies begin by presenting background to provide context for the conflict. A constant framework for historical analysis provides similar ways of collecting, organizing, and analyzing data to gather comprehensive and systematic information about each case to determine its character.

The analytical framework used in this thesis examines three historical case studies using the chronological “process of violence” premise presented in Madeleine Albright and William Cohen’s Book *Preventing Genocide*. Breaking down the escalatory process of violence into these five distinctive phases allows for a detailed analysis of airpower’s effect within this escalatory process to gain leverage across the spectrum of violence. First, it is important to consider the “process of violence” that leads to mass atrocities. Albright and Cohen offer a five-phase spectrum in the “process of violence.” Figure 1 depicts a visual description of this model useful as a military planning tool to identify interruption points

⁶⁴ Michael Sheehan, “The Changing Character of War,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 216.

⁶⁵ Sheehan, *The Changing Character of War*, 216.

⁶⁶ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 19.




Figure 1: Process of Violence: A Military Planning Tool

Source: Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

The process begins with the breakdown of the “social contract,” which leads to “political uncertainty”. The Chinese concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which is reflected in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 1762 social contract, states a government derives its authority and legitimacy through service to its people.⁶⁷ The social contract breaks down when a government fails to protect its population or, worse, becomes the perpetrator of crimes, creating political uncertainty. This “political uncertainty” leads to “group mobilization” when leaders judge that a target group seriously threatens their intent to keep, gain power, or impose an ideology and they are able to manipulate and mobilize potential perpetrators.⁶⁸ The “killing begins” when popular support or complacency creates a group of core members that take up arms and possess the organizational and

⁶⁷ William A. Levinson, “Responsibility to Protect (R2P): White Man’s Burden Redux,” *American Thinker*, 28 April 2011, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/04/responsibility_to_protect_r2p.html (Accessed 4 March 2012).

⁶⁸ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

physical capability to kill.⁶⁹ Finally, “mass killing” commences when leaders see genocide as the way to prevail in an ideological, political, or military contest and the target group is unable to defend itself.⁷⁰ At this point, the only way to stop the mass atrocities is an intervention to disrupt the killing or for the perpetrators to achieve their goals. This “process of violence” provides a chronological approach to analyze the MARO historical case studies.

As decision-makers and military leaders draw on their own images of conflict, it is important to examine how desired effects match airpower expectations within the historical context of each phase of violence. The cardinal error that political leaders or military commanders commit, according to Clausewitz, is misunderstanding the kind of war about to be undertaken and ensuring that the means applied is suited to the desired ends.⁷¹ By comparing historical airpower targeting effects across the escalatory process of violence with interviews and sources from political and military leaders identifying expectations of a military intervention, the effectiveness of specific airpower options in a MARO begin to emerge.

During analysis, it is important to remember that airpower offers many tools other than the traditionally conceived lethal options. These include airlift for humanitarian aid, movement of aid workers, medical and refugee evacuations, and communications, as well as tools for the “power of witness” such as Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and psychological operations. Although much of this thesis is focused on the lethal, ISR, and information capabilities of airpower, when one contemplates what airpower could do in an intervention, it is important to think across the entire spectrum to include both lethal and non-lethal, air, space and cyber capabilities.

The two primary historical case studies examined, the Bosnia (Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force) and the Kosovo conflict (Operation Allied Force) identify the perpetrators of violence as explicitly associated with the state. These cases were selected because they are examples of Western-led operations that sought to protect civilians and stop mass atrocities. Taken as a whole, each historical case study demonstrates the important relationship between the political objectives or expectations

⁶⁹ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

⁷⁰ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

⁷¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

and airpower's individual targeting options and effects. The compounding effects created by airpower ultimately lead to the achievement of the strategic objectives and broad political strategy. In the end, the historical case studies are compared to the 2011 military intervention in Libya to draw the connections between airpower expectations, strategy, targeting options and the ultimate success of a Mass Atrocity Response Operation.

Chapter 2 builds on the R2P, strategic guidance, and common lexicon presented earlier to develop political expectations of a MARO. Beginning with an examination of the No-Fly Zone (NFZ) operations in Bosnia, we observe some of the complexities involved in the political crafting and military interpretation of strategic guidance. This is especially important because a misinterpretation of political strategic guidance by the military can lead to vastly different outcomes from what was expected. Additionally, using the Bosnia NFZ and Operation Deliberate Force (ODF), a summary of political rhetoric prior to the Libya intervention in 2011, and interviews with political officials and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), we determine the expectations and objectives decision makers want to produce from a MARO when a choice to intervene has been made.

Chapter 2

Airpower Rhetoric and Expectation Management of a Military Intervention

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

— Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Military operations must be understood as part of a broader political strategy.

When a Mass Atrocity Response Operation’s primary objective is the protection of civilians, military leaders must calculate options, effects, and targeting differently than if the objective was something else such as regime change. Additionally, important contextual factors such as the physical environment, the nature of the perpetrators, and the historical significance of the conflict should be captured in an environmental analysis.¹ With these considerations in mind, airpower’s limited assets must be allocated to influence the operational environment in a way that will affect the overall political objectives within the broad political strategy most effectively. This requires an accurate interpretation of the broad political objectives by military leaders and planners.

Guidance provided by policymakers should contain clear expectations of what they want the military to accomplish. A sufficiently broad policy must translate into a sound strategy that can be used to propose policy recommendations. If guidance is too broad, the insidious tendency exists for military operations to develop momentum that forces policy to adjust to the new reality created by military actions. If the guidance is too narrow, the military is either so restricted that it cannot effectively carry out the operation or it is forced to “bend the guidance” to match overall objectives. Ultimately, a strategy for a MARO must include the management of expectations and accurate interpretations on both sides of policy.

Recent humanitarian operations have been characterized by policy recommendations focused on operational tasks founded in historical rhetoric. Rather than clear strategic objectives and expectations, these policies promote a strategy of hope based on past-perceived operational successes. This is particularly evident with airpower recommendations and is exemplified by blanket policy endorsements for NFZs in recent

¹ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 81.

humanitarian interventions that effectively exemplify a MARO. The NFZ recommended and established in Bosnia demonstrates this process of political expectation, military interpretation, and creation of military effects.

Militarily, NFZs—as their title states—are designed to prevent specific flights within a geographic area. This function could be important as a means to support another operational end such as humanitarian aid missions or the monitoring of humanitarian crises. To these operational “ends,” accomplished with sufficient “means,” subject to reasonable constraints, NFZs have been relatively successful.² Unfortunately, claims by some political leaders equate NFZs to a “means” of enforcing “ends” that they have difficulty doing without the support of ground troops, such as embargoes or holding ground to protect civilians in safe areas or cities.³ By analyzing history, one can see clearly, specifically with respect to MAROs, that military leaders must manage expectations with honest feedback of airpower’s capabilities and limitations within the specific context of a conflict, while political leaders must understand and either reduce the constraints on airpower or its expectations.

No-Fly Zones are generally supported by political leaders and opposed by military leaders.⁴ In a MARO, political leaders generally recognize the necessity of speed over mass. The expectation of airpower’s ability to execute a quick and low-cost operation is a seductive lure. Additionally, there are few adverse domestic political consequences to enforcing a NFZ, and to most political leaders, a NFZ presents resolve and a commitment to the protection of civilians.⁵ However, NFZs alone do not protect civilians unless the perpetrators are using aircraft to execute their attacks.

There have been many NFZs enacted over the past 20 years for a variety of reasons beginning in Iraq with Operation NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH (ONW and OSW) in 1991. Until ODF in the Balkans, NFZ’s served their intended purpose, but ODF differed in many respects from previous operations. ODF was more than a NFZ. As former commander of ONW Major General David Deptula described it,

² Major William M. Tart, “No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions,” (SAASS Master’s thesis 1 June 2001), 18.

³ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 18.

⁴ Micah, Zenko, *Between Threats and War: US Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) 120.

⁵ Zenko, *Between Threats and War: US Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World*, 120.

the ODF no-fly zone went further to “influencing events on the ground through airpower” than had others.⁶

Although the term “No-Fly Zone” exists in doctrine, it is not a doctrinal term; rather it evolved from the term “exclusion zone.” Joint Publication 3-0 describes an “exclusion zone” as a “zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area in order to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or the use or threat of force.”⁷ It continues, “Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land (no-drive zones).”⁸ Since no specific definition of a NFZ exists, Major William Tart’s examination of NFZs offered a practical description that combines doctrinal definitions and historical characteristics of past NFZs. A No-Fly Zone is, “A defined area where specific flight by an entity is prohibited or controlled by a sanctioning body. No-Fly Zones are an intrusive tool of foreign policy, which can be tailored by the National Command Authority (NCA) in pursuit of US national security objectives. Objectives of no-fly zones range from solving immediate challenges that require security or deterrence to maintaining a long-term US engagement posture in accordance with the National Security Strategy.”⁹

Given this doctrinal guidance, even as expanded by Major Tart, the establishment and sustainment of a NFZ implies certain limited airpower tasks, functions, and effects to “prohibit or control specific flight in a defined area.”¹⁰ These tasks would require allocation of airpower for combat air patrols to control the air through counter-air operations. In addition, airpower would be allocated to suppress the enemy air defenses by attacking radar, surface-to-air missile (SAM), and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites. Targeting assets on the ground not associated with gaining and maintaining air superiority goes beyond the tasks necessary to accomplish the NFZ mission, essentially adding new missions requiring additional resources and methods. However, a number of interviews with policy makers in Washington DC and New York indicate the term, “No-

⁶ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 122.

⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations 11 Aug 2011, GL-9.

⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations 11 Aug 2011, V-13.

⁹ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 124.

¹⁰ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, Summary of the specific tasks in Major Tart’s NFZ definition.

“Fly Zone” produces fundamentally different expectations—notably, the ability for a NFZ to do much more than they are designed to do.¹¹ Extracting lessons from airpower operations in Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 concerning political expectations and airpower rhetoric demonstrates that many challenges in current Mass Atrocity Response Operations thinking still remain.

Initially, ODF was implemented to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina in an attempt to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid by NGOs to isolated civilian concentrations from Serbian air attack. The operations was conceived in part because of similarities to the conflict two years earlier in Northern Iraq, when images broadcast by the international media of Kurdish “ethnic cleansing” drove reluctant political leaders down the road toward a “do something” strategy.¹² Following the disastrous Somali mission in 1993, the US was increasingly weary of humanitarian intervention using American troops.¹³ As a result of the air campaign successes in Operation Desert Storm, airpower rhetoric created the perception of a low-cost, low risk solution.¹⁴ On this point, Eliot Cohen described this perception when he compared airpower’s acquired seductiveness following Desert Strom to a modern teenage romance in its seeming propensity to offer political leaders a sense of “gratification without commitment.”¹⁵ Airpower rhetoric remained strong with both international and US political leaders as the US “refused to send troops into Bosnia until a ‘peace’ had been established.”¹⁶

¹¹ Statement based on a number of interviews with political leaders and NGOs in New York and Washington D.C. in January 2012.

¹² Adrian Johnson, “‘Do Something’ is not a Strategy,” *RUSI*, <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D834B8C9DBFF/> (accessed 22 March 2012). Operation Northern Watch’s repelled Iraqi air attacks on the Kurds in an attempt to prevent the more atrocities against the Iraqi Kurds. Between February and September 1988, 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds were killed by Saddam’s regime with chemical weapons.

¹³ Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 27-28.

¹⁴ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 232. Operation Desert Storm was the overwhelmingly air centric 1991 invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Forty-eight hours after the air initial attacks against Iraq began, US aircraft armed with precision-guided bombs, operating in tandem with preprogrammed cruise missiles, rendered Iraq’s civilian and military leadership all but deaf, dumb and blind. By the time the coalition launched its ground offensive on February 24, the Iraqi army could scarcely defend itself, much less take meaningful offensive action against its enemy. Operation Desert Storm signified the “promise” of airpower.

¹⁵ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 232.

¹⁶ Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) 103.

As the operation evolved, the UN authorized NATO to fly additional missions providing close air support (CAS) to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) soldiers on the ground, if requested, and to protect UN designated safe areas. Politically, ODF capitalized on airpower rhetoric to demonstrate NATO, UN, and US resolve and get more forcefully involved in ending the deadly ethnic fighting in Europe. Militarily, ODF evolved from an easily defined deterrent operation toward a more coercive use of airpower ultimately culminating in Operation Deliberate Force; an 11 day bombing campaign in reaction to atrocities committed in the safe areas the UN vowed to protect.

Bosnia Historical Context

The “process of violence” that erupted in the Balkans during the 1990s was seventeen hundred years in the making.¹⁷ In 285, the emperor Diocletian divided the vast Roman Empire in half simply for administrative purposes. The new Eastern capital was at Byzantium, later Constantinople, while the Western capital remained in Rome. During the 11th century, the old Roman world that had embraced Christianity divided over ideological issues with the Orthodox Church forming in Constantinople and the seat of the Catholic Church remaining in Rome.¹⁸ This fissure effectively created a religious and ethnic fault line in the Balkans with primarily Christianity in the West and Islam in the East.

On 28 June 1389, the Ottomans swept through the Balkan Peninsula from Turkey defeating the Serbians at Kosovo-Polje.¹⁹ This humiliating defeat represented the start of five hundred years of domination of the Serbians by the Ottoman Empire. The battle of Kosovo-Polje is the most important event in Serbian history, not because the Serbians lost, but because Kosovo-Polje ushered in a dark epoch of Ottoman oppression of Serbs. To this day, the Serbians take great pride in having emerged from that period with their language, culture, and values intact and, ironically, draw great strength and inspiration

¹⁷ Michael O. Beale, “Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia Herzegovina,” (SAAS Master’s thesis June 1996). The general historical context follows Beale’s ideas of Balkan history. Specifically, chapters’ 1 and 2.

¹⁸ “Black History,” *The Economist*, 22 August 1992, 36. General historical context follows thesis by Michael O. Beale.

¹⁹ Robert C. Owen, *Deliberate Force: a Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning: Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000), 7.

from their subjugation.²⁰ Serbian resistance during this time is a romantic part of their identity, much like the American Revolution remains a part of United States'.

Geography, which has played such a large part in the history of the Balkans, was especially significant in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Turkish, the word “balkan” means “mountain chain” and it is an accurate description of the area.²¹ Bosnia-Herzegovina is physically isolated from much of the land around it, bounded on the North by the Sava River, the East by the Drina River, and the West by the Dinaric Alps, which run from Austria through Greece. In 1463, the Ottomans finally conquered Bosnia-Herzegovina after their relentless march up the peninsula.²² They offered the Bosnians land, tax relief, education, and jobs in exchange for adopting the Muslim faith.²³ Most Bosnians converted. For the next five hundred years, the majority of wealthy landowners, military officers, and politicians within Bosnia practiced the Muslim religion and commanded a peasant class of Serb Orthodox serfs.²⁴

From the 15th to the 19th century, many of the Serbs who did not convert to Islam left the land under Ottoman rule and settled farther North in the Krajina—ethnic enclave—in Southern Croatia and Northern Bosnia.²⁵ This essentially created a buffer zone between the Hapsburg (latter-day Austro-Hungarian) Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The Hapsburgs sought fortified garrisons in southern Croatia and Hungary in order to hold back the Turks. They offered tax relief, release from feudal obligations, and freedom from religious persecution to the Serb settlers.²⁶ In exchange, the settlers in the

²⁰ Jim Moody, US Representative, US Congress, (testimony, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Civil Strife in Yugoslavia*), 21 February 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991) 43.

²¹ Encarta Dictionary, <http://www.webcitation.org/5kwPqi7mD>, (accessed on 19 March 2012).

²² Markus Koller and Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril*, (University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).

²³ Richard Frucht, ed. *Eastern Europe: an Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture / Edited by Richard Frucht*. 3 vols. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2005. 633

²⁴ Glenn E. Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*. (Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992) 22. Many Bosnians, both converted Muslims and Serbs, were also employed as Janissaries, an elite fighting force, within the Ottoman system.

²⁵ Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*, 23.

²⁶ Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*, 24.

Krajina provided a permanent military force. Noted for their fierce nature and fighting skills, the Krajina Serbs did their job well.²⁷

To balance the growing influence of the newly independent rival state of Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908.²⁸ Since the Muslim-dominated Bosnian bureaucratic apparatus was already in place to administer the country, Vienna kept it in power. The tension created by Vienna's annexation of Bosnia finally broke when Bosnian Serb nationalists assassinated Archduke Ferdinand of Austria while he was visiting Sarajevo on the anniversary of Kosovo-Polje in 1914.²⁹ Historians credit this event with triggering a chain reaction of alliance support, which ultimately led to World War I.

Serbian soldiers fought on the Allied side during the First World War. Over one hundred thousand Serb soldiers perished in the punishing winter retreat as they were forced to abandon their country, but they were never truly defeated.³⁰ Two years later, the Serbs fought back up the peninsula as part of an Allied army driving back the Central Powers in the Balkans.³¹ When the war ended, the Austro-Hungarian Empire no longer existed, leaving a power vacuum in a region filled with starving Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. The Serb Army was the only local force strong enough to restore order. Although ethnically diverse and without a history of living together under the same government, the "Southern Slavs" developed a collective security that countered potential threats from western Europe, Russia, or Turkey.³² Thus, in late 1918, the Allied victors recognized the new state of Yugoslavia, officially called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."³³

The state of Yugoslavia was constructed from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the independent Allied states of Serbia and Montenegro, themselves

²⁷ Alexandra Stiglmayer, "The War in the Former Yugoslavia," in *Mass Rape*, edited by Alexandra Stiglmayer, (Lincoln, NE., University of Nebraska Press, 1994) 4.

²⁸ Brian Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*. (Boston, MA.: David R. Godine, 1994) 68.

²⁹ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 173.

³⁰ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 71.

³¹ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 72.

³² Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998), 8.

³³ Spencer Tucker, *Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social, and Military History*. (Santa Barbara, California, USA: ABC-CLIO, 2005) 1189.

apportioned from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century.³⁴ In the latter twentieth century, although they still looked similar to each other and spoke dialects of the same root language, centuries of divide-and-rule policies of the Ottoman and Hapsburg overlords, internal migration, differing religious ideas, and wars had divided Bosnians into distinct—though geographically intermixed—communities of faith and culture.³⁵ Ethnic conflict in the region appeared inevitable.

In Yugoslavia, the Serbs were a majority in the population; the other groups felt dominated by them. The Croats and Slovenes, in particular, saw themselves as better educated and more cultured than the Serbs, and bitterly resented Serbian domination.³⁶ By contrast, the Serbs argued that they had liberated the Croats and Slovenes at a great cost in Serbian blood.³⁷ Yugoslavia was on the brink of civil war when Adolph Hitler invaded in 1941. Hitler exploited these ethnic tensions masterfully. After less than two weeks of fighting, Yugoslavia capitulated to the Germans, who recorded only 558 casualties.³⁸

The period between 1941-1945 was a particularly bloody one in Yugoslav history and is a central factor in much of the modern day fighting in Bosnia. After the Germans subdued the Balkans they moved on to their greater objective—Operation Barbarossa—the conquest of the Soviet Union. The Third Reich annexed Slovenia and created the “Independent State of Croatia,” which encompassed both Croatia and Bosnia.³⁹ The Croatian Revolutionary Movement (Ustase) served as Croatian foot soldiers. Along with several German and Italian divisions, they were responsible for security in the region. The Ustase initiated a program of genocide against the Krajina Serbs and eliminated almost three quarters of a million Serbs during their four-year reign.⁴⁰ Ante Pavelic, the “Fuhrer” of Croatia, had a recipe for fixing the Serb problem in Croatia: “One third must

³⁴ Owen, *Deliberate Force: a Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning: Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study*, 1.

³⁵ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 7.

³⁶ Alan Palmer, “Operation Punishment” in B. H. Liddell Hart, *The History of the Second World War, Part 17*, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1973) 374.

³⁷ Palmer, *The History of the Second World War Part 17*, 374.

³⁸ Palmer, *The History of the Second World War Part 1*, 375.

³⁹ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 8.

⁴⁰ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 132.

be converted to Catholicism, one third must leave, and one third must die.”⁴¹ Even German officers were repulsed by Croatian concentration camps and were generally disgusted with the Ustase’s treatment of their fellow Slavs.⁴²

Josep Broz Tito led a partisan group countering the Ustase and Germans. Tito, the son of a Croat father and Slovene mother, proved to be a skilled leader. His power base increased throughout the war and through superior organization and brutal partisan tactics, Tito kept thirteen Axis divisions tied down in the country.⁴³ Ironically, most of the fighting in Bosnia was among the various indigenous groups.⁴⁴ By the end of the war 1.7 million people, 11% of Yugoslavia’s pre-war population was dead.⁴⁵ Tito came out of World War II with the difficult objective of maintaining Yugoslavia together as a nation. He used communism and the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” to refocus ethnic differences on a common ideology and he liquidated most of those responsible for the genocide within Yugoslavia during the war years.⁴⁶

The Yugoslavian communities generally lived at peace when times were good and the federal government was strong. However, when times were tough and the central government weakened, as was the case during the economic and political crisis of the 1980s, ethnic loyalties regained preeminent importance for enough Bosnians to orient political competition and widespread violence along communal—rather than ideological, economic, or class—lines.⁴⁷ Particularly following Tito’s death in 1980, as both Yugoslavia’s economy and Communism declined, Slovenia and Croatia pressed for more autonomy from a Serbia which was insisting on tighter central control. The stage was set for a long developing ethnic conflict within the context of a political struggle for power and legitimacy. However, the political struggle led to more than just a civil war; it led to ethnic cleansing and mass killing.

Airpower Within The “Process of Violence” in Bosnia

⁴¹ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 23.

⁴² Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*, 38.

⁴³ Phyllis Auty, “The Rise of Tito,” in *The History of the Second World War Part 50*, 1393.

⁴⁴ Auty, *The History of the Second World War Part 50*, 1393.

⁴⁵ Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*, 42.

⁴⁶ Auty, *The History of the Second World War Part 50*, 1393.

⁴⁷ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 7.

The “process of violence” in the Balkans during the 1990s began with the breakdown of the “social contract.” The breakdown of the ethnic “social contract” that emerged as a predominant theme of Bosnian politics in the latter 1980s was to some degree the consequence of the manipulations of federal and provincial politicians. Indeed, the “process of violence” in the Bosnian conflict had its tangible beginnings in the demagoguery of Slobadan Milosevic. In 1987, Milosevic left Belgrade to investigate an Albanian charge of human rights violations by the minority Serbs in Kosovo.⁴⁸ Instead of validating the charge, he sided with his brother Serbs, who felt they were being mistreated, and made a famous speech that propelled him to ultimate leadership within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Milosevic told the Serbs in Kosovo that he would not allow them to be treated as minorities within their own country. The phrase “You will not be beaten again,” became his battle cry.⁴⁹ The outcry that this caused within the multi-ethnic Yugoslav government opened Pandora’s box of nationalist aspirations within the various republics, and is generally cited as the flash point for the break-up of Yugoslavia.⁵⁰ Consequently, Milosevic’s public statements representing the Yugoslavia government began a breakdown of the “social contract” to protect its citizens and the transition toward the second phase of “political uncertainty” within the Balkan region further fueling the “process of violence.”

Maneuvering for power, Milosevic began using his position as president of the Yugoslavian League of Communists as a platform to generate pride and paranoia in the Serb community.⁵¹ His speech in Kosovo re-awakened the old dream of a “Greater Serbia” with Milosevic providing the leadership, which rapidly escalated “political uncertainty.”⁵² Kosta Pecanac, the leader of the Chetniks in the 1920s and ‘30s, had

⁴⁸ *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Television Documentary, January 1996. Milosevic, a Communist Party protégé to the collective president, Stombolic went to Kosovo to investigate alleged human rights violations being directed against the Albanians. He also agreed to listen to the complaints of Serb minorities there, and actually staged a riot to coincide with this meeting. When he, as a party member, acknowledged and spoke out for Serb rights, he violated the Communist doctrine espousing “Brotherhood and Unity” among the various ethnic groups and enflamed nationalist Serbs passions. In the Tito era, this was taboo, but with Yugoslavia sliding into economic turmoil, it was a powder keg waiting to explode or be exploited and Milosevic did this.

⁴⁹ *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Television Documentary, January 1996.

⁵⁰ *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Television Documentary, January 1996.

⁵¹ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 8.

⁵² Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 300.

originally formulated the dream of a modern Greater Serbia.⁵³ Their ideology only recognized the Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian nations, which would be ruled in a centralized state under Serb leadership.⁵⁴ Greater Serbia would include “old Serbia,” Bosnia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Batschka, the Barrat, the Sandzak, approximately half of Croatia and some Bulgarian and Romanian border areas.⁵⁵ The remaining area of Yugoslavia would consist of a federation.⁵⁶ In order to “Serbianize” this new country, the Chetniks would forcibly move or “ethnically cleanse” 2.5 million Yugoslavs from greater Serbia and resettle 1.3 million Serbs from non-Serb territory.⁵⁷ In this way, Greater Serbia would constitute about two-thirds of the population and territory of Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ Milosevic rekindled this “Greater Serbia” dream among his people, as Yugoslavia’s economy and Communist ideology began collapsing in the late 1980s, and consequently escalated the “process of violence” toward “group mobilization.” Until this point airpower was not used, but that would change.

Croatia and Slovenia held presidential elections early in 1990 for the first time in over fifty years, citing irreconcilable differences over the political direction of Yugoslavia.⁵⁹ In April 1990, voting prevailed along ethnic lines, contributing to the election of independence minded Franjo Tudjman as president of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic as president of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁰ Tudjman’s own Croatian nationalism and solicitation of symbols from Croatia’s brief independence caused fear among the Croatian Serbs.⁶¹ As political uncertainty grew, Milosevic’s nationalist rhetoric stirred Serbian groups living in the *Krajina* of southwestern Croatia and in a number of smaller *Krajinas* in Bosnia. By mid-1990, Croatian Serbs were committing acts of defiance and limited violence against the Croatian government in protest to the election of Tudjman.⁶² As the confrontation escalated, Tudjman’s new government sent in helicopters carrying

⁵³ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 9.

⁵⁴ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 9.

⁵⁵ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 9.

⁵⁶ Hall, *The Impossible Country. A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, 9.

⁵⁷ Michael O. Beale, “Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia Herzegovina,” (SAAS Master’s thesis June 1996), 15.

⁵⁸ O. Beale, *Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia Herzegovina*, 15.

⁵⁹ Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 124.

⁶⁰ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, 124.

⁶¹ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 8.

⁶² Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 9.

Special Forces to suppress the budding rebellion.⁶³ In an attempt to flex his military power, Milosevic directed Yugoslav Air Force MiG fighters to intercept the helicopters and turn them back, effectively creating the appearance of a NFZ to deter attacks on Croatian Serbs.⁶⁴ In this, the first application of airpower of the Balkan conflict, the “process of violence” progressed toward Milosevic’s overwhelming capability to organize and create a core group willing to take up arms, finalizing the “group mobilization” phase. The nationalist idea of a “Greater Serbia,” coupled with the capability and will to act, made Milosevic and the Yugoslav military a dangerous enemy.

In an apparent bid for hegemony, Kosovo, then Vojvodina, lost their autonomous status when Milosevic used his strong arm tactics, threatening those who spoke out against reintegration of the two provinces within Serbia.⁶⁵ Slovenian representatives and later the Croatian delegates saw through Serbia’s tactics to gain political leverage at the expense of the other republics and walked out of the Communist Party Congress in 1991.⁶⁶

In the summer of 1991, the former Yugoslavia fractured along ethnic lines when the provinces of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Serbian-controlled government. Almost immediately, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), comprised mainly of Serbians, attacked, allegedly to protect the Serb minorities and maintain order. However, what followed was a rapid escalation through the “killing begins” phase nearly directly into the “mass killing” phase of the “process of violence.” An “ethnic cleansing” campaign started in Croatia and reached fruition a year later in Bosnia- Herzegovina.⁶⁷ Pictures of indiscriminate Serb attacks on the Croatian cities of Dubrovnik, Vukovar, and in the Krajina, combined with Serb paramilitary atrocities against civilians, branded the Serbians, in the world’s view, as the aggressors and war criminals.⁶⁸ Fighting continued primarily between Serbia and Croatia for the rest of the year until the European

⁶³ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 9.

⁶⁴ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 9.

⁶⁵ *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Television Documentary, January 1996.

⁶⁶ *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Television Documentary, January 1996.

⁶⁷ *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Television Documentary, January 1996.

⁶⁸ William J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J Durch (New York: St. Martain’s Press, 1996), 215-216.

Community achieved a cease-fire.⁶⁹ The European Community consequently agreed to recognize republics within Yugoslavia if these republics agreed to remain independent in nationwide referendums and to protect all citizens' human rights. Throughout the conflict, the displacement of population and ethnic atrocities created a growing humanitarian crisis, but the US resisted involvement. International political leaders were not prepared to risk forces in what appeared to be a long and deadly struggle.⁷⁰ This war ended in January 1992 with the establishment of a tense truce in the *Krajina* and creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervise it.⁷¹

The UN committed peacekeeping ground troops in February 1992 to establish conditions for a lasting peace under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 743.⁷² The UNPROFOR entered Croatia to conduct a traditional peacekeeping mission. Upon arrival of the UN forces, the Yugoslavian National Army disengaged and departed. The Krajina Serbs, however, lived in and controlled northwest Croatia. They were not prepared to submit to Croatian rule. Eventually, the internal conflict was settled militarily, and the Krajina Serbs were expelled from Croatia.⁷³ In the meantime, Bosnia sank into hostilities in 1992, and the battle lines among the three ethnic belligerents were much less defined.⁷⁴

Like Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia, with its Muslim-led government under the leadership of President Alija Izetbegovic, declared independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992. Although the majority of the population in Bosnia was Muslim, there were also a significant number of Serbians and Croatians living in the province as well.⁷⁵ The Bosnian Serbs were not about to live under Muslim rule, and Bosnian Croats were not comfortable living in Bosnia without representation.⁷⁶ Once the "process of violence" had reached the "mass killing" phase in the Balkan region, the idea of genocide had created a "way" to prevail in the military contest while also meeting the desired endstate. Forces of the Bosnian Serb Republic, with overt assistance from the Yugoslav People's

⁶⁹ Dürch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 200.

⁷⁰ Dürch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 200.

⁷¹ UNSCR 743, Available at <http://www.nato.int/for/un/home.htm> (accessed 22 February 2012).

⁷² UNSCR 743, Available at <http://www.nato.int/for/un/home.htm> (accessed 22 February 2012).

⁷³ Dürch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 221-223.

⁷⁴ Dürch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 223-235.

⁷⁵ Dürch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 224-225.

⁷⁶ Dürch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 225.

Army (JNA), advanced to expand its borders, while the relatively weak Bosnian army fought to preserve the territorial integrity and authority of its newly independent state.⁷⁷ The Bosnian Serbs had the will and the overwhelming military power—particularly in the vast preponderance of aircraft and heavy field weapons—to advance around the Northern and Eastern parts of Bosnia.⁷⁸ In a matter of a few weeks, Serbs controlled almost two-thirds of the territory of Bosnia and the government found itself surrounded by unfriendly and mutually supporting Serbian enclaves and states.⁷⁹ Fighting consumed the country, and it was not long before press reports of mass murder and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia made headlines.⁸⁰

As society crumbled in Bosnia, the need for international action became more and more obvious. By the summer of 1992, numerous organizations and countries were taking a more active interest in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Political rhetoric increasingly centered on stopping Serbian aggression, by military means if necessary.⁸¹ Serbian troops isolated civilian concentrations, and attempts to deliver humanitarian aid by NGOs were routinely intercepted.⁸² Additionally, widespread human rights abuse and a growing refugee problem in Western Europe mobilized anti-Serb sentiment. Reports coming out of Bosnia-Herzegovina suggested that acts of genocide were prevalent throughout Bosnia.⁸³ The emaciated bodies of inmates at the Serb-run Manjica concentration camp, revealed in the summer of 1992, reinforced these suggestions and stirred thoughts of the Nazi holocaust.⁸⁴ This put pressure on international leaders to do something. Despite several diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, deep-seated ethnic differences were too much to overcome without significant external pressure. The situation in Bosnia had boiled over and an operation with characteristics of a MARO was the key to obtaining a viable solution.

⁷⁷ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 8.

⁷⁸ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 8.

⁷⁹ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 8.

⁸⁰ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*, 8.

⁸¹ Dutsch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 223-224.

⁸² Dutsch and Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*, 228.

⁸³ Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 163.

⁸⁴ Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*, 163.

No-Fly Zone: An Operation in Search of A Strategy

On 5 June 1992, UNPROFOR personnel began their humanitarian role at Sarajevo's international airport.⁸⁵ From there, humanitarian convoys protected by UNPROFOR delivered assistance throughout Sarajevo and surrounding areas.⁸⁶ In October 1992, to minimize the threat to UN personnel and at the same time contain a small part of the violence in this conflict, the UN banned all military flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina except those in support of UN operations.⁸⁷ The results after the first five months were impressive. Zero of the 2,476 allied aircraft bringing supplies into Bosnia-Herzegovina had encountered belligerent air activity while they had successfully delivered 27,460 tons of food, medicine, and other relief goods.⁸⁸ However, by April 1993, NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) had documented over 500 airspace violations.⁸⁹ This flaunting of UN resolutions coupled with continued fierce fighting throughout Bosnia led to UNSCR 816.⁹⁰

Operation DENY FLIGHT officially began on 12 April 1993 as NATO's response to UNSCR 816. The initial objective of ODF, as explicitly stated, directed participating nations to conduct aerial monitoring and to take more active measures to control unauthorized flights, effectively enforcing compliance with UNSCR 816, which banned both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of the Bosnia-Herzegovina No-Fly Zone.⁹¹ For the US and international political leaders, a quick, low-

⁸⁵ UNSCR 758, Available at <http://www.nato.int/for/un/home.htm> (accessed 22 February 2012).

⁸⁶ UNSCR 770 established its delivery mission under Chapter VII authority. Source UNSCR 770. Available at <http://www.nato.int/for/un/home.htm> (accessed 23 February 2012). UNPROFOR was tasked to coordinate delivery and protection for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees convoys of aid and of released civilian prisoners if requested by the International Committee of the Red Cross. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*. Third Edition. (Department of Public Information, United Nations: New York, 1996), 522.

⁸⁷ UNSCR 781 was passed on 9 Oct 1992. Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet: NATO Operation Sky Monitor. UNSCR 781 called on member states to provide technical assistance and authorized 75 military observers to monitor airfields in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Source: Available at <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/OperationSkyMonitor.htm> 12 February 2001, 1. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*. Third Edition. (Department of Public Information, United Nations: New York, 1996), 523.

⁸⁸ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*. Third Edition. (Department of Public Information, United Nations: New York, 1996), 524.

⁸⁹ Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet: Operation Deny Flight, 6 December 2000, 2. <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DenyFlightFactSheet.htm>, (accessed 23 February 2012).

⁹⁰ UNSCR 816, Available at <http://www.nato.int/for/un/home.htm> (accessed 23 February 2012).

⁹¹ UNSCR 816, Available at <http://www.nato.int/for/un/home.htm> (accessed 23 February 2012).

cost airpower option presented the cleanest way to get NATO involved without exposing its troops to the hostile ground environment.

In May, the UN passed UNSCR 824, demanding that six areas—Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac, Zepa, and Srebrenica—be treated as "safe areas," free from hostile acts which endangered the inhabitants' safety.⁹² The model for these safe areas was Srebrenica, where earlier, UNPROFOR had disarmed the city's Muslim citizens in exchange for a Serb ceasefire guarantee. However, the UN had unknowingly created a perceived safe area, effectively corralling thousands of unarmed Muslims into a confined area with little means to protect them. The originally limited NFZ mission that allocated air resources for "prohibiting or controlling specific flight in a defined area" would have to evolve to supplement the outnumbered UNPROFOR assigned to protect the safe areas.

UNSCR 836, passed on 4 June 1993, was a response to the subsequent fighting, primarily initiated by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces. It directed that NATO provide close air support "in and around the safe areas to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate."⁹³ That mandate also directed UNPROFOR to deter attacks against the safe areas, monitor the cease-fire, and, if necessary, use force to ensure freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.⁹⁴ As the application of airpower under UNSCR 836 (Chapter VII) expanded to include close air support and, later, air strikes, the rules of engagement became more complicated. According to Colonel Robert Owen, a "dual key" command and control arrangement was implemented to ensure America's allies that there would be no unilateral use of force.⁹⁵ This system required CAS requests to be routed through both NATO and United Nations channels. A request had to be coordinated between the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe and the UN Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Yashusi Akashi.

⁹² UNSCR 824, Available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/home.htm> (accessed 23 February 2012).

⁹³ UNSCR 836, Available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/home.htm> (accessed 23 February 2012).

⁹⁴ UNSCR 836, Available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/home.htm> (accessed 23 February 2012).

⁹⁵ Owen, *The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1*. NATO air presence prior to 31 March had been authorized under Chapter VI. Thus, they could react to threats in self-defense. After UNSCR 816.s Chapter VII implementation their actions included "all necessary measures" to enforce the no-fly zone. As the application of airpower under UNSCR 836 (Chapter VII) expanded to include close air support and later, air strikes, rules of engagement became more complicated.




Figure 2: NATO and UN Chains of Command: The “Dual Key” System

Source: *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*. Third Edition. (Department of Public Information, United Nations: New York, 1996), 529.

While the arrangement was created for understandable political reasons, Figure 2 demonstrates the considerable length of time added to the approval process, which was paid for in UNPROFOR and civilian lives.

On 6 July 1995, as Serb trucks, tanks, and infantrymen closed in on Srebrenica, Dutch commander of UN troops in the town’s safe zone Colonel Tom Karremans made his first appeal for NATO air strikes.⁹⁶ Four days later, as the Serb forces tightened their grip on the city, Karremans met with Muslim leaders, assuring them that forty to sixty NATO planes would soon arrive to stage a “massive air strike.”⁹⁷ That night, Dutch peacekeepers and unarmed Muslim civilians kept one eye to the sky, longing for NATO fighters, while the other stayed fixed on the enemy, knowing if nothing came they would be overrun by the Serb forces.⁹⁸ Finally on 11 July, four hours after Karremans submitted another futile request for NATO assistance, a group of eighteen US F-16’s roared overhead. However, one pair failed to find the Serb targets and another pair

⁹⁶ Samantha Power, *Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2003) 399.

⁹⁷ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 399.

⁹⁸ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 399.

bombed near a Serb tank with little effect. As quickly as the jets had arrived, they were gone.⁹⁹

The city of Srebrenica fell to a well-planned Serb attack, after the outnumbered Dutch peacekeeping battalion was forced into a virtual hostage situation and Serbian threats to kill the hostages forced NATO to halt CAS strikes after only a few sorties.¹⁰⁰ Shortly after, Bosnian Serb forces also took the Zepa safe area and threatened the town of Gorazde.¹⁰¹ The Serbs effectively exploited the safe area's corralling effect and took advantage of the outnumbered UN peacekeeping forces and the severely restricted NATO CAS missions. In the end, over 100 CAS missions were requested during the entire Operation Deny Flight, but only four were authorized.¹⁰² The scale and shame of the Srebrenica atrocities mounted as reports came in that Bosnian Serb forces had systematically massacred more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men in cold blood after capturing the city.¹⁰³ The expectations of airpower's ability to protect civilians, coupled with the extreme political restrictions, a lack of doctrinal guidance for the protection of civilians, and changing NFZ requirements, had facilitated the largest massacre Europe had seen since the Holocaust.¹⁰⁴

The political level expectations of the NFZ over Bosnia were much broader than their initial mandate had directed. In months prior to the massacre at Srebrenica, diplomats, journalists, peacekeepers and Bosnian Muslims had warned of the possibility that the Serbs could seize the vulnerable safe areas. The UNPROFOR mission's mandate had been to "facilitate demobilization, disarmament, and conflict resolution, as well as to provide humanitarian relief."¹⁰⁵ It had not been to "break the siege of Sarajevo, stop the bombardment of civilians or prevent ethnic cleansing."¹⁰⁶ In effect, the UNPROFOR had spent much of their time simply trying to protect themselves within the safe areas. The

⁹⁹ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 400.

¹⁰⁰ John Andreas Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2010) 211.

¹⁰¹ Owen, *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, 102.

¹⁰² Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 178.

¹⁰³ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 392.

¹⁰⁴ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 392.

¹⁰⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003), 58.

¹⁰⁶ Thomas Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 106.

outnumbered and lightly armed force could in no way retaliate against Serb aggression, and therefore had held little deterrent power against the confrontational Serbian forces. The evolved NFZ's restricted airpower was severely limited. The Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Ratko Mladic, and his Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, understood this fact well before the international community did. The recognition of UNPROFOR impotence by the Serbs led them to discredit NATO airpower and in effect, the Serbs "called the international community's bluff."¹⁰⁷ It was something that Milosevic would attempt unsuccessfully again four years later in Kosovo. Srebrenica's fall profoundly damaged the NFZ's deterrent credibility and set a dangerous precedent of disregard for NATO threats of force for the protection of civilians.

After the fall of another safe area at Zepa on 25 July, the North Atlantic Council extended a coercive threat of decisive NATO aerial bombardment if Serbs threatened any of the remaining four safe areas: Sarajevo, Gorazde, Bihac, or Tuzla. NATO Secretary General Willy Claes pronounced, "Military preparations which are judged to represent a direct threat to the UN safe areas or direct attacks upon them will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO air power."¹⁰⁸ In addition, following the Srebrenica massacre, "public pressure on Western governments suddenly rose to an unprecedented pitch."¹⁰⁹ In response to public pressure and the continued threat to UN safe areas, NATO launched Operation DELIBERATE FORCE on 30 August 1995 as the UN and NATO strategy of deterrence abruptly turned to one of coercion.¹¹⁰

Operation DELIBERATE FORCE represented a significant transformation from past NATO and UN actions in the region and attempted to change the Serb precedent of disregard for NATO force. Previous NATO strategy had focused on the rhetoric of the deterrent use of airpower to maintain a stable status quo while political negotiators deliberated equitable solutions to the crisis; however, this evolved toward a coercive use of force. The 11-day air campaign featured 3,515 sorties flown by 293 aircraft from eight NATO countries operating from 18 locations across Europe in addition to the USS

¹⁰⁷ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 392.

¹⁰⁸ Craig R. Whitney, "Allies Extending Shield to Protect All Bosnia Havens," *The New York Times*, 2 August 1995.

¹⁰⁹ Samantha Power, *Chasing the Flame* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 188-189.

¹¹⁰ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 174.

Theodore Roosevelt and the USS America.¹¹¹ The bombing campaign reversed Serb gains enough to force them back to the negotiating table and deter them from entering any more safe areas. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed before the end of the year, bringing an end to war in Bosnia.¹¹² Effectively, coercive diplomacy tied to the very real threat of something more than a NFZ was required to get the Serbs to the negotiating table.

USAF Lieutenant General David Deptula, former commander of Operation Northern Watch, pointed out this distinction when he said, “We get ourselves into a box by calling them something they’re not. It’s not a No-Fly Zone; it’s an Air Exclusion Zone. The term ‘No-Fly Zone’ sets you up to lose right from the start.”¹¹³ Returning to the origin of the NFZ definition as an exclusion zone he continued:

A NFZ may be better described as an Air Exclusion Zone (AEZ), a term that more accurately captures its strategic meaning. An AEZ is a territorially bounded area in which a target nation’s air and surface operations are controlled as a tool of foreign policy. More specifically, an AEZ is an area in which a target nation’s sovereignty has been temporarily expropriated with the goal of producing certain policy decisions by the target state’s leaders. Use of the new term, AEZ, reinforces the idea that enforcement aircraft only occupy airspace, not a nation’s territory. And yet, by operating within this airspace, [airpower] can, to a degree, control the surface without occupying it.¹¹⁴

Perhaps the term Air Exclusion Zone more appropriately fits the evolution of what political leaders expect when they ask for a No-Fly Zone. Nevertheless, clear political expectations within the broad political strategy are still much more valuable to military leaders than assigning specific operational tasks. Additionally, military leaders must effectively create a feedback loop where they inform policy makers of realistic courses of action and plans of operation to ensure airpower effects meet political expectations.

After nearly four years of unspeakable atrocities in Bosnia, Operations DENY FLIGHT and ultimately DELIBERATE FORCE successfully achieved their designated

¹¹¹ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 176.

¹¹² Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 440.

¹¹³ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 11.

¹¹⁴ Lieutenant General David Deptula, Unpublished paper. “Air Exclusion Zones: Powerful Tools to Advance US Interests in the New International Environment.” Quoted from Major William M. Tart, “No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions, (SAASS Master’s thesis 1 June 2001), 11.

political objectives, including the restoration of safe areas from threat of attack, the removal of offending heavy weapons, and the reopening of the Sarajevo airport and road access for relief supplies, but the military and humanitarian results were mixed.¹¹⁵ Some leaders claimed that the NFZ over Bosnia had contained the conflict and had been coercive since it limited Bosnian Serb military options.¹¹⁶ It did act to contain the level of violence from the air, ensuring there were no outside interventions by other air forces, and it deterred fixed-wing flights from attacking civilians on the ground. However, it did not completely deter rotary-wing flight, which is an easy means for attacking civilians; nor did it compel the perpetrators to stop mass atrocities until the introduction of the air-to-ground missions beyond a self-defense role.¹¹⁷

To be sure, it was not only allied airpower but a confluence of other factors such as increased allied artillery fire, a Croatian ground offensive, mounting diplomatic pressure and sanctions, and pressure from a stream of refugees entering Serbia that ultimately drove the Bosnian Serb leadership to the table.¹¹⁸ In underscoring the limited intent of the operation, General Ronald Fogleman stressed afterward that the aim of the NATO bombing during Deliberate Force had been “not to defeat the Serbs, but simply to relieve the siege of the UN safe areas and gain compliance with UN mandates and thus facilitate ongoing negotiations to end the fighting.”¹¹⁹ Fogleman was playing a cautionary card, but the political rhetoric of airpower’s success endured. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke later observed that although it had taken a Bosnian Serb atrocity to trigger the launching of Deliberate Force, the air campaign had made a “huge difference” in helping to bring about an acceptable outcome.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 177.

¹¹⁶ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 103.

¹¹⁷ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 103. A huge and virtually insurmountable problem for NATO from day one was stopping unauthorized flights by helicopters. DENY FLIGHT rules of engagement required that the engaged fighter needed to physically observe the helicopter committing a “hostile act” in order to shoot it down. Flying on an unauthorized mission over Bosnia was not enough justification. The violators quickly learned the rules on engagement and would play cat and mouse games with NATO. When intercepted, the violator would heed the warning to land but would wait until the interceptor left to continue on his flight.

¹¹⁸ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 177.

¹¹⁹ General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, “What Air Power Can Do in Bosnia,” letter to the editor, *Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 1995.

¹²⁰ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, (New York, Random House, 1998) 104.

NATO's decision to expand the deterrent NFZ mission five months after its inception, to provide CAS for UNPROFOR soldiers in atrocity response operation and to protect the safe areas, was unprecedented for its time and not properly thought out or implemented. ODF was essentially a Mass Atrocity Response Operation, intended initially to prohibit unauthorized flights over Bosnia and, subsequently, to protect UNPROFOR soldiers and designated safe areas. For airpower to be effective, military leaders needed clear political expectations and objectives and the threat of coercive airpower needed to be immediately responsive to the needs of the UN troops on the ground. The unwieldy dual chain of command requiring the UN Secretary General's personal approval for CAS missions proved deadly to both civilians and UNPROFOR soldiers.

Additionally, protecting safe areas proved difficult. As a deterrent against assaults on the safe areas, ODF had limited effectiveness and when challenged, handcuffed with restrictions, airpower could neither prevent assaults on the safe areas nor protect UNPROFOR soldiers and civilians on the ground as the rhetoric had professed. In the end, for three and a half years, "some 200,000 Bosnians were killed, and more than 2 million displaced."¹²¹ Consequently, rhetoric boasting the US can win wars through airpower alone, and then pointing to Operations DESERT STORM and DENY FLIGHT as examples, can be misleading. Clearly airpower played a significant role in the successes of Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE. However, it takes realistic political expectations and a clear political understanding of airpower capabilities and definitions to effectively carry out a MARO. With an accurate interpretation of the broad political objectives, there is no group better suited to design effective operational tasks and allocate airpower in a MARO than those who do it best—military leaders. Sixteen years later, the events leading to Srebrenica were consistently framed in relation to the protection of the Libyan city of Benghazi in 2011, but unfortunately, many of the critical lessons learned from Bosnia were neglected.

Libya Comparisons

¹²¹ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 251.

North African unrest began in December 2010 when protests against the Tunisian government spread like wildfire through Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and Libya. In January 2011, peaceful protests and demonstrations began against the Libyan government. One month later, the arrest of a human rights activist triggered a riot in Benghazi, Libya, which set off protests across the country that quickly turned violent. On 22 February, Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi vowed to crush the revolt immediately, creating a “breakdown of the social contract” and “political uncertainty” within the “process of violence.”¹²²

Because of concerns about escalating violence and the previous statement, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed US Africa Command (AFRICOM) to begin planning for the evacuation of American citizens in Libya. On 3 March 2011, AFRICOM established a Joint Task Force for Operation ODYSSEY DAWN to facilitate civilian evacuation via Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), provide humanitarian assistance, and support operations in the region in response to the situation in Libya. As the situation in Libya deteriorated, the “process of violence” accelerated into the “group mobilization” phase when Pro Gadhafi Forces (PGF) took up arms as the violence against the civilian population increased.

Earlier attempts to implement the peaceful measures encompassed in UNSCR 1970 called upon Libya’s “Responsibility to Protect.” By referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and imposing initial diplomatic incentives, financial sanctions, and an arms embargo, the US Department of State worked with the DoD to contact nations willing to form a coalition that would potentially enforce the Resolution.¹²³ On 12 March, the League of Arab States called on the UN to establish a maritime arms embargo and NFZ over Libya to protect the civilian population. Five days later, on 17 March, Gadhafi threatened to burn the city of Benghazi, the current rebel stronghold, to the ground. In response, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973. It approved a No-Fly-Zone, called for an immediate cease-fire, and tightened

¹²² “Gaddafi vows to crush the revolt “house by house” as protests escalate,” *The Journal*. 23 February 2011, <http://www.thejournal.ie/gaddafi-vows-to-crush-the-revolt-house-by-house-as-protests-escalate-2011-02/>, (accessed 22 March 2012).

¹²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm (accessed 28 Mar 2012).

sanctions on the Gaddafi regime in Libya.¹²⁴ The Resolution also condemned the Libyan government for failing to comply with international law and for allowing gross violations of human rights and attacks that may amount to crimes against humanity.¹²⁵ In addition, it strengthened sanctions and the enforcement of an arms embargo against the Gadhafi regime.

During a briefing at the White House Roosevelt Room on 23 March 2011, White House Middle East Strategist Dennis Ross said, “We were looking at ‘Srebrenica on steroids’ – the imminent possibility that up to 100,000 could be massacred.”¹²⁶ When large parts of Libya broke away from Colonel Gaddafi's rule, he retaliated with tanks, air power, and artillery against heavily populated urban areas. Initially, the goal of the operation was strictly a humanitarian one. The international community rallied to prevent Gaddafi from carrying out his threat, issued in February 2011, to “attack [the rebels] in their lairs” and “cleanse Libya house by house.”¹²⁷ He repeated his intent by saying, “The moment of truth has come. There will be no mercy. Our troops will be coming to Benghazi tonight.”¹²⁸ As the signs of an impending state-sponsored “process of violence” escalation to mass murder were clear and Gadhafi’s son promised “rivers of blood” for protestors in Benghazi, airpower offered the international community a quick and low cost way out.

In Libya’s case, as in many Mass Atrocity Response Operations, speed achieved prominence over mass in the political response. However, similar to Bosnia, a lack of comprehension of airpower’s coercive deterrence and compellence effects reappeared as the requirement for swift action forced vague strategic guidance in Libya.¹²⁹ The absence

¹²⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm (accessed on 13 February 2012).

¹²⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm (accessed on 13 February 2012).

¹²⁶ Robert Mackey, “March 23 Updates on War in Libya and Mideast Protests” *New York Times: The Lede*, 23 March 2011.

¹²⁷ “Qaddafi: I will fight protests, die a martyr,” *CBS News*, available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/22/501364/main20034785.shtml>, 22 February 2011, (accessed 24 Feb 2012).

¹²⁸ Dan Murphy, “Qaddafi threatens Libya rebels as UN no-fly vote nears,” *Christian Science Monitor*, available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle- East/2011/0317/Qaddafi-threatens-Libya-rebels-as-UN-no-fly-vote-nears>, 17 March 2011, (accessed 24 Feb 2012).

¹²⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Fredericksburg, Virginia: BookCrafters, 1966), 1. Summarized from Col Clint Hinote. USAF, “Campaigning to Protect: Using Military Force to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities,” March, 2008. Leveraging the coercive power of force—the power to hurt—can deter violence before it has started. If the violence has started or the potential exists, that same

of clear strategic guidance in Libya appears to have been a necessary trade-off for the kind of preventative action needed to stop the atrocities before they began; however, both political and military leaders should have been better prepared than they were. Airpower rhetoric, the misunderstanding of operational terms, and vague guidance leading to the Libyan intervention demonstrates the failure of both political and military leaders to learn from the past.

According to a State Department release on the military intervention in Libya, the President authorized these actions for several reasons of national interest.¹³⁰ First, an intervention would limit the spread of violence and instability in a region pivotal to US security interests, particularly while it was undergoing sensitive transitions. Second, it would prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe. Third, an intervention would show the people of the Middle East and North Africa that America stood with them at a time of momentous transition. Beyond these specific objectives, the President stated that Gadhafi had lost all legitimacy to rule and therefore had to step down.¹³¹ His brutal behavior against his own population was catalogued by a United Nations Commission of Inquiry and resulted in a request for arrest warrants by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.¹³²

Moreover, the Libyan government's actions posed a significant threat to regional peace and security. As the President noted in his March 21 report to Congress, the

power can compel the perpetrators to stop. Schelling argues that deterrence is different, and generally easier, than compellence. Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and *waiting*. The overt act is up to the opponent.... Compellence, in contrast, usually involves *initiating* an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds. Both deterrence and compellence have three requirements. First, the state or coalition making the threat must have the capability to carry out the threat. It does no good to threaten an act of force that cannot be executed. Second, the threat must be credible in the context of the situation. It is not useful to threaten nuclear strikes, for example, when trying to deter actors contemplating lesser offenses such as seizing territory in a border dispute. Alternatively, there are ways to increase the credibility of threats. Physical actions, for instance, can bolster the perception that a threat is likely to be followed through. For example, logistical movements and shows of force can bolster a threat. Third, the threat must be clearly communicated to the people who must either act or forego action. This clear communication must include the delivery of a specific message to the right audience. The message must include both the action required as well as the consequences for noncompliance. All three requirements are necessary when attempting to use force to coerce would-be perpetrators of atrocities.

¹³⁰ Harold Hongju Koh, "Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya," US Department of State, 26 March 2011. <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm> (accessed 22 March 2012). Based on President Obama's direction 19 March 2011 on foreign policy interests of the US to support UNSCR 1973.

¹³¹ Koh, Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya, 26 March 2011.

¹³² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm> (accessed 26 Mar 2012).

Gadhafi regime’s “illegitimate use of force” was “forcing many [civilians] to flee to neighboring countries, thereby destabilizing the peace and security of the region.” “Left unaddressed,” the President further noted, “the growing instability in Libya could ignite wider instability in the Middle East, with dangerous consequences to the national security interests of the United States.”¹³³

As early as 2 March 2011 policy makers called for a No-Fly Zone in response to airstrikes and attacks reported on opposition-held areas in the East and West, as Gaddafi forces tried to secure key oil terminals and a larger area around the capital.¹³⁴ However, military leaders needed clear strategic expectations, rather than perceived airpower capabilities and prescribed operational tasks for campaign planning. By all military doctrine, a NFZ was the correct operational task to combat *airstrikes* on opposition-held areas, but the political guidance ultimately asked for much more.

On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1973, instituting a No-Fly Zone over Libya.¹³⁵ Vague political guidance in UNSCR 1973 authorized member states to take “all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” in Libya while also prescribing a specific operational task of a NFZ.¹³⁶ On 18 March 2011, one day prior to the beginning of the multi-state Mass Atrocity Response Operation dubbed Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD), President Obama articulated:

We will provide the unique capabilities that [the US] can bring to bear to stop the violence against civilians, including enabling our European allies and Arab partners to effectively enforce a no fly zone. I also want to be clear about what we will not be doing. The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal -- specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya. In the coming weeks, we will continue to help the Libyan people with humanitarian and economic assistance so that they can fulfill their

¹³³ President Barack Obama, “Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate: Regarding the Commencement of Operations in Libya” White House Press Release, 21 March 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya> (accessed 22 March 2012).

¹³⁴ Christine Delargy, “McCain Calls for No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Criticizes Obama’s Handling of the Situation,” CBS News, 2 March 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20038372-503544.html>tag=contentMain;contentBody (accessed 24 Feb 2012).

¹³⁵ UNSCR 1973

¹³⁶ UNSCR 1973

aspirations peacefully. I have no doubt that the men and women of our military are capable of carrying out this mission.¹³⁷

Meanwhile, the rhetoric about military options had been aired in the press. Testifying before the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee, Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed what many planners were struggling with: “A No-Fly Zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses.”¹³⁸ To an airpower planner, a NFZ is a means to facilitate a follow-on operation such as the humanitarian mission explained in Bosnia, not a way to protect civilians. However, the United Nations Security Council, President Obama, and the overall international community effectively tied the enforcement of a NFZ to the protection of civilians on the ground. UNSCR 1973 guidance further complicated the issue by providing a clear exclusion of a “foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,” eliminating a deterrent option for Gadhafi’s consideration.¹³⁹

Like the mission creep described in the NFZ established over Bosnia, Libya’s mission quickly began to evolve. Guidance from the White House and DOD was confusing. Many planners were unsure as to whether “regime change” was the intended option, or whether operations were to be focused solely on protecting civilian life and providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees, as implied by the Defense Secretary’s warning orders. President Obama initially stated, “We are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal-specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya.”¹⁴⁰ Simultaneously, Obama also mentioned the need for Gadhafi to go, but explicitly ruled it out as a goal of the military operation.¹⁴¹ In vague terms, the President stated the regime was going to change by other means, “In the coming weeks, we will continue to help the

¹³⁷ President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya”, 18 March 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya>, (accessed 26 March 2012).

¹³⁸ Delargy, *McCain Calls for No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Criticizes Obama’s Handling of the Situation*, 2 March 2011.

¹³⁹ UNSCR 1973 excluded “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” Paragraph 4 UNSCR 1973.

¹⁴⁰ Obama, *Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya*, 18 March 2011.

¹⁴¹ Aprille Muscara, “Obama Leave Doors Open to Regime Change in Libya,” IPS News, 21 March 2011, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54939> (accessed 26 Feb 2012).

Libyan people with humanitarian and economic assistance so that they can fulfill their aspirations peacefully.”¹⁴²

Translating given political objectives into viable and coherent military objectives without a clearly defined end state proved difficult. With no specific guidance on desired outcomes after the intervention, termination criteria were determined by transfer of ongoing operations vice completion of operations or end of hostilities.¹⁴³ The course of action was to remain narrowly focused on the limited military objectives given:

[T]he biggest problem and concern was difficulty in getting a definite/consistent message from the White House and [State]. From discussions, it was clear that we would work some type of intervention in Libya; the UNSCR would allow civilian protection, but regime change? This discussion fed ambiguity all around . . . we had to look at policy statements from [principals] to use as policy direction.¹⁴⁴

To complicate matters, while being given the specific operational task of enforcing a NFZ under the political expectation to protect civilians, the US military’s responsibilities as an “air occupation” force also had moral and pragmatic targeting consequences that could not be avoided. Were aircraft supporting the NFZ supposed to watch as columns of Pro-Gadhafi Forces (PGF) entered into Benghazi to commit mass atrocities? The obvious answer was no because UNSCR 1973 authorized “all necessary means” to protect civilians; however, the vague guidance produced questions from military planners at all levels. If NATO airpower was authorized to attack targets beyond those necessary to establishing a NFZ, what was a valid target? If a column of tanks was moving toward Benghazi, was an attack authorized? If the tanks stopped outside Benghazi or started a retreat, did intent still make them a valid target? How should pilots identify and target the perpetrators rather than the victims? With limited assets, what airpower allocation should be established to maintain a NFZ versus protection of civilians? Was targeting regime leadership something that should have had resources

¹⁴² President Barack Obama, “President Obama’s Statement on Libya”, 18 March 2011 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/18/president-obama-s-statement-libya> (accessed 2 Mar 2012).

¹⁴³ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹⁴⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J5, Senior Officer, interview by JCOA, May 18, 2011.

allocated immediately? These were all questions military planners in both EUCOM and AFRICOM were trying to answer.¹⁴⁵

In the absence of clear strategic guidance, military planners fell back on existing planning guidance, doctrine, definitions, and targeting models. Ultimately, the requirement for swift action in Libya coupled with vague UNSCR guidance and policy mission creep fueled the military machine prompting planners to return to a familiar Warden-esque targeting process, explained in the next chapter, rather than contemplating a targeting scheme based on the primary mission to protect civilians.¹⁴⁶ This created a targeting strategy that military leaders had difficulty relating to the political expectations, and one that political leaders did not expect.¹⁴⁷

Further complicating the problem, the political expectations of the Libyan mission evolved. In April 2011, President Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron published a joint pledge declaring that in order to achieve the humanitarian goal, regime change must take place. They stated, “Gaddafi must go, and go for good,” so that “a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders.”¹⁴⁸ In addition, they added that NATO would use force to promote these goals, “So long as Gaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds.”¹⁴⁹

The issue reached a crucial stage in May as Gaddafi offered a ceasefire that would have ended the humanitarian crisis and led to negotiations between the rebels and Gaddafi but entailed no regime change. NATO rejected the offer saying the alliance needed “to see not words but actions,” and that NATO would keep the pressure on until

¹⁴⁵ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹⁴⁶ NATO CAOC Operation Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector planners (Poggio Renatico), interview by the author, 29 February 2012. Warden-esque refers to John Warden’s Five-ring target prioritization model developed prior to Operation Desert Storm. The model will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

¹⁴⁷ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹⁴⁸ “Allies: ‘Gadhafi must go, and go for good,’” MSNBC, 15 April 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42602914/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/allies-gadhafi-must-go-good/#.T1JzdsyTbgo (accessed 23 Mar 2012).

¹⁴⁹ Allies: ‘Gadhafi must go, and go for good, 15 April 2011.

the UN Security Council mandate to protect the Libyan civilians was fulfilled.¹⁵⁰ Mission creep continued as NATO proceeded to bomb not only military targets but also Gaddafi's residential compound in Tripoli, reportedly killing his son and three grandchildren.¹⁵¹

Conclusion

Mission creep proved costly for the US in both Bosnia and Libya. Adding extra missions such as CAS, tactical reconnaissance, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) missions, required a commitment of new assets from outside the Joint Operating Area (JOA). It also required significant changes to the rules of engagement, command and control procedures, and intelligence collection measures. Once the objective priorities changed from establishing and maintaining a NFZ to one of protecting civilians and UNPROFOR personnel in the safe areas in Bosnia, the airpower mission evolved to one of compellence. This increased both the risks and the payoff for airpower as a tool of foreign policy. The utility of airpower was now connected to the success of these air strikes to compel a political solution. In essence, NATO was “putting all of its eggs in one basket” and the policy makers were beginning to depend on that basket to enforce their ultimatums.¹⁵² In the end, although tragically some lives were lost, relative peace was established and many were saved. However, depending on one basket is a dangerous strategy for MAROs.

The discussion of the No-Fly Zones in Bosnia and Libya demonstrate the necessity of clear political expectations that lead to a military interpretation that produces the desired effects in a MARO. Just as military operations need to be understood as part of a broader political strategy, individual military tasks must be understood in a broader political strategic framework.¹⁵³ When this process breaks down, effect does not match expectation. Future leaders must understand that while No-Fly Zones can be a valuable

¹⁵⁰ Simon Denyer and Leila Fadal, “Gaddafi calls for ceasefire as NATO strikes Tripoli.” *The Washington Post*, 30 April 2011.

¹⁵¹ Tim Hill, “Muammar Gaddafi son killed by NATO air strike-Libyan government.” *The Guardian*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/01/libya-muammar-gaddafi-son-nato> (accessed 27 Mar 2012).

¹⁵² Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 114.

¹⁵³ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 80.

option in certain situations, they should not be the default strategy for a MARO. While compelling against adversaries who are highly reliant upon their own airpower to threaten and intimidate civilians, NFZs also provide the forces and access required for future operations.¹⁵⁴ They can enable other US instruments of power to be brought to bear in a crisis and can enable future military operations through pre-built air superiority and a forward presence.¹⁵⁵ Political understanding of a NFZ's capabilities and limitations can tailor expectations toward a realistic and clear military application of airpower to achieve the desired effects. Whether a MARO's political expectations put priority on stopping the mass atrocities, protecting civilians, protecting a specific safe area, enabling ground forces, creating a humanitarian corridor, or regime change, military leaders will calculate choices, plan operations, and target differently based on that priority objective.¹⁵⁶ Clear political objectives within the broad political strategy and expectation management are critical aspect to Mass Atrocity Response Operations.

¹⁵⁴ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 129.

¹⁵⁵ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 129.

¹⁵⁶ Cara Alison, (Office of the Secretary of Defense Plans and Policy), interview by the author, 24 January 2011.

Chapter 3

Kosovo and Airpower Targeting

Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it.
—Theodore Roosevelt

Shortly after the end of Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF), USAF Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan observed, “The campaign did not begin the way that America would normally apply airpower—massively striking at strategic centers of gravity that support Milosevic and his oppressive regime.”¹ In October 1999 USAF General Michael Short, the Allied Air Component Commander in Kosovo, expressed himself more forcibly in testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee saying, “I believe the way to stop ethnic cleansing was to go at the heart of the leadership, and to put a dagger in that heart as rapidly and directly as possible...I’d have gone for the head of the snake on the first night.”² This Warden-esque style targeting approach, developed prior to Operation Desert Storm, serves conventional warfare well, but a different approach is necessary in a MARO. The late application of decisive force against the fifth ring of Warden’s model suggests a strategic error. Focused airpower targeting on fielded forces could have provided the necessary strategic effect to stop the killing and possibly even bring Milosevic to sue for peace.

Important contextual factors such as the character and intentions of the perpetrators, the human and physical geography, the means and ability to obtain and analyze intelligence information, and the technology—specifically airpower—to exploit a perpetrator’s weaknesses significantly affect the targeting in a MARO and ultimately determine the broad strategic approach. The air campaign in Kosovo presents an enlightening historical case study on the effects of targeting within the “mass killing” phase of the “process of violence.” A comparison to the targeting prioritization in the 2011 Libya operations highlight critical differences in the timing of the intervention and specific intelligence and targeting issues that support a modified approach to the Warden targeting model. Before embarking on the Kosovo case study, however, an examination

¹ Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 248.

² Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 248.

of Colonel John Warden III's five-ring systems theory of targeting gives context to the targeting mindset of airpower planners in the days and weeks leading to Operation Allied Force. In addition, it arguably presents a view into the mind of many current military airpower planners.

Contemporary air power theorist John Warden inherited an enthusiasm for strategic bombing from airpower theorist Giulio Douhet and the later Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). Like Douhet, Warden recognized that offensive airpower brings greater concentration of force against an opponent's vital center more rapidly and potentially with fewer casualties, than ground combat.³ However, unlike Douhet, Warden's assessment of the most effective target was not necessarily population centers. Instead, he recognized five separate but related concentric centers of gravity that might be vulnerable from the air.

A theoretical underpinning of Warden's five-ring theory can essentially be traced to Carl von Clausewitz's classic work *On War*. In *On War*, Clausewitz noted that to effectively defeat an enemy, a state should direct all of its energies against those points upon which everything for the enemy depends—center(s) of gravity or the “hub of all power and movement.”⁴ Warden took this principle a step further and developed a concept designed to guide wartime target selection.⁵ The theoretical foundation of effects based warfare was provided in 1993 in the writings of Warden's theory of strategic paralysis.

Colonel John Warden also depicted the enemy as a system of systems, similar to the ACTS industrial web theory from World War II, highlighting the relative nature of effects within the enemy system.⁶ He believed that nation-states operated like biological organisms composed of discrete systems.⁷ In a perfect world these systems function in harmony and the organisms survive and flourish. However, certain systems control other

³ John Andreas Olsen, *John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power* (Dulles: Potomac Books, Inc, 2007) 108.

⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 595-96.

⁵ Colonel John A. Warden III, —Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century, “*Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, ed. Karl P. Magyar (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994) 311-32.

⁶ Steven M. Leonard, “The Elusive Silver Bullet: Effects in Army Operations,” unpublished manuscript, March 27, 2007, 3-4.

⁷ John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System.” *Airpower Journal* 9, Spring 1995, 43.

systems and are thus significant, while other elements appear to be vital but are actually not important for sustaining the organism. Warden believed that, like a biological organism, a nation could be stunned.⁸ Military action could produce strategic paralysis. Strategic paralysis in Warden's terms would make an enemy incapable of taking any physical action to conduct operations.⁹ In Warden's view, to think strategically was to view the enemy as a system composed of numerous subsystems.¹⁰

The essence of Warden's systems approach was his Five-Ring Model. Warden argued that any modern state, business organization, military, terrorist organization, or criminal gang can be seen as a system of five interrelated rings that enable it to perform its intended function.¹¹ Graphically, he represented these system attributes as concentric rings in the overall shape of a bulls-eye. Each concentric ring represented an enemy's center of gravity that if properly attacked would make war prohibitively expensive for the enemy or eliminate the enemy's ability, temporarily or permanently, to wage war.¹² Figure 3 graphically depicts Warden's model. The innermost, and most important, ring is the *leadership ring* that controls the system or state—for example the state's leaders and enemy command. The second ring, *system essentials*, provides or represents key production that is critical for state survival such as essential production such as oil, electricity, food, and money systems. The third ring, *infrastructure*, ties the entire system together, such as transportation road and train networks. The fourth ring, *population*, is composed of the state's civilian population. The fifth and outermost ring, *fielded forces*, consists of the fighting mechanism that defends the state from attack.¹³

⁸ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 43.

⁹ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 43.

¹⁰ Christopher Bence, "Warden vs. Pape," *Air & Space Power Chronicles*, February 28, 2000, 2.

¹¹ Dale C. Eikmeier, The Center of Gravity Debate Resolved (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 16, 1998), 27.

¹² Warden, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, 314, 319.

¹³ Warden, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, 318-19.




Figure 3: Warden's Five-Ring System Theory Diagram

Source: Warden, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, 314.

Warden believed the object of war was to, “induce the enemy to do [one’s] bidding.”¹⁴ Consequently, one could more effectively and efficiently accomplish this objective by rapid, simultaneous attacks on the enemy’s inner ring or leadership.¹⁵ From these concepts and model, target prioritization followed, endorsing airpower to first attack the leadership. If targeting leadership was not possible, then the priority moved to system essentials, and so on. Consequently, if the first four centers of gravity were not susceptible to attack, only then would it be necessary to target the fielded forces. Warden recommend attacking the latter rings, in ascending order of importance, only if one was unable to attack the enemy’s leadership.¹⁶

Warden’s five-ring system theory does have merit, particularly in conventional major combat operations. In Operation Desert Storm, it’s underpinnings not only provided the warfighter with a valuable tool for understanding how airpower could contribute to conventional wartime planning but it also provided a target prioritization model. Following airpower’s perceived overwhelming victory expelling Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait in 1991, the Air Force gradually embraced Warden’s

¹⁴ Warden, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, 318.

¹⁵ Warden, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, 318.

¹⁶ Warden, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, 317.

model.¹⁷ Today, Warden's five-ring systems theory has become a principal lesson in all Air Force Professional Military Education (PME) schools such as the Air and Space Basic Course (ASBC), Squadron Officer School (SOS), and Air Command and Staff College (ACSC).¹⁸ Former US Air Force Historian Dr. Richard P. Hallion went as far as to call Warden the “most influential” figure in American airpower since Billy Mitchell.¹⁹

Indeed, Warden's influence on military airpower planners has been profound. As Air Force officers progress through the PME schools they are effectively indoctrinated with Warden's ideas.²⁰ However, excluding a relatively limited exposure to the air campaign planning process, during the same PME schools, Air Force officers are not exposed to the intricacies of planning until they are assigned to a planning staff.²¹ As will be shown, in the midst of vague guidance or political restrictions, airpower planners will likely resort to a targeting scheme that they know and understand, like Warden's model, and this can result in unintended effects. Operation Allied Force highlights this tendency.

Some time after the conflict in Kosovo, General Michael Short reflected on the importance of the relationship between strategic guidance and military planner during his time as the Air Component Commander.

We need to prepare our politicians as best we can for what is going to happen. If we are going to initiate an air campaign, not an air effort, but an air campaign, airmen need to be given the chance to explain what is going to happen to our political leadership. Airmen, who have practiced their craft and their trade for 30 or 35 years, need to be given the opportunity to make that explanation. I read in General Horner's [the air component commander in *Desert Storm*] superb book how he went to Camp David and briefed the President of the United States on how he intended to conduct an air campaign to prepare the battlefield in Kuwait

¹⁷ David A. Deptula, *Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare* (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001), 18.

¹⁸ Air University Catalog: Academic Year 2011-2012, October 2011, 74-84, 166-171. ASBC information only available in 2010-2011 due to cancelation of course. Air University Catalog: Academic Year 2010-2011, October 2010, 162-168. In multiple discussions with both SOS and ACSC instructors, they each stated that although Warden's model is academically looked at more critically, it still plays a major role in target prioritization during airpower exercises.

¹⁹ Olsen, *John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power*, Back Cover.

²⁰ Personal experience and interviews with senior strategy six strategic planners for operations Allied Force, OIF, OEF, and OOD/OUP. Strategy division chief panel during SAASS 643, 16 April 2012.

²¹ Personal experience and interviews with senior strategy six strategic planners for operations Allied Force, OIF, OEF, and OOD/OUP. Strategy division chief panel during SAASS 643, 16 April 2012.

and Iraq. I am not campaigning for a trip to Camp David, but there was a case to be made for an air campaign, and airmen should have made that case.²²

General Short believed that despite the desire to execute a Warden-esque targeting plan to “cut the head of the snake that first night,” political restrictions forced an air campaign where targeting effects did not meet any of the strategic objectives.²³ General Short criticized the ad hoc campaign of Allied Force which, in his assessment, was executed like a pick-up game. He proposed, “Our targeting philosophy clearly has to be agreed upon before we start . . . We need to have agreed how we intend to employ our forces.”²⁴ Political and military leaders and planners cannot let the critical link between targeting effects and the broad overarching strategy happen by chance—they must create it by design. Frustrated by conflicting guidance, severe political targeting restrictions, and ambitious expectations, military planners resorted to a targeting prioritization based on the limited targets approved. This initially continued despite the limited effect it had on getting Milosevic to the table and halting ethnic cleansing. General Short recollected one of his peers calling the air campaign a “random bombing of military targets.”²⁵

A disjointed target process, as it will be shown, increases the potential that political and military leaders will fail to match operational and tactical objectives to the broader political strategic objectives, particularly in Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Additionally, within the historical context of Kosovo, intelligence and technology short falls and successes will also be analyzed.

Kosovo Historical Context

The historical struggles of the Balkan region described in the previous chapter not only played a vital role in the Bosnian conflict but was also central to the conflict in Kosovo. In 1389 the Ottoman Turk army defeated the Serbs in Kosovo-Polje, the

²² General Michael C. Short, “Coalition Air War” *AFA Air Warfare Symposium*. (Orlando: Air Force Association, 2000) 1.

²³ General Michael C. Short, PBS Interview by Frontline, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html> (accessed 19 Feb 2012).

²⁴ Short, *Coalition Air War*, 1.

²⁵ General Michael C. Short, PBS Interview by Frontline, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html> (accessed 19 Feb 2012).

southern province of Kosovo, beginning five centuries of Ottoman rule.²⁶ In Serbian culture, this battle is the reason for many Kosovar-Serbian problems. During the Ottoman occupation, many Orthodox Christian Kosovars and ethnic Albanians converted to Islam. By the late twentieth century, ethnic Albanians constituted an estimated ninety percent of Kosovo's population.²⁷ A province the size of the greater Los Angeles area, Kosovo remains a significant place of history, religion, and culture for Serbia.

As previously discussed, during World War II Josep Broz Tito seized power in Belgrade and established a Communist-style dictatorship and in July 1945 Serbia officially annexed Kosovo.²⁸ In time, Kosovo was declared an autonomous region of Serbia.²⁹ Tito was skilled enough to keep tensions in the Balkans under control until his death in 1980. As a result of the nationalistic, ethnic, and religious differences, violent factionalism tore the republics apart.³⁰

Long unsettled disputes re-emerged with the break-up of Yugoslavia as war raged in Bosnia from March 1992 to November 1995. The United States was largely involved with the peace negotiations as well as military efforts to coerce Serbia to cease hostilities in Bosnia. From 29 August to 20 September 1995, NATO conducted Operation DELIBERATE FORCE.³¹ Milosevic capitulated and accepted the Dayton Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia. However, the Dayton Accords exacerbated the situation in Kosovo because ethnic tensions remained, leaving the Serbs feeling they were "under siege" by ethnic movements outside of Serbia and the only remaining non-Serbian element was the Muslim (ethnic) Albanian.³²

Consequently, the Dayton Accords of 1995 accelerated ethnic problems in Kosovo. They left the false impression that all parties involved had accepted a mutual agreement between ethnic Muslims of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. In reality, the overall "efforts" of the United States, NATO, and the United Nations resolved the Bosnia

²⁶ Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, *Milosevic, Portrait of a Tyrant* (New York: The Free Press, 1999) 4.

²⁷ Greg Campbell, *The Road to Kosovo, A Balkan Diary* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) 149.

²⁸ Doder and Branson, *Milosevic, Portrait of a Tyrant*, 66.

²⁹ Tim Judah, *Kosovo, War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) 31.

³⁰ Alan Axelrod, *Political History of America's Wars* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007) 509.

³¹ Bruce R. Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV, and John G. McGinn, *Disjointed War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001) 12.

³² Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo* (Westport, CT:Praeger Publishers, 2001) 7.

conflict, but not the ethnic tensions in the Balkans.³³ In Kosovo, the “process of violence” was already well established in the “group mobilization” phase as an extension of the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia and was on the verge of rapidly escalating to the “killing” phase.

When Slobodan Milosevic became president in 1989, part of his appeal and power was his insistence on the reunification of Serbia with Kosovo. He chose Kosovo because of the historical and religious significance for Serbs and revoked its autonomy in 1989.³⁴ Following the war in Bosnia, Milosevic deployed troops to Kosovo in response to guerrilla actions conducted by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA formed in 1996 to undertake armed resistance to Serbian rule and gain independence for Kosovo.³⁵ KLA attacks on Serbian police and paramilitary forces continued throughout 1998 but the resulting lethality of Serbian reprisals was arguably not proportional nor always against the KLA, essentially vaulting the “process of violence” into the “killing begins” phase. With every KLA attack, the Serbian response intensified as Serb gunmen torched whole villages suspected of housing KLA loyalists.³⁶ A massacre of villagers in the Drenica area in March 1998, subsequently verified by a Human Rights Watch investigation, was classified by the Serbian authorities as an “operation to liquidate the heart of Kosovo terrorism.”³⁷ The “killing begins” phase quickly escalated to “mass killing” the following year when some 3,000 Albanians were killed and some 300,000 others were expelled from their homes, their property burned and their livelihoods extinguished.³⁸ The “mass killing” phase in the “process of violence” was fully developed in Kosovo prior to any international military intervention.

Kosovar survivor Azize Dreshaj described that difficult time as television cameras captured civilians who were forced to live in the mountains, chilled by winter snowfalls and terror.

The military and paramilitaries continued the expulsion of [the] population (ethnic cleansing) from their homes, shelling of villages without specific

³³ Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in in Kosovo*, 7.

³⁴ Doder and Branson, *Milosevic, Portrait*, 51.

³⁵ Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 225.

³⁶ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 445.

³⁷ Kosovo Report: Independent International Commission on Kosovo, annex 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69.

³⁸ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 445.

targets only to frighten the civilian population. We left everything, we escaped for more than 6 weeks in [the] mountains, and we lived in plastic tents, improvised without any protection. I was lucky because that mountain where we were sheltered was away from the village. We escaped the first columns of forced departures where [women and children marched] for three days and nights on foot from Mitrovica to the Albanian border.³⁹

As Serb police and militia committed more and more atrocities, Western journalists and human rights groups descended on the region and called for action. In exchange for avoiding NATO air strikes, US diplomat Richard Holbrooke negotiated a deal with Milosevic to pull back some of his forces to allow the deployment of 2,000 unarmed international verifiers in October 1998.⁴⁰ Serb forces initially pulled back, but were angered when the KLA exploited the withdrawal. The situation boiled over on 15 January 1999 with the "Racak Incident" in which Serbian forces rounded up and executed forty-five ethnic Albanian civilians including three women, a twelve-year-old boy, and several elderly men in the Kosovo village.⁴¹ When the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, Ambassador William Walker, arrived at the scene, he was appalled at what he found. He examined visible bullet holes beneath the gray hair of three bloody corpses left facedown by Serb forces and roared into the television cameras that the Serbs had committed a "crime against humanity."⁴²

The atrocities of the 1990s taught many American political leaders that they could not simultaneously demand both an end to genocide and a policy of non-intervention. Thus the Clinton administration came under pressure to respond with what was essentially a Mass Atrocity Response Operation.⁴³ This final atrocity triggered intervention by the United States and NATO. However, the US decided to intervene without clear objectives and without any examination of the consequences of using military force.

³⁹ Azize Dreshaj, (Kosovo war survivor), interview by the author, 4 March 2012.

⁴⁰ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 446.

⁴¹ Axelrod, *Political History of America's Wars*, 510.

⁴² Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 447. This incident's validity has been questioned but that didn't matter at the time—the images of Srebrenica were too powerful.

⁴³ Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 446.

The Air Campaign in Kosovo

On March 1997, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo, which called for autonomy and “meaningful self-administration” for Kosovo and warned that “additional measures” were possible if no progress was made toward a peaceful solution.⁴⁴ For the next twelve months, NATO debated how to support the resolution, recalling the successful use of airpower three years earlier in Bosnia. In April 1998, British foreign secretary Robin Cook asked General Wesley Clark, US Supreme Allied Commander Europe, if Milosevic’s policy of increasing repression could be halted by the threat of airpower, “Yes, probably,” responded the General.⁴⁵ However, one month later, German General Klaus Naumann, chairman of the NATO Military Standing Committee, clearly identified the difference between Bosnia and Kosovo. This time, there were no ground forces to threaten Milosevic with defeat.⁴⁶

General Clark had already directed General John Jumper, commander of US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), to draw up a plan for an air campaign against Yugoslavia. Its objective was to “halt or degrade a systematic Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo [with the] intent that the air strike would be coercive in nature, providing a strong incentive for Milosevic to halt operations.”⁴⁷ Code-named “Nimble Lion,” the plan envisioned attacks by a large number of US and coalition aircraft against 250 targets.⁴⁸ Military targets throughout Yugoslavia included its integrated air defense systems (IADS), command and control assets, airfields and/or aircraft, logistic sites, operational bases, and deployed heavy weapons within Kosovo.⁴⁹ Excluding the deployed heavy weapons and necessary targeting of the IADS to gain and maintain air superiority for follow on strikes, few of the additional targets created the effects necessary to halt the ethnic cleansing in the near term. General Short deduced, “We had a plan to go after tanks, armored vehicles, and troops in the field. But the battle area in Kosovo was enemy

⁴⁴ UNSCR 1160, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm> and UNSCR 1998 <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm> (accessed on 29 Mar 2012).

⁴⁵ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 112.

⁴⁶ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 117.

⁴⁷ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 122.

⁴⁸ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001) 11.

⁴⁹ United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MOD), Press Release 148/98, 12 June 1998.

territory. You could cause collateral damage, and we feared that we'd kill refugees.”⁵⁰ He continued, “My advice was to go after the head of the snake, go after the center of gravity,” despite the enormous pressure from the 19 other nations saying “you're not doing anything in Kosovo, you're not attacking the Third Army.”⁵¹ Despite the severe strategic level target vetting process, given an objective unfamiliar to many airpower planners—protecting civilians and halting atrocities—they attempted a familiar Warden-style targeting plan.

On 22 March 1999, the NAC authorized the secretary general to decide, subject to further consultations, on a “broader range of air operations, if necessary.”⁵² The Clinton administration did not seek a UN Security Council resolution approving the air attack plan, since it knew that Russia and China had both vowed to veto any proposal calling for air strikes.⁵³ By this time, two very different NATO air plans existed, “There was a limited air option [Operation FLEXIBLE ANVIL] which was a short, sharp, punitive shock...Then there was the phased air option [Operation ALLIED FORCE] which went through a series of escalatory steps.”⁵⁴ Clinton and the NATO coalition elected for the second option as the President remarked,

Our strikes have three objectives: First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And, third, if

⁵⁰ General Michael C. Short, PBS Interview by Frontline, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html> (accessed 19 Feb 2012).

⁵¹ General Michael C. Short, PBS Interview by Frontline, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html> (accessed 19 Feb 2012).

The Third Army was the primary Serbian fielded force in Kosovo acting as the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and violence against civilians.

⁵² Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 229.

⁵³ This should not be taken to suggest that NATO's air war against Serbia was a unilateral action undertaken without regard for the UN whatsoever. On the contrary, in March 1998 the Security Council had expressly recognized in Resolution 1160 that the Serb government's repression of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo constituted a threat to international peace and security, a view later repeated in Resolution 1199 six months before the start of Allied Force, which called for action aimed at heading off “the impending humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo. As an IISS comment later noted, NATO's air war for Kosovo thus constituted “a highly significant precedent,” in that it established “more firmly in international law the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds, even without an express mandate from the Security Council.”

Strategic Survey 1999/2000, (London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000) 26.

⁵⁴ General Sir Rupert Smith, General, DSACEUR, in evidence to the House of Commons Defense Committee, “Lessons of Kosovo” vol II, para. 934, 17 May 2000.

necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capability.⁵⁵

Political and NATO leaders' initial expectation was that the bombing would be over very quickly, and this assumption was reflected in the objectives. Secretary of State Madeline Albright commented on television, "I don't see this as a long term operation. I think this is something that is achievable with a relatively short period of time."⁵⁶ A White House spokesman "made it clear they felt the bombing would last only three or four days."⁵⁷ The operational objectives clearly reflected Warden's five-ring systems model by focusing primarily on the leadership and coercing Milosevic to the bargaining table through imposing the price of damaging Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future. Indeed, the leaders were so confident that it would merely take a token bombing effort to persuade Milosevic to yield that not one objective included the actual halting of ethnic cleansing or protection of civilians.

In Kosovo, while constrained target sets, a belief in a short campaign, and Warden indoctrination persuaded airpower planners to target the first three rings of Warden's model (Leadership, System Essentials, and Critical Infrastructure) in hopes of Milosevic's rapid capitulation, the potential for the mass killing by fielded forces continued on the ground.⁵⁸ This contradicted the basic humanitarian legitimacy for military intervention. British Prime Minister Tony Blair outlined the moral tone and justification for NATO action saying, "We are taking this action to prevent Milosevic from continuing to perpetrate his vile oppression against innocent Kosovar civilians."⁵⁹ The ways did not match strategic ends.

To make matters worse, Clinton revealed his confidence in airpower as he openly announced, "I don't intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war," effectively taking

⁵⁵ President William Clinton, "Clinton's Statements on Kosovo," *The Washington Post*, 1 June 1999. The speech followed the beginning of Operation Allied Force 24 March 1999.

⁵⁶ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 425.

⁵⁷ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 425.

⁵⁸ David Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*. (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005) 155. This statement was confirmed by Maj "Coyote" Smith who worked in the strategy cell of the CAOC for Operation Allied Force.

⁵⁹ R.W. Apple Jr., "Nimble Security Juggler: Sandy Berger, The Strategist And Politician," *New York Times*, August 25, 1999.

that option off the table.⁶⁰ Airpower was confirmed as the sole coercive military instrument. The next day, the order to begin air strikes was given, and on 24 March 1999, the 72 day Operation Allied Force began.

Allied Force thus began with NATO expecting a speedy outcome, despite the fact that the Bosnian precedent was irrelevant and the targeting model was inappropriate. The Bosnian precedent—the basis for the belief in a speedy capitulation—was rendered irrelevant by the vastly different context, including a lack of ground troops and the significantly greater importance of Kosovo to the Serbs. Although planners attempted to identify targets based on the same thinking used by Warden for Desert Storm in 1991, the operational environment of Serbia and Kosovo was sharply different than that of Iraq. Defined by a series of interwoven valleys mostly surrounded by mountains and many times protected by low cloud cover and fog, Serbia and Kosovo made up an arena smaller than the state of Kentucky (39,000 square miles), with Kosovo itself no larger than the Los Angeles metropolitan area.⁶¹ Its topography and weather, compounded by an enemy IADS that was guaranteed to make offensive operations both difficult and dangerous, promised to provide a unique challenge for NATO air power.⁶²

On 24 March, eighty aircraft were involved in the first attacks against forty widespread targets, including primarily IADS targets but also military installations and arms factories.⁶³ The air war commenced with 250 US aircraft, including 120 land based fighters, 7 B-52s, 6 B-2s, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 combat search and rescue (CSAR) aircraft, 3 airborne command and control center (ABCCC) aircraft, and around 40 tankers.⁶⁴ Of NATO's additional 18 members, 13 contributed aircraft for use in the operation and 11 allies participated in both offensive and defensive airpower operations.⁶⁵

Kosovar war survivor Azize Dreshaj distinctly remembers that day: “[My family] was listening to the Albanian news on TV, when the announcer gave the news that NATO air campaign started on Serbian military targets. We all jumped as we were

⁶⁰ “Map of Serbia/Montenegro,” *PBS Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/map.html> (accessed 19 Mar 2012).

⁶¹ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 17.

⁶² Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 17.

⁶³ Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 231.

⁶⁴ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 20.

⁶⁵ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 20.

standing there in the room and began to hug each other, to burst into tears of joy, because [we] knew that the beginning of air strikes would be the conclusion of a long history of suffering and injustice that Serbian regime was making for my nation.”⁶⁶

General Jumper estimated that the air defense suppression phase could last from four to six days, already exceeding the time White House officials had estimated.⁶⁷

Yugoslavian air defenses were nothing to discount, dominated by surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries equipped with thousands of Soviet-made SAMs, including SA-2's, 3's, and the deadly SA-6.⁶⁸ In addition to some 1,850 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) pieces, the Yugoslav Air Force consisted of 238 combat aircraft, including Soviet MiG 21's and the advanced MiG-29.⁶⁹

In accordance with doctrine, priority was given to achieving control of the air. In the first seven days of the war, NATO air forces flew 1,700 sorties, of which 425 were attack missions, and over 100 cruise missiles were fired against more than 70 targets that included 4 secret police bases, 3 ammunition dumps, and a helicopter field in Kosovo, plus 42 assorted attacks on AD facilities across the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).⁷⁰

These figures were frequently but unrealistically contrasted with the two thousand sorties flown on the first night of DESERT STORM despite the fact the chief of the UK Defense Staff, General Charles Guthrie, admitted that on 30 March, “bad weather had forced the cancellation of planned NATO air attacks on three of the six nights since the air campaign began.”⁷¹ In addition, precision laser and optical weapons guidance systems would not work through the clouds, and insufficient aircraft existed to launch parallel attacks powerful enough to induce shock or paralysis on the IADS.⁷² According to Kosovo historian Benjamin Lambeth, the attacks did not cause the effects necessary to create serious inconvenience for the Serbs.⁷³ This allowed them to adjust to the new level of pain and continue what they had planned all along—redouble their effort to run

⁶⁶ Azize Dreshaj, (Kosovo war survivor), interview by the author, 4 March 2012.

⁶⁷ Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 231.

⁶⁸ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 17.

⁶⁹ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 17.

⁷⁰ UK MOD and Pentagon Television Briefings, 31 March 1999.

⁷¹ Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 231.

⁷² Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 231.

⁷³ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 24.

as many ethnic Albanian civilians as possible out of Kosovo and thus be able to take an unobstructed shot at the KLA once and for all.⁷⁴ Equipped with 630 tanks, 634 armored personnel carriers, and more than 800 howitzers, the Yugoslav army reportedly numbered about 90,000 men. The Yugoslav 3rd Army was assigned to Kosovo operations, along with reinforcements from 1st and 2nd Armies.⁷⁵ About 40,000 troops and 300 tanks crossed into Kosovo, spreading out in burned out villages and buildings abandoned by the refugees.⁷⁶ Paramilitary security forces from the Interior Ministry were engaged in multiple areas across Kosovo.

The escalation in ethnic cleansing should not have come as a surprise to NATO. Weeks earlier, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, had predicted that Serbian forces *might* respond to a NATO bombing campaign with precisely such a strategy of escalated killing.⁷⁷ In as early as 1998, the CIA had reportedly learned that Belgrade was planning a move with tanks and artillery, called Operation Horseshoe, to drive ethnic Albanians over the southern and western borders of Kosovo as soon as the snow melted in the spring.⁷⁸ Therefore, the KLA would be stripped of its surrounding civilian population and exposed to direct attack.⁷⁹ The Serb incentive for such a move was not difficult to fathom, considering that the heavily radicalized KLA, which represented the aspirations of most Kosovar Albanians, was committed to the establishment of an independent Kosovo—and a Greater Albania over the longer term.⁸⁰

Milosevic's continuation of large-scale atrocities in Kosovo and his belligerent defiance of NATO denied the alliance the quick settlement it had counted on. This left both NATO and the Clinton administration with no alternative but to continue air attacks until NATO prevailed, since ground troops had already been taken off the table.⁸¹ Because both US and NATO military leaders had counted on a quick win, little thought had gone into anticipating what the consequences of an accelerating ethnic cleansing plan might be and what airpower requirements and effects the immediate protection of

⁷⁴ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 24.

⁷⁵ Vernon Loeb, "Yugoslav Military is a Formidable Foe," *The Washington Post*, April 3, 1999.

⁷⁶ Loeb, *Yugoslav Military is a Formidable Foe*, *The Washington Post*.

⁷⁷ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 24.

⁷⁸ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 24.

⁷⁹ Johanna McGahey, "The Road to Hell," *Time*, 12 April 1999, 42.

⁸⁰ Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999, 24-42.

⁸¹ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 25.

civilians might require. German General Klaus Naumann admitted a month into the bombing that from the air war's very start, "there was the hope in the political camp that this could be over very quickly" and that as a result, no one at any level had prepared for Milosevic's ethnic cleansing push.⁸² As a result, what had begun as a coercive NATO ploy aimed at producing Milosevic's quick compliance quickly devolved into an open-ended test of wills between the world's most powerful military alliance and the wily and resilient Yugoslav dictator.⁸³

This test of wills required a significant change in the airpower-targeting plan. US and NATO forces faced a difficult task because operations began in the "mass killing" phase, already behind the enemy. To stop the killing, NATO airpower had to take on the military both at the tactical level, by targeting fielded forces who had a month to fortify their positions in Kosovo, and at the strategic level, by hitting targets in the inner three rings of Warden's model in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. The airpower-targeting model appeared to repurpose Warden's rings in a way he had neither anticipated nor instructed.

NATO expanded and clarified the air campaign's objectives in early April. The goal was to conduct simultaneous attacks against two unique target sets, one of strategic value and the other tactical value. The strategic target-set, termed fixed targets of unique strategic value, was a direct application of Warden's prioritization, including national command and control; military reserves; infrastructure such as bridges, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) production; communications; and the military industrial base of weapons and ammunition factories and distribution systems.⁸⁴ The tactical target-set, Warden's lowest target of priority, consisted of the fielded military forces and their sustainment elements and it quickly became a high priority for General Clark.⁸⁵ Fielded forces included attacks on Yugoslav military forces, their tactical assembly areas, command and control nodes, logistic resupply areas, and choke points. Initial guidance focused on forces south of the 44th parallel, but soon, military targets north of the line

⁸² Carla Anne Robbins, Thomas E. Ricks, and Neil King, Jr., "Milosevic's Resolve Spawned Unity, Wider Bombing List in NATO Alliance," *Wall Street Journal*, 27 April 1999.

⁸³ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 25.

⁸⁴ Dana Priest and William Drodziak, "First Raids Targeted Defensive Facilities," *The Washington Post*, March 25, 1999.

⁸⁵ Priest and Drodziak, *First Raids Targeted Defensive Facilities*, *The Washington Post*.

also made the list.⁸⁶

As the expanded guidance became clear, NATO pursued a multipronged strategy with its air campaign based on the operational environment and the strategic objectives. The goal was not just to demonstrate NATO resolve and hope to coerce Milosevic, but it was also to directly reduce and eliminate the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry on their campaign of violence and killing in Kosovo. Fortunately, NATO's air forces could make the transition, but had these been the objectives from the beginning, one wonders how many more lives could have been saved.

The targeting transition expanded to focus on the fielded forces acting as the perpetrators of violence, but it also expanded the complexity. Many of these engagements would likely take place in close-contact conditions where Yugoslav forces practiced deception and mixed in with civilians and refugees, making them difficult to identify. Precision and intelligence quickly became a critical factor in the protection of civilians.

Operation ALLIED FORCE demonstrated that airpower had made significant strides since the Gulf War in its precision weapon technology and accessibility. Two B-2s flew from Whiteman AFB, Mo, more than 30 hours, on a round-trip mission and launched highly accurate Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) against multiple targets marking the first use of the B-2 in combat. The JDAM, also employed for the first time during Allied Force, laser guided munitions, and other precision weapons gave NATO airpower a truly all-weather, access denied, day-or-night precision attack capability.⁸⁷ The technology and accessibility facilitated the precision necessary to target fielded forces where collateral damage was a primary concern. A DoD after-action report to Congress noted that during Allied Force, 35 percent of the bombs delivered were precision munitions, compared with 8 percent in the Gulf War.⁸⁸ However, despite the improved precision capability, intelligence challenged feasibility.

The intelligence community's capability to identify perpetrators from innocent civilians and their sources of power became a critical requirement, while airpower's

⁸⁶ Priest and Drodziak, *First Raids Targeted Defensive Facilities*, *The Washington Post*.

⁸⁷ United States Department of Defense, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," news release, October 14, 1999.

⁸⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002) 11.

heavy reliance upon the quality and flexibility of the intelligence became a critical limitation. Knowing where the perpetrator's are, how their "system" functions, how much pain it can take, and where to inflict that pain are critical prerequisites. During Allied Force, an intelligence failure led to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO aircrew who believed they were targeting a logistics center.⁸⁹ It is significant that the performance of the intelligence function in support of bombing has often been poor.⁹⁰ In April, General Short established a "Flex-Targeting Cell," consisting of two cells in one in an attempt to fix this problem.⁹¹

The Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) Targeting Cell, under the C-2 (deputy for intelligence) attempted to fuse intelligence to find and destroy the elusive threat of SAMs. The Fielded Forces Attack Cell, under the C-3 (deputy for operations) attempted to find and destroy the Serb forces that were carrying out the ethnic cleansing campaign. On 14 April, the planners finally established a "Kosovo Engagement Zone" (KEZ) to allow the attacking aircraft to engage targets of opportunity. The KEZ was similar to killboxes that had been used in the past (including Desert Storm) to destroy armies in the field. Only now the army was not in the field but hiding amongst the civilians and under camouflage.⁹²

The result was that the tactical target set missions were overwhelmingly geared toward fleeting targets, due to their ability to hide.⁹³ As a result aircraft such as the A-10, brought to the war for the sole purpose of conducting search and rescue, gained new missions such as forward air controller (airborne) FAC(A)s.⁹⁴ The new targeting strategy finally merged capability with feasibility in an attempt to affect strategy.

In the realm of ISR, Allied Force witnessed the first large-scale use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) with near real-time sensors, which provided persistent surveillance without putting aircrew at risk.⁹⁵ However, in Kosovo, similar to today, there were problems associated with the volume of intelligence, reliable sources, and hasty analysis. This becomes particularly difficult when the protection of civilians is the priority objective but the perpetrators are intermixed with the civilian population. General

⁸⁹ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 156.

⁹⁰ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 156.

⁹¹ Michael W. Kometer, *Command in Air War: Centralized Versus Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2007), 128.

⁹² Kometer, *Command in Air War: Centralized Versus Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower*, 128.

⁹³ Kometer, *Command in Air War: Centralized Versus Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower*, 129.

⁹⁴ Kometer, *Command in Air War: Centralized Versus Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower*, 129.

⁹⁵ Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation*, 201.

John P. Jumper, later recalled that the difficulty

of attacking fielded enemy forces without the shaping presence of a NATO ground threat had produced “major challenges,” including creating a faster flexible targeting cycle; putting a laser designator on Predator [a RPA]; creating new target development processes within the CAOC; creating real-time communications links between finders, assessors, and shooters; and developing more real-time retargeting procedures.⁹⁶

In addition, JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], ABCCC [Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center], U-2 and improved satellite and reconnaissance coverage proved extremely capable in giving attack sorties more lethality.⁹⁷ However, any perpetrator faced with such an array of intelligence-gathering devices would likely place significant weight on the art of deception.

If the strength of military resides in its specific technologies, then those technologies are likely the most credible target for the enemy. The Kosovo conflict revealed that a technologically disadvantaged adversary could still deceive opponents fielding the most advanced information systems.⁹⁸ Serbian camouflage, deception, and techniques as simple as the employment of laser dazzlers significantly limited the numbers of military hardware destroyed by NATO airpower in Kosovo.⁹⁹

While Kosovo revealed the utility of the RPA for reconnaissance and command and control, the employment of deception proved the value of quality intelligence.¹⁰⁰ The Serbian use of UN hostages as human shields in Bosnia illustrates how a simple act can negate the advantages gained by millions of dollars worth of technologically advanced equipment.¹⁰¹ KLA soldier Jeton Dreshaj described one such encounter.

On the ground, it was very difficult to identify and target during enemy movement because many times they used public transportation, with civilians inside, to camouflage their movement from point A to B. [I] remember a mistake on a target from NATO where they bombed a bus with Albanian civilians in Suhareka because Serbian Forces put the bus in the middle of military convoy. We had a few [other] cases were the

⁹⁶ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 242.

⁹⁷ Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation*, 201.

⁹⁸ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 56.

⁹⁹ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 56, from *Janes Defense Weekly*, 7 July 1999, 21.

¹⁰⁰ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 68. see also ‘Predator a Lethal Eye in the Sky,’ www.cnn.com/2002/US/11/04/predator.background/index.html.

¹⁰¹ W. Caldwell Jr., “Promises, Promises”, *Proceedings*, 1996, 1, 57, 122.

Serbian forces sent big trucks with Albanian people inside over the bridges just to [provoke] a NATO strike.¹⁰²

Admitting and learning from these mistakes creates better techniques, tactics, and procedures. Paradoxically, however, too many mistakes that kill the very civilians airpower is trying to protect negate the value of military intervention and a MARO in the first place.

NATO's difficulty in this respect was further compounded by the geography and weather of Kosovo that sometimes hampered the effective operation of air-based sensors.¹⁰³ The environment in which the conflict occurred had a significant impact on dispersing the fog of war. Even today's most technologically advanced sensors have limitations. The challenges of a jungle, urban environment, or the wooded areas of Kosovo in contrast to the dry environment of Iraq affected the performance of infrared, radar, electro-optical, and laser systems. Cloud cover, for instance, significantly affected British bombing missions while political concerns compelled NATO bombing missions to operate above 15,000 feet for fear of anti-aircraft fire.¹⁰⁴ In addition to the lack of sensor effectiveness, flying at higher altitudes limited visual identification of targets, making pilots more susceptible to Serbian deception tactics.

Furthermore, in spite of advances in RPA's, reconnaissance, and intelligence systems and analysis, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) was also a particularly difficult concern during Allied Force. One air planner said NATO lacked the capability to "close the loop" in terms of reliable, real-time battle damage assessment that could be used to determine effects for effective tactical and operational decision making.¹⁰⁵

Taken together, these factors produced a kill rate much lower than in the 1991 Gulf War, but civilians emerged far better off.¹⁰⁶ In ALLIED FORCE, the civilian casualty rate from bombing was only 14% that of the rate in Iraq during Operation

¹⁰² Lieutenant Colonel Jeton Dreshaj, (KLA Army officer during ALLIED FORCE), interview by the author, 4 March 2012.

¹⁰³ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, xvi.

¹⁰⁴ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 77.

¹⁰⁵ Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation*, 152.

¹⁰⁶ Stephen Biddle, "Land Warfare: Theory and Practice" in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin Gray, eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 109.

DESERT STORM.¹⁰⁷ In a single incident alone, two USAF stealth planes bombed a bunker in Amiriyah, Iraq causing the deaths of 408 civilians who were in the shelter at the time.¹⁰⁸ An investigation by Beth Osborne Daponte estimated total civilian fatalities at about 3,500 from bombing during the Gulf War in 1991.¹⁰⁹ In Kosovo, a Human Rights Watch report estimated between 488 and 527 civilian deaths in 90 separate incidents, where one-third of the incidents account for more than half of the deaths, the worst of which were the 87 Albanian refugees who perished due to mistaken NATO bombs near Koriša.¹¹⁰ In the end, uncertainties are endemic to all intelligence functions and must be taken into account despite the constant improvements in technology. Nevertheless, strategy and continuously evolving technology require military planners to examine innovative ways of identifying and targeting fielded forces such as the “Flex-Targeting Cell,” particularly when civilian protection is a high priority in a MARO. The right balance between timely and accurate intelligence must be merged with the technological capability and an effective targeting plan to achieve the desired effects that produce the broad strategic results.

The campaign violated a number of principles of military theory. Despite its best effort, airpower did not completely stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians by the Serb forces.¹¹¹ An initial lack of political judgment by certain NATO leaders announcing they had ruled out a ground campaign resulted in the loss of a flexible deterrent option.¹¹² This was compounded by the initial lack of a comprehensive NATO prioritized targeting plan that put a priority on the protection of civilians within the campaign objectives. Admiral J. C. Wylie warned of the dangers of having only one plan, because the enemy will eventually discern it and counter it.¹¹³ Not only did NATO initially restrict itself to a single plan, but also saved the enemy from having to identify the plan by publicly

¹⁰⁷ Biddle, *Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* 109. 500 estimated civilian casualties in Kosovo and 3,500 in Iraq during Desert Storm.

¹⁰⁸ Beth Osborne-Daponte, “Toting the Casualties of War,” *Businessweek*. 6 February 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Carla Conetta, *Wages of War—Appendix 2: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 1991 Gulf War*, Comw.org. (accessed 26 March 2012).

¹¹⁰ Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO “Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge,” March 2000.

¹¹¹ Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 121.

¹¹² Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 149.

¹¹³ J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1967) 71.

announcing it. In his memoirs, General Wesley Clark, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe during Allied Force, cautioned that the reluctance to enter a ground campaign could be an emerging pattern in US strategic culture.¹¹⁴ If true, this would be disconcerting based on J. C. Wylie’s warning that control must be applied to protect populations, resources, or territory.¹¹⁵ He describes the method by which control is enforced, “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in war. He is in control.”¹¹⁶

Additionally, the late application of decisive force against the fifth ring of Warden’s model suggests an initial strategic error. The assessment of NATO’s air campaign revealed initial attacks that were focused on Warden’s three inner rings had little effect on halting ethnic cleansing or protecting civilians. On the contrary, attacks on civilians actually increased as the war progressed under Warden’s target prioritization.¹¹⁷ This highlights some serious weaknesses with Warden’s theory. First, Warden assumes universal validity to the priority he gives the five centers of gravity in relation to their importance in sustaining hostilities. While it may be safe to assume that the will of the leadership is a common denominator in most organized aggression, it is a poor assumption in a mass atrocity situation that all killing will be highly organized or directed from a common source. Next, the kind of ethnic cleansing that ripped apart Kosovo was sometimes spontaneous or only loosely planned. There was not necessarily a main artery to sever that would prevent the continuation of the killing. However, in the absence of a unified leader capable of both directing and stopping the violence, the perpetrators will likely act based on original leader intent and continue killing until told to stop. Therefore, by neutralizing the leader or his communication with his fielded forces, one also neutralizes the capability to command a “stop killing” order to the fielded forces. This does not negate the possibility of pressuring the leadership to order a stop to the killing, but it highlights the threat of specifically targeting the leader in a MARO.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Wesley K. Clack, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York, Public Affairs, 2001, 438.

¹¹⁵ Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, 72.

¹¹⁶ Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, 72.

¹¹⁷ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, 150.

¹¹⁸ Although the primary goal in Kosovo was to bring Milosevic back to the table to accept the Rambouillet accords, that does not preclude us learning lessons with respect to a MARO.

Warden's targeting theory was a *viable* option but probably not the *best* option for ALLIED FORCE. All five centers of gravity were accessible to allied targeting in Serbia. There was a discreet, identifiable leadership and command structure as well as production centers, transportation networks, urban population, and fielded forces in Kosovo. The Warden-esque targeting plan would launch offensive air attacks directly into Belgrade, first against the regime, system essentials, infrastructure and then, if necessary, against the population. Initially, planners hoped that with any luck, the air campaign would never have to venture beyond the capital region. However, political restrictions severely limited targeting, and those targets approved failed to create the effects to meet the broad political strategy.

In the end, a total of 23,300 strike missions were conducted in OAF, directed at 7,600 aimpoints associated with fixed targets and 3,400 flex targets resulting in the capitulation of Milosevic.¹¹⁹ However, as the CIA predicted, atrocities increased as the targeting of leadership increased. The initial targeting plan failed to address the Serbian military units in Kosovo actually committing the atrocities that drew the United States and its allies into war in the first place. Although airpower played a significant role in the ultimate achievement of the overall objectives, in effect, NATO had not properly planned for the war it entered.

Libya Comparisons

Twelve years later, a similar NATO alliance entered a conflict in Libya where the military leadership received little political or strategic guidance of the expectations and goals of the military intervention—the closest in history to truly mirror a MARO. In those twelve years, much was written on the importance the US should place on the prevention of mass atrocities, but little discussion or doctrine was developed to prepare the military for a Mass Atrocity Response Operation. General Jean-Pierre Kelche commented with regard to NATO's preparedness in Libya, “[There] was no political direction in the beginning—absent.”¹²⁰ Gradually the military effort improved, “but in

¹¹⁹ *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000) 87.

¹²⁰ Dag Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007) ix.

the beginning, it was a mess.”¹²¹ Similar words from a senior AFRICOM leader described the opening days of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD).¹²² Once again, the US and its NATO allies began a war that it had not planned or prepared for based on the rhetoric and expectations of airpower.

Comparably, the wars in Kosovo and Libya began with the expectation that they would be over in a matter of days or weeks, not months. Equally, the US and NATO committed to the wars while political leaders categorically excluded the possibility of sending in ground troops. Once again, a lack of an overarching national strategy, the public exclusion of a ground invasion, reliance on indoctrinated planning and targeting methods, mission creep, and unclear political objectives resulted in an initially disorganized plan for the protection of civilians in Libya.

As clear as Resolution 1973 might have sounded to political leaders, it raised a host of questions to military planners. Military leaders struggled with guidance as UNSCR 1973 tasked a specific military operation—No-Fly Zone (NFZ)—in Libya while also authorizing, “All necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”¹²³ As described in Chapter 2, NFZs imply a specific military task that does not necessarily protect civilians.

Additionally, by excluding a foreign occupation force of any form, as was also done in Kosovo, further deterrent options become less flexible. Even though both US Presidents’ Clinton and Obama were reluctant to commit troops respectively, they both felt they needed to do something. Yet the impulse to do *something* can be dangerous, as Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, famously warned in the early 1990s.¹²⁴ NATO, therefore, could not use the threat of land forces as a deterrent, a

¹²¹ Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, ix.

¹²² EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 paragraph 4 and 6 available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement>. EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹²⁴ The Powell Doctrine states that a list of questions all have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken by the United States: 1. Is a vital national security risk threatened? 2. Do we have a clear attainable objective? 3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? 5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? 6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? 7. Is the action supported by the American people? 8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

strategic restraint that had created issues in Kosovo. Once again, the political expectations of airpower's capabilities were forced to live up to significant strategic restrictions.

Military planners faced a situation, similar to Kosovo, where the “process of violence” appeared to be quickly escalating toward the “mass killing” phase. To complicate matters, until days prior to commencing OOD, officials in the DOD told military planners at both EUCOM and AFRICOM that a military intervention was unlikely; therefore little effort was undertaken to plan a contingency operation where it was doubtful to happen.¹²⁵ Major General Paul Schaefer, a senior EUCOM planner, believed quickly changing and confusing guidance reflected uncertain end states that created problems in resourcing and planning for the operations. “Early on, in setting up potential NEO operations, there was poor coordination between DOS and DOD...During preparations for the NEO, there were almost daily changes to tasking by DOS and DOD, gradually morphing from a NEO to enforcing a NFZ and arms embargo.”¹²⁶

In both Kosovo and Libya, the US walked a strategic middle path between decisive force and passivity, raising questions about the broad strategy in Libya and its clear objectives. On 19 March 2011, Joint Task Force ODYSSEY DAWN (JTF-OD) launched airstrikes to enforce Resolution 1973 and establish a NFZ in Libya. As Operation ODYSSEY DAWN commenced, twelve years had passed since Kosovo and little had been done to consider solutions concerning how the military, specifically airpower, could be used to protect civilians. Furthermore, international leaders added new political rhetoric strengthening the potential “need to achieve a regime change” while raising questions of the civilian protection objective’s priority.¹²⁷

Even as senior military leaders stressed that the primary goal of operations in Libya was the protection of civilians, vague political guidance once again forced military planners to fall back on what they knew in order to develop an operational targeting

¹²⁵ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹²⁶ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary,” 21 September 2011, 4. Available upon request from JCOA. Quote from Major General Paul Schaefer.

¹²⁷ Aprille Muscara, “Obama Leave Doors Open to Regime Change in Libya,” IPS News, 21 March 2011, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54939> (Accessed 26 Feb 2012).

plan—Warden’s five-ring model.¹²⁸ As in Kosovo, success required overcoming a number of challenges in the areas of strategic guidance, intelligence, and the requirement to protect civilians without coalition ground forces.

Similar to Kosovo, and in accordance with doctrine and UNSCR 1973, priority was initially given to achieving control of the air. Unlike Kosovo, Libya's desert geography, open terrain, and dry weather was similar to Iraq and much more conducive to waging an airpower campaign. However, at nearly 1000 nautical miles (NM) wide and 500 NM tall, its sheer size created a formidable problem with the limited assets assigned to the operation. The country's demographics slightly aided in resolving this problem as most tribes concentrated in separate cities along the coast and within reach of numerous NATO airfields. The first main strike involved the launch of 112 Tomahawk cruise missiles from US and UK ships against shoreline air defenses of the Gaddafi regime.¹²⁹ On the second day, three B-2 Spirit bombers targeted 45 hardened aircraft shelters at a Libyan airfield near Sirte.¹³⁰ U.S. Navy EA-18G Growlers jammed Libyan radar and communications while an EC-130J played a recorded warning to Libyan shipping, "If you attempt to leave port, you will be attacked and destroyed immediately" in Arabic, French and English.¹³¹

By day three, Tomahawk and aircraft strikes against Libyan IADS continued as Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that there would be continuous allied air cover over Benghazi, and that the no-fly zone was "effectively in place."¹³² The coalition had suppressed most of the Libyan air and coastal defense system and military leaders now faced the dilemma of "what next?"

¹²⁸ Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander for Operation Unified Protector, interview by the author, 24 February 2012. and EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹²⁹ Jim Garamone, "Coalition Launches Operation Odyssey Dawn," *Defense.gov*. 19 March 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63225>. (accessed 20 March 2012).

¹³⁰ Steve Inskeep, "B-2 Bombers From Missouri Hit Libyan Targets." *NPR Morning Edition*, 21 March 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/21/134726240/No-Fly-Zone-Enforcer>, (accessed 22 March 2012).

¹³¹ David Kirkpatrick and Elisabeth Bullmer, "Allies Target Qaddafi's Ground Forces as Libyan Rebels Regroup," *The New York Times*. 20 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/africa/21libya.html?_r=1&hp, (accessed 22 March 2012).

¹³² Tom Cohen, "Mullen: No-fly zone effectively in place in Libya," *CNN*, 20 March 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/20/us.mullen.libya/index.html?iref=NS1>. (accessed 21 March 2011).

On 24 March, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney told reporters “We are not engaged in a militarily-driven regime change.”¹³³ Instead, the administration was engaged in “time-limited, scope-limited” action with other countries to protect civilians from forces loyal to Muammar Qaddafi.¹³⁴ However, just two days later, statements from President Obama suggested the objective had broadened. “The goal is to make sure that the Libyan people can make a determination about how they want to proceed, and that they’ll be finally free of 40 years of tyranny and they can start creating the institutions required for self-determination.”¹³⁵ As described in Chapter 2, this seemingly implied regime change was at least one of the objectives of the operation. Due to rapidly changing guidance and compressed timelines, many planners were unsure whether “regime change” was the intended option, or whether operations were to be focused solely on protecting civilian life and providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees, as implied by SECDEF warning orders.¹³⁶

It was clear that mission creep, strengthened by the UN mandate for “all necessary means,” had created the political will by many for something much more than a NFZ. Faced with statements similar to one above coupled with a lack of clear guidance, military leaders were forced to create strategy with the limited airpower assets they were apportioned. However, among planners, there still existed a struggle concerning target prioritization.

The immediate threat to the civilians in Benghazi was from approaching columns of tanks, but to indoctrinated military air planners, the “Warden-esque” idea of “cutting the head of the snake” was still a seductive way to protect civilians in the “economy of force” effort.¹³⁷ Many political leaders believed that pressuring Gadhafi directly would compel him to either order a stop to the killing or step down.¹³⁸ Consequently, this

¹³³ Alan Silverleib, “White House defends Libya response,” *CNN*, 25 March 2011.

<http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/03/24/libya.obama.criticism/index.html> (accessed 22 Mar 2012).

¹³⁴ Silverleib, *White House defends Libya response*, 25 March 2011.

¹³⁵ Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, “As Goal Shifts in Libya, Time Constrains NATO,” *The New York Times*, 26 March 2011.

¹³⁶ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*, 5.

¹³⁷ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹³⁸ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

would either re-legitimize the current Gadhafi regime in the eyes of the international community by restoring the social contract between the government and its people, effectively giving him an out, or create room for a leader who would. In the early hours of 21 March, a building in Moammar Gadhafi's compound in Tripoli was completely destroyed by a cruise missile.¹³⁹ Twelve more cruise missiles and subsequent electronic attack and airstrikes targeted command and control sites as the NFZ extended further West to cover the rest of the Joint Operations Area (JOA).¹⁴⁰ For a brief moment, targeting appeared to follow Warden's theory.

But as columns of tanks approached Benghazi, military planners were forced to make critical targeting decisions based on limited airpower assets that shifted prioritization to the PGF fielded forces. In hindsight, this change in priority based primarily on the urgent necessity to target the PGF prior to entering Benghazi arguably changed the momentum and outcome of the conflict.

US, UK, French, and coalition fighters struck advancing columns of PGFs, expanding the scope of the NFZ by invoking “all necessary means” to protect civilians. Airpower was extremely effective targeting massed PGF fielded forces in a desert environment prior to entry into the city. NATO timing was a key factor to this success. Had they waited until the PGF entered Benghazi, the same perpetrator identification and collateral damage issues that plagued the Kosovo air campaign would have likely developed again. Had the PGF been able to enter the city, forcing an urban CAS mission with little means to identify perpetrator from innocent civilian, the outcome would likely have been significantly different.

Having stopped the immediate threat to civilians in Benghazi, the air component encountered questions regarding enduring target validity.¹⁴¹ If a column of tanks stops outside of a city, does their intent to enter still consider them a valid target? Are they still a target if they withdraw? At what point do air strikes move beyond protecting civilians to supporting opposition forces? Recognizing these types of questions, DOD leaders used

¹³⁹ “U.S. official: Gadhafi's momentum stopped,” *CNN*. 21 March 2011. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/21/libya.civil.war/index.html?hpt=T1>. (accessed 22 Mar 2012).

¹⁴⁰ Pauline Jelinek and Richard Lardner, “General: Coalition strikes more Libya defenses,” *Military Times*, 21 March 2011.

¹⁴¹ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

UNSCR 1973 and US Presidential guidance as a foundation for limiting combat actions against forces that were actively attacking or threatening to attack civilians and not withdrawing from designated geographical areas.¹⁴² However, as the conflict continued, the objective to protect civilians without the use of coalition ground forces posed a number of challenges that had to be overcome for the mission to succeed.

The first of these, similar to Kosovo, was a lack intelligence, or in this case, current intelligence. When Gadhafi had agreed to give up his nuclear weapons in 2003, US intelligence resources had begun to focus on other higher priority areas, leaving a void in up-to-date intelligence on Libyan force strength and disposition.¹⁴³ This void required the intelligence community to quickly adapt as the crisis in Libya unfolded. One intelligence official described the situation, saying, “Intel was completely caught by surprise...we started out with a 10-year-old Libyan [Order of Battle] OOB, we had to update it on the fly as components moved out of garrison.”¹⁴⁴ The intelligence picture improved as airpower provided Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS) and other ISR assets in the JOA, but their numbers were very limited.¹⁴⁵ Two RPA’s and a maximum of 170 sorties a day did not provide enough assets to cover an area roughly the size of Alaska.¹⁴⁶

As in Kosovo, another intelligence challenge was distinguishing civilians from regime forces and avoiding civilian casualties. General Carter Ham, AFRICOM Commander, described this difficulty: “How you apply airpower, particularly in very close combat is a very, very difficult situation for us. And the identification and the distinction of forces in very close quarters is a particular challenge.”¹⁴⁷ Fortunately in Libya, intervening near the “killing begins” phase of the “process of violence” allowed ISR and strike aircraft to positively identify (PID) threats outside the cities, before they

¹⁴² General Carter Ham, DOD News Briefings, 21 and 22 March 2012, 2011 <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4790> (accessed 21 March 2012).

¹⁴³ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*, 12.

¹⁴⁴ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*, 12. Quote from AFRICOM IKD-M Commander.

¹⁴⁵ Jodice, interview by the author, 24 February 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012).

¹⁴⁷ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “*Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*,” 12.

became embedded in congested urban environments, permitting easier targeting.¹⁴⁸ For regime forces that made it into the cities, the coalition concentrated on cutting supply lines and communications to reduce their capability to fight.¹⁴⁹ Similar to Kosovo, every pilot was required to make careful collateral damage estimates to ensure that the people the coalition was trying to protect were not put at risk.¹⁵⁰

A final intelligence problem resulted from the lack of “boots on the ground.” The lack of communication with the Anti-Gadhafi Forces (AGF) to identify and coordinate enemy targets forced the coalition to rely on air assets to do the job. However, in a country approximately the size of Alaska, limited ISR air assets and long distances required extensive time to search for threatening forces, complicating planning and execution. Admiral Samuel Locklear, the JTF Commander, summarized this difficulty, saying, “The Gadhafi forces are a fairly significant land force that he has arrayed in various locations around the country. It requires the coalition to be well-coordinated...”¹⁵¹ In addition, similar to Kosovo, accurate battle damage assessments (BDA) were difficult without ground forces. This led to multiple air assets servicing targets that might have already been neutralized.¹⁵² For these reasons, Lieutenant General Jodice, OUP CFACC, proclaimed the Swedish Gripen tactical reconnaissance aircraft as one of the heroes of the conflict. Its ability to quickly travel long ranges, capability for airborne retasking, and capability to rapidly process the intelligence data collected, created a much more efficient and compressed targeting cycle.¹⁵³

Without troops on the ground, the only way to directly influence Gadhafi and the regime leadership was either through the direct targeting of command and leadership (as Warden suggests) or through information operations (IO). As NATO took control and OOD transitioned to OUP, planners initially appeared to place Warden’s center ring front

¹⁴⁸ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

¹⁴⁹ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary,” 12.

¹⁵⁰ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary,” 13.

¹⁵¹ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary,” 13.

¹⁵² Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary,” 13.

¹⁵³ Jodice, interview by the author, 24 February 2012.

and center as UN leaders insisted; “maintaining pressure on Tripoli” was not overstepping the UN mandate in UNSCR 1973.¹⁵⁴ Despite the continued strategic focus on the protection of civilians, a center of gravity (COG) analysis produced by the OUP planning cell—most of whom were British officers whose political leaders favored regime change—positioned Gadhafi’s regime as the primary COG. Although there was no mention of regime change in the mission statement, planners again argued that direct and indirect pressure on Tripoli and Pro-Gadhafi leaders would support the protection of civilians by pressuring the strategic source of the perpetration.¹⁵⁵ This may be true in some cases, but as was seen in Kosovo, pressuring the leadership only resulted in the escalation of atrocities as the government flexed its power.¹⁵⁶

By applying Warden’s model in a MARO-like situation, even unintentionally, without taking the political and military environment into account, planners create a potential for unforeseen consequences. If the communication between the leader, who could order an end to the killing, and the fielded forces was severed, it is likely that the fielded forces would continue to carry out their last orders and commit further atrocities. Even after the fall of Tripoli, when Gadhafi went into hiding, the killing continued. Evidence revealed that even after Tripoli had fallen and Gadhafi had fled to his hometown of Sirte, PGF forces continued to kill scores of detainees and arbitrarily executed dozens of civilians. In late August, Human Rights Watch documented more than 110 corpses in four locations in Tripoli, many of whom appear to have been killed execution style.¹⁵⁷ A two-way line of communication from regime leadership to its fielded force leaders facilitates the timely receipt and acknowledgement of orders to “stop

¹⁵⁴ Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012).

¹⁵⁵ Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012). The CFACs mission stated, the “CFAC is to conduct air operations in the Joint Operations Area, to protect civilians in Libya through employment of kinetic and non-kinetic means against belligerent actors attacking or threatening to attack civilians or civilian-populated areas, and enforcing an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, while permitting approved non-NATO flight activity and enabling the delivery of humanitarian aid.”

¹⁵⁶ It must be recognized that in Kosovo, there was the stated intent of coercing Milosevic to come to the table. In Libya, there was no such stated intent, although there were hints of it in the “Qadhafi must go” rhetoric. As the conflict matured and more states recognized the TNC as the legitimate gov’t, the goals should have been explicitly changed.

¹⁵⁷ “Evidence Mounts of Atrocities After Tripoli’s Fall,” *Voice of America News*, 28 August 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Evidence-Mounts-of-Atrocities-After-Tripolis-Fall-128572543.html>, (accessed 24 April 2012).

killing.” Additionally, communication facilitates rapid bottom-up interaction that could expose direct pressure on the fielded forces to the leadership. There may be value in leaving the line of communication between the leadership and the fielded forces open while pressuring the regime indirectly. One way to do this is through Information Operations.

IO created a potential gap-filler to both directly and indirectly influence Gadhafi’s regime and its leaders. It is possible to use airpower to directly pressure leadership through electronic, cyberspace, and airborne systems such as the EC-130 Compass Call and Commando Solo, RC-135 Rivet Joint, EA-18G Growler, and EP-3 Aries II. When asked, “To what extent have there been communications, or even psychological warfare outreach, to Libyan ground forces,” Admiral Samuel Locklear, commander US Naval Forces Europe and Africa replied, “With this type of operation, a key component of it is information.”¹⁵⁸ Locklear continued, “We are executing...operations to ensure that that type of information [to ground troops and commanders] is being made available to Gaddafi forces, and that’s all I’ll say about that.”¹⁵⁹ The US used IO during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 when senior commanders, addressed by name and unit, were getting personal e-mails with instruction on how to show coalition forces that they didn’t want to fight.¹⁶⁰

IO can also be used to target regime leadership indirectly by using Warden’s fifth ring—the fielded forces. Warden argues, “Although we tend to think of military forces as being the most vital in war, in fact they are a means to an end. Their only function is to protect their own inner rings or to threaten those of an enemy.”¹⁶¹ Almost certainly, however, in a MARO there are actions that can be taken to induce any enemy force to offer some degree of resistance to its government’s policies of state sponsored atrocities. In the case of Libya, IO was used against fielded forces as well as the leadership. “Key

¹⁵⁸ Pentagon Press Briefing, (transcript: Update by Admiral Locklear, III, on Operation Odyssey Dawn”, 22 March 2011, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=6259>, (accessed 20 March 2012).

¹⁵⁹ Pentagon Press Briefing, 22 March 2011.

¹⁶⁰ David A. Fulghum, “Libyan Leaders, Soldiers Face Cyber and Information Attacks,” *Aviation Week*, 25 March 2011, <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&lckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3Ac3f95ee8-3fce-41ee-aedc-b69053fbdb1a>, (accessed 25 March 2012).

¹⁶¹ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 7.

units for electronic infiltration would have been the 32nd and 9th Special Brigades under Gaddafi's personal command.”¹⁶² These units likely received emails or digital communication similar to the senior commanders in Iraq telling them not to attack innocent civilians.

A successful IO campaign ensures that both messages and actions are synchronized. By synchronizing IO with kinetic operations, military planners hope to create a consistent message that amplifies the effects of each beyond their sum. Unfortunately, the process for the IO messaging approval process during OOD was difficult and inefficient, rendering the effort initially less useful.¹⁶³ However, the process evolved during OUP, removing inefficiencies and allowing for greater synchronization of IO and other operations.¹⁶⁴ In addition to influencing regime leaders, IO also helped guide opposition forces and civilians to avoid civilian casualties.¹⁶⁵

Another way to influence leaders without troops on the ground was to use the indigenous ground forces as a surrogate. In Kosovo, pressuring Serbian forces by supporting the KLA effectively achieved this. In Libya it was determined that while the AGF were in control of the cities, the potential for civilian casualties was much less.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, by indirectly supporting the AGF, the coalition was able to achieve the goal of protecting civilians. Consequently, planners used this reasoning to legitimize attacks on the traditional first three rings of Warden’s model to relieve some of the pressure on the AGF.

The operations in Libya ended 31 October 2011. In the end, 16 nations flew over 26,500 sorties, including over 9,700 strike sorties, destroying over 5,900 military targets including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 600 tanks or armored vehicles. OOD and OUP demonstrated that airpower had made significant strides since the Allied Force in its precision weapon technology and availability.¹⁶⁷ Over 7,700 weapons

¹⁶² Fulghum, *Libyan Leaders, Soldiers Face Cyber and Information Attacks*, Aviation Week.

¹⁶³ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*, 14.

¹⁶⁴ Jodice, interview by the author, 24 February 2012.

¹⁶⁵ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*, 14.

¹⁶⁶ Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012).

¹⁶⁷ “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats”, NATO Fact Sheet, 2 November 2011.

dropped on targets in Libya and for the first time in any conflict, all were precision-guided weapons.¹⁶⁸ In spite of the challenges airpower faced in Libya, the campaign is generally accepted as a success, but it was not without lessons learned.

Conclusion

Following operations in Kosovo, General Short criticized the ad hoc campaign of ALLIED FORCE, which in his assessment was executed like a pick-up game, saying, “Our targeting philosophy clearly has to be agreed upon before we start. . . We need to have agreed how we intend to employ our forces.”¹⁶⁹ In Kosovo and again in Libya, both political and military leaders and planners failed to create the critical link between targeting, its effects, and the broad overarching strategy; they let it happen by chance and necessity. Political restrictions, vague guidance, and ambitious expectations contributed to these strategic problems. However, the late application of decisive force against the fifth ring of Warden’s model suggests a strategic error. Both unconscious and conscious attempts to adhere to Warden’s five-ring model in Kosovo and Libya created operations where leaders and planners failed to match operational and tactical objectives to the broader stated political objectives of halting ethnic cleansing and protecting civilians.

¹⁶⁸ Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012).

¹⁶⁹ Short, *Coalition Air War*, 1.

Chapter 4

Case Study Synthesis

Humanitarian interventions involve an inherent contradiction: they use violence in order to control violence. Setbacks are almost inevitable, and so it is no surprise that the operations often attract criticism. Yet when carried out thoughtfully, legitimately, and as part of a broader set of mechanisms designed to protect civilians, the use of military force for humanitarian purposes saves lives.

— Joshua S. Goldstein

During the period between World War I and World War II, airpower theorist Giulio Douhet noted, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”¹ Though no two wars are alike, there are most certainly contemporary lessons to be drawn from previous military interventions that help leaders anticipate changes in the character of conflict. The Balkans and Libya may well be frozen in the past, but they continue to live and evolve through historical analysis. Given the influence these conflicts continue to exert on current foreign policy and strategic decisions, a synthesis of the historical case studies reveals valuable insight. Douhet’s observation holds true today, and the changing character of these operations should form a basis of political and military force expectations and planning for MAROs.

MAROs are extremely dynamic and complex operations. This complex environment, in and of itself, is not new, but a high potential for mass atrocities has become the new norm. The historical case studies examined in this thesis contained dynamic conflict, full of uncertainties and risk. A detailed analysis of these studies produced a clarity that can be used to exploit the complex issues in a MARO. A fundamental understanding of the complexities involved in a MARO permits planners to craft an appropriate response that will prepare the military for this likely possibility in the future.

Some common themes have developed from the case studies in this thesis. First, it is the changing character of conflict within a MARO that sets the foundation for further analysis. Instead of a dual, MARO presents an “adversary trinity” within which an intervener attempts to protect civilians and influence a perpetrator without necessarily

¹ Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* (Washington DC: GPO, 1998), 30.

destroying the perpetrator. Second, there is inherent risk in airpower's perceived low cost, historical success, and ability to protect civilians, particularly in the absence of a ground force. Airpower rhetoric has played a huge role in the political calculus and expectations of intervention. Third, airpower planning norms and targeting models are challenged when dealing with the specific operational environment of a MARO. This chapter will propose a four-ring adaptation of Warden's traditional five-ring model tailored to a MARO. Finally, the earlier an intervener can act, the more likely that lower levels of force will solve the problem. Amid the escalating "process of violence", complexity increases as the violence progresses through each phase. Intervention is possible at any time during this process, but history illuminates a relationship between the point of entry and the risk and complexity within the "process of violence" that offers more airpower options.

The Changing Character of Conflict Within a MARO

The nature of war is timeless regardless of the changes in the political environment, the cause of a war, or technological advances.² However, as described earlier, the character of war, or rather its style, is a constantly changing phenomenon. The question, then, is what is the style of a MARO? A MARO's complexity contributes to its character in many ways. It is this understanding of the character within conflict that becomes the guiding force behind the preparation for it. By understanding the character of a MARO, the US and its allies can better prepare for an intervention, but understanding the complexities of a MARO is a challenge. Although no two conflicts are the same, anticipating the "adversary trinity" and the shifting definition of "winning" in a MARO helps leaders understand its character and ultimately its political and military objectives.

Instead of a Clausewitzian dual, a MARO presents an "adversary trinity" within which an intervener attempts to protect civilians and influence a perpetrator without necessarily destroying the perpetrator. A MARO is an intervention operation where the primary objective is stopping violence against non-combatants by a third party—the

² Michael Sheehan, "The Changing Character of War," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 216.

perpetrator. Clausewitz emphasized that the object of war was “to impose our will on the enemy.”³ The perpetrators of mass atrocities have a specific objective that they intend to achieve through widespread and systematic violence against non-combatants. Therefore, the perpetrators are trying to “impose their will” on the non-combatants with violence. However, to complicate this, the interveners must impose their will on the perpetrators. Though the interveners must influence the perpetrators, they must also support the non-combatants while maintaining impartiality. This creates a trinity of influence.

These distinctive characteristics were highlighted in the MARO military planning handbook. Unlike traditional warfare between enemy and friendly forces, a MARO has a multiparty dynamic between the perpetrators, the victims, the intervener and other interested actors such as bystanders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. These complex interactions complicate planning and operations, making results difficult to predict. There is also an illusion of impartiality, where the intervener’s stated goal of protecting civilians is interpreted by the perpetrator as an alliance with the victims in an internal conflict and perceived as anything but impartial. Consequently, an intervener’s intention to impose its will on the perpetrators results in inconsistent objectives. A MARO still maintains the concepts that encompass the true nature of war—climate of war, fog and friction—but the character of the conflict is distinctive in a MARO. The “Adversary Trinity” shown in Figure 4 graphically depicts the character complexity of conflict within a MARO.

³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.




Figure 4: The Adversary Trinity

Source: Author's original creation

These inconsistent objectives reveal themselves in an operational and strategic center of gravity (COG) analysis. Particularly in the Balkans, but also in Libya, the case studies identified the regime leaders, Milosevic and Gadhafi, as the strategic adversaries of the coalition, or the source of power where mass killing originated.⁴ However, to the victims, the fielded forces, whose hands carried out the actual killing, represented the clear and immediate operational COG. In a MARO “adversary trinity”, targeting the operational COG can create strategic effects that may eliminate the necessity to target the strategic COG with military means. Inconsistencies arose in these two cases when the coalition tried to “impose its will” on differing adversaries with limited resources. Political leaders and military planners must understand the complexities involved with the “adversary trinity” and prioritize means and objectives to meet the desired end states.

The struggle between “winning” and “victory” highlights a second distinctive character trait in a MARO. This requires political leaders to better define these end states. In past conflict, as in the Balkans and Libya, political leaders lacked a broad

⁴ Col Michael Smith, Operation Allied Force Strategy Division Planner, interview by the author, 20 Jan 2012. Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012).

strategy that included the definition of “winning.” Indeed, atrocities will not stop unless the perpetrators see peace as more desirable than a continuation of conflict. In Clausewitzian terms, if the effort required exceeds the value of the political objective, the fighting has to stop.⁵ In a MARO, it may equally be possible for neither side to declare “victory”, but “win” in relative terms.⁶ Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart wrote, “Peace through stalemate, based on a coincident recognition by each side of the opponent’s strength, is at least preferable to peace through common exhaustion—and has often provided a better foundation for lasting peace.”⁷ Liddell Hart was implying that a “win” can sometimes be achieved without “victory.”

The fact that conflict is about “winning” does not mean it is about “victory.” One can “win” a conflict, especially a MARO or limited conflict, without achieving victory; here the distinction in words becomes significant to its character. Military force can be legitimately used to obtain goals short of total victory or for immediate political advantage with no intent of resolving the underlying issues. The point is that war is about politics, and consequently “winning” in the end is a political matter.⁸ “Winning” a MARO at both the strategic and operational level could simply mean stopping the atrocities. For example, the perpetrator might see a military intervention that results in political negotiations to stop an uprising or protests against the government as a way out and a “win.” In this case, an absolute strategic “victory” consisting of regime change may not be necessary when the regime is given an out. The ultimate goal to stop the killing and protect civilians could be achieved very quickly. In the end, despite who is in power, the international community could consider the intervention a “win” if the result is a legitimate government that honors a social contract to protect its civilians.

In Libya, this concept of “winning” versus “victory” could have tailored military objectives to meet the specific political objective of stopping the killing and ending the “process of violence.” One could argue the objective to stop potential mass atrocities in Libya was met in the first two weeks when the PGF began to withdraw its forces from Benghazi and Misrata. The immediate objective to protect civilians was effectively

⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 92.

⁶ J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” *Parameters*, Summer 2008, 30.

⁷ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954, reprint 1967) 370.

⁸ Bartholomees, *Theory of Victory*, 36.

accomplished. The compelling airpower force used to separate perpetrator and civilian created an opportunity for an immediate strategic “win.” Withdrawing US and NATO airpower, with the threat to return should the potential for mass atrocities arise again, could have demonstrated resolve. On-going diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could have continued to pressure the Gadhafi regime to either step down or reestablish the social contract to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Although this is clearly a counterfactual, at a minimum it should raise political and military questions with respect to the formation of a MARO’s objectives.

Understanding a MARO’s character, or rather its style, is critical to both civilian and military leaders. By considering a MARO through the “adversary trinity” and the political definitions of “winning,” planners are better prepared to design realistic airpower objectives that create the effects to “win” the conflict. *Realistic* airpower objectives, however, will likely require expectation management as airpower rhetoric has taken hold within MARO’s political calculus.

Airpower Expectation Management

There is risk in promoting the perception that airpower is a low cost, low risk, high payoff way to achieve political success. According to Clausewitz, the cardinal error that political leaders or military commanders commit is misunderstanding the kind of war about to be undertaken and ensuring that the means applied are suited to the desired ends.⁹ Unfortunately, as was shown in both Bosnia and Libya, some political leaders equate NFZs and airpower to a “means” of enforcing “ends” for which they are not well suited, particularly without the support of ground troops, such as holding ground to protect civilians in safe areas or cities. Eliot Cohen described this perception when he compared airpower’s seductiveness following Desert Storm to a modern romance in its seeming propensity to offer political leaders a sense of “gratification without commitment.”¹⁰ Indeed, airpower rhetoric and expectations have played a large role in the political calculus of MAROs.

⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579

¹⁰ Elliott A. Cohen, “The mystique of U.S. Air Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1994.

Politically, Operations DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, and ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya capitalized on this airpower rhetoric. They demonstrated US, NATO, and UN resolve to get more forcefully involved in ending the deadly ethnic fighting in Europe at a *perceived* low cost. However, beginning in Bosnia, as mission creep changed objectives from establishing and maintaining a NFZ to protecting civilians and UNPROFOR personnel in the UN designated safe areas, both the risks and payoff for airpower as a tool of foreign policy increased significantly. Its utility was now connected to its success in compelling the perpetrators toward a political solution instead of just deterring them. In essence, the interveners began “putting all [their] eggs in one basket” and policy makers began to depend on that basket to enforce their ultimatums.¹¹ However, depending on one basket involves a huge risk for Mass Atrocity Response Operations. With each apparently successful employment of airpower, rhetoric, expectations, and restrictions grew.

The inherent conflict between these three dimensions made it successively more difficult for airpower to achieve the expected success. Recalling lessons previously discussed in Bosnia, airpower’s expectation to protect the UN safe areas coupled with the “dual key” command and control arrangement contributed to the massacre at Srebrenica. In Kosovo, restrictions including political target selection and constricting ROE led to less effective targeting despite increased numbers of precision weapon technology. In Libya, although restrictions eased on political targeting, political expectations affected an unrealistic “zero civilian casualty” guidance.¹² The US and its allies employed a very effective and capable military force; however, in the fog and friction of conflict, a “zero” mistake mentality is not only unrealistic but also dangerous to the morale of the troops and success of the operation.¹³

¹¹ Tart, *No Fly Zones: Costs, Benefits, and Conditions*, 114.

¹² Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Operation Unified Protector (briefing, SAASS, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 February 2012).

¹³ Capt Jason Heard, F-15E pilot in OOD, interview by the author, 23 February 2012. Capt Heard discussed the extreme pressure placed on each individual pilot during the missions in Libya. Due to the limited pre-planned targets, pilots were given responsibility to conduct their own collateral damage assessments on military targets of opportunity (flex targets). Despite this efficiency, they were also told that the pilot “owns” each bomb they release. A zero civilian casualty policy puts an extreme amount of pressure on pilots and has the potential to create a mentality of hesitation to target anything at all.

Following operations in Libya, political airpower rhetoric and expectations appeared to endure. On 20 October, 2011 President Barak Obama celebrated, “Without putting a single US service member on the ground, we achieved our objectives, and our NATO mission will soon come to an end.”¹⁴ In a speech hours before, Vice President Joe Biden praised the operation in Libya saying, “In this case, America spent \$2bn total and didn’t lose a single life. This is more of the prescription for how to deal with the world as we go forward than it has been in the past.”¹⁵ After hailing the lifting of the “dark tyranny” over Libya, he also issued a warning to other dictators in the Middle East, particularly Syria, that they could be next.¹⁶ Indeed, without airpower these missions would have likely failed, but there is significant risk to future operations when unchecked rhetoric and expectations guide political leaders’ decision calculus. These expectations coupled with a perceived understanding of airpower options have also prompted political leaders to include operational tasks in strategic documents.

Although political leaders may believe providing operational tasks, particularly in time critical situations, will expedite the planning process, in reality it can cause more confusion. The military planning process is very effective at translating political objectives into operational tasks. Specifying an operational task, such as UNSCR 1973 did with the NFZ, can limit critical thinking and military planning. Airpower planners are forced to restrict their options, creating a potential for underdeveloped campaigns. Although planners appreciate clear political end states, *some* vagueness in political guidance offers flexibility at the operational level. Conversely, the “all necessary means” statement included in UNSCR 1973 effectively created operational flexibility but it also created strategic confusion.

The inherent conflict between operational flexibility and strategic decisiveness is evident in MAROs. The earlier discussion of NFZ mission creep in Bosnia and Libya demonstrated the necessity of clear political expectations. Clear political expectations and objectives facilitate a well-defined military interpretation of the problem that produces the desired effects. Nonetheless, political leaders require *strategic* flexibility

¹⁴ Ewen MacAskill, “Obama hails death of Muammar Gadhafi as foreign policy success,” *The Guardian*, 20 October 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/obama-hails-death-gaddafi>, (accessed 24 April 12).

¹⁵ MacAskill, “Obama hails death of Muammar Gadhafi as foreign policy success,” *The Guardian*.

¹⁶ MacAskill, “Obama hails death of Muammar Gadhafi as foreign policy success,” *The Guardian*.

often found in vague guidance. To solve this problem, future leaders must understand airpower. For instance, NFZs can be a valuable option in certain situations, but they should not be a default operational task for a MARO. Additionally, a constant dialogue of feedback between political leaders and military planners, similar to the one established by General Horner in Desert Storm and desired by General Short in Kosovo, facilitates options with both operational and strategic flexibility.¹⁷

In the end, political leaders must use caution when applying airpower rhetoric and expectations to their political calculus. A realistic understanding of airpower's capabilities and limitations will help leaders calculate risk more effectively. As airpower technology becomes more precise and allows easier access, leaders are prone to expect more. When decision makers believe they have a tool to deal with a complex situation then they will likely use it. It is the responsibility of military leaders to highlight unrealistic expectations. General William Tecumseh Sherman said it best, "Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster."¹⁸ Airpower options must always include expectation management. Therefore, there is risk in applying airpower for its perceived low cost, historical success, and ability to protect civilians, particularly in the absence of a ground force. However, when political leaders require action, the military must also be prepared to execute, and the critical link between airpower targeting and its effects becomes vital.

Four-Ring MARO Targeting Model

In Kosovo, the late application of decisive force against Warden's fifth ring raised questions of strategic effectiveness. In the Balkans and Libya, military leaders and planners did not create the critical link between targeting and its effects to the broad overarching strategy; they let it happen by chance and necessity. In all these instances, the tendency for airpower planners to recall Warden's five-ring model was pervasive.

Although military planners did not always follow Warden's model explicitly, their target selection and prioritization indicated they followed it conceptually, and it

¹⁷ General Michael C. Short, "Coalition Air War" *AFA Air Warfare Symposium*. (Orlando: Air Force Association, 2000) 1. See discussion on the importance of the relationship between strategic guidance and the military planner in Chapter 3.

¹⁸ William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of Gen William T. Sherman Volume II*, (A Public Domain Book, 1864).

often took a significant incident to inhibit this influence. Events such as the massacre at Srebrenica in Bosnia, escalating violence against civilians in Kosovo, and approaching columns of tanks near Benghazi forced the targeting philosophy to change. Interviews and analysis of airpower planners in the Balkan and Libyan conflicts exposed both a conscious and unconscious inspiration from John Warden's five-ring model as a foundation for airpower planning, particularly in the midst of vague guidance. Exposure to Warden's five-ring model throughout all levels of Air Force professional military education effectively indoctrinated US and NATO airpower planners. Ideas such as, "the essence of war is applying pressure against the enemy's innermost strategic ring, its command structure,"¹⁹ and "It is pointless to deal with the enemy military forces if they can be bypassed by strategy or technology either in the defense or the offense," initially prevailed.²⁰

Nevertheless, airpower planning norms and targeting models were challenged to deal with the specific character of these interventions. Important contextual factors such as the character of the conflict, the geography, and the limited means to obtain and analyze intelligence information significantly affected targeting and challenged Warden's Five-ring targeting model.

Viewing the "adversary trinity" as a system instead of limiting the system to the perpetrator alone, Warden's analysis would yield a realignment of his five-ring model.²¹ Both the Balkan and Libyan strategies were designed to "punish" the enemy for undesirable behavior by striking those targets that made further non-compliance costly. However, targeting prioritization and selection differed greatly, particularly initially, as the objective to protect civilians fluctuated in importance.

In Warden's description of his five-ring model he even recognized, "the relative importance of the outer four rings...has changed over time," and the vulnerabilities of the rings clearly change from one societal system and one historical period to another.²² In addition, he recognized that a military may be forced to deal with the enemy's fielded military forces either because he cannot reach strategic centers without first removing

¹⁹ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 8.

²⁰ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 8.

²¹ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 9.

²² Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 8-9.

enemy defenses, enemy forces are threatening his own strategic or operational centers of gravity, or his political masters will not permit him to attack strategic centers.²³

However, in Warden's model, the center circle always remained the leadership. This fact raises questions of its strategic effectiveness in a MARO.

The changing character of a MARO, the "adversary trinity," and the "winning" versus "victory" discussion challenges both Warden's model and general airpower planning norms. By replacing leadership with fielded forces in the center ring, a new targeting prioritization and planning model better describes the character of a MARO. The only sure way to stop the killing and achieve the ultimate goal of a MARO is to separate the perpetrators and civilians. Directly targeting the fielded forces that are committing the violence meets this objective. In the absence of planning time and guidance, these ideas remain outliers to the planning norms indoctrinated by PME and airpower rhetoric. Indeed, a modified MARO targeting model would serve military planners more effectively. Figure 5 depicts the "Four-Ring MARO Targeting Model."




Figure 5: Four-Ring MARO Targeting Model

Source: Author's original creation

²³ Warden, *The Enemy as a System*, 9.

The four-ring MARO targeting model synthesizes the three historical case study targeting lessons with the “adversary trinity.” The model eliminates the population ring, because the people are not part of the support structure for the perpetrator—the social contract has been broken. However, the four remaining rings offer critical COGs for targeting.

The earlier discussion of the “adversary trinity” demonstrated how the intervener’s objective to impose its will on the perpetrators results in inconsistent objectives. While the perpetrators try to impose their will on the non-combatants, the interveners try to impose their will on the perpetrators, creating a trinity of influence. Though the interveners influence the perpetrators, they must also support the non-combatants while maintaining impartiality. These inconsistent objectives reveal themselves in the operational and strategic center of gravity (COG) analysis. In the “adversary trinity” the direct threat to the civilians or source of violent power is the fielded forces. This is represented in the operational COG analysis of the case studies. The direct threat to the intervener and source of influential power is the regime leadership and its ability to indoctrinate, mobilize, and direct the fielded forces to carry out mass atrocities.

In a MARO, the primary objective is to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Since directly targeting the fielded forces would eliminate their ability, temporarily or permanently, to carry out atrocities against civilians or make it prohibitively expensive, this should be at the center of the circle. In contrast, directly targeting the regime leadership could indirectly stop the violence. Nonetheless, this may take precious time, while hundreds or thousands die directly from the hands of the fielded forces. Additionally, as described earlier, it may be safe to assume that the will of the leaders is a common denominator in most organized aggression; it is a poor assumption in a mass atrocity situation that all killing will be highly organized or directed from a common source. In the end, both methods have the potential to stop the killing, but targeting regime leadership comes with more risk to the primary objective of protecting civilians.

An analysis of targeting regime leadership in the Balkan and Libyan case studies exposed three additional risks. In Bosnia and Kosovo as the regime leadership was targeted kinetically, atrocities tended to increase. Next, in all cases the threat of airpower

from a NFZ did not deter regime leaders after they made the choice to escalate the “process of violence” and actively target their own civilians. It took mission creep and a compelling airpower force to de-escalate the “process of violence.”²⁴ Finally, in Libya fielded forces continued to execute the last orders they received—to kill civilians—despite the absence of regime leadership.

First, the Balkan case studies evidenced an increase in atrocities against civilians after NATO targeted the Milosevic regime. Just as the CIA predicted in Kosovo, the atrocities increased as intervention increased. As attacks against regime leadership began, the perpetrators redoubled their effort to kill and run as many ethnic Albanian civilians out of Kosovo as possible.²⁵

Second, history demonstrated that when leaders make the conscious decision to break down the social contract and begin killing their own people, no airpower deterrent threat will likely cause them to capitulate. The Srebrenica massacre was a prime example of this. Even after establishing NFZ and creditable air threat over Bosnia, Milosevic flaunted his ability to mass forces outside Srebrenica. Despite the deterrent threat of airpower overhead, the outnumbered and lightly armed UNPROFOR force in Srebrenica fell to Serb aggression and 7,000 civilians were massacred. The two-year deterrent NFZ created effects necessary for humanitarian aid missions, but it produced little leverage over Milosevic once his mind was made up to confront the forces at Srebrenica. It was

²⁴ Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Fredericksburg, Virginia: BookCrafters, 1966), 1. Summarized from Col Clint Hinote. USAF, “Campaigning to Protect: Using Military Force to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities,” March, 2008. Leveraging the coercive power of force—the power to hurt—can deter violence before it has started. If the violence has started or the potential exists, that same power can compel the perpetrators to stop. Schelling argues that deterrence is different, and generally easier, than compellence. Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and *waiting*. The overt act is up to the opponent.... Compellence, in contrast, usually involves *initiating* an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds. Both deterrence and compellence have three requirements. First, the state or coalition making the threat must have the capability to carry out the threat. It does no good to threaten an act of force that cannot be executed. Second, the threat must be credible in the context of the situation. It is not useful to threaten nuclear strikes, for example, when trying to deter actors contemplating lesser offenses such as seizing territory in a border dispute. Alternatively, there are ways to increase the credibility of threats. Physical actions, for instance, can bolster the perception that a threat is likely to be followed through. For example, logistical movements and shows of force can bolster a threat. Third, the threat must be clearly communicated to the people who must either act or forego action. This clear communication must include the delivery of a specific message to the right audience. The message must include both the action required as well as the consequences for noncompliance. All three requirements are necessary when attempting to use force to coerce would-be perpetrators of atrocities.

²⁵ Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 24.

not until a more compelling airpower force was used and a shift in targeting prioritization, nearly three years after the initial intervention, that Milosevic capitulated. Similarly in Libya, as NATO established air superiority, PGF forces continued their unyielding drive toward Benghazi and Misrata. It took compelling airpower targeting the fielded forces for the pressure to build on the Gadhafi regime. Despite Gadhafi's decision to continue the "process of violence", the difference in Libya's case was that targeting the fielded forces also protected civilians while Gadhafi contemplated capitulation.

Third, if the intervener targets and removes or cuts off the source of organization, indoctrination, and direction, it removes a key ability to order a stop to the atrocities. In the absence of a unified leader capable of both directing and stopping the violence, the perpetrators will likely act based on original leader intent and continue killing until told to stop. Therefore, by neutralizing the leader or his communication with his fielded forces, one also neutralizes the capability to command a "stop killing" order. This phenomenon appeared in Libya. Earlier supported evidence revealed that even after Tripoli had fallen and Gadhafi had fled to his hometown of Sirte, PGF forces continued to kill scores of detainees and arbitrarily executed dozens of civilians. A two-way line of communication from regime leadership to its fielded force leaders facilitates the timely receipt and acknowledgement of orders to "stop killing."

A quick and decisive air campaign focusing on gaining air superiority only *enables* the four-ring targeting model. A NFZ enables the ability to target the center ring's fielded forces in order to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Focusing airpower on the fielded forces creates the effects necessary to stop the killing. This requires a separate effort not included in the traditional NFZ's objectives. In addition to creating the desired effects, concentrating on fielded forces also inherently decreases airpower risk from surface to air missiles, particular strategic SAMs. Strategic SAMs, although in some cases mobile, tend to be placed to protect a strategic area or a specific location such as command and control nodes. Strategic SAMs are unable to maintain the mobility of the fielded forces and take time to set up, therefore they do not follow the forces. The shoulder launched SAMs and AAA that can maintain the pace of the fielded forces present much less risk to airpower assets. Indeed, placing fielded forces at the center of

the four-ring MARO targeting model exploits the critical link between targeting and the desired effects.

The second ring, system essentials and processes, are elements that convert energy from one ring to another. This includes military logistics such as tactical assembly areas, tactical command and control nodes, logistic resupply areas, and choke points that enable the fielded forces to perpetrate violence. Targeting system essentials degrades the essential items, without which perpetrators cannot prosecute violence. Targeting system essentials also provides an indirect targeting capability against the fielded forces when they cannot be attacked directly. When PGF forces made it into the congested Libyan cities, identification became very difficult. The coalition concentrated on PGF system essentials, cutting supply lines and tactical communications to reduce their capability to fight.²⁶ As PGF forces exited the cities for re-supply they could once again be targeted, returning focus to the center of the 4-ring MARO model.

The third ring is the leadership. The discussion earlier highlighted the risks in targeting regime leadership directly; however, there is still value in targeting this ring. When airpower assets are limited, a likely case in an “economy of force” MARO, non-lethal Information Operations (IO), strategic communications (STRATCOM), and cyber operations offer an alternative method to target the third ring. IO messaging capitalizes on the informational instrument of power. The Gadhafi regime was targeted using IO. Intelligence agencies concentrated their IO efforts on mounting an effective propaganda campaign to persuade key figures in the regime to defect.²⁷ IO was also used to target regime leadership indirectly by targeting the fielded forces.²⁸ Using IO to target the fielded forces indirectly pressured the leadership. Actions that induce any adversary to offer some degree of resistance toward its government’s policies of state sponsored atrocities can pressure the regime toward capitulation. The PGF commanders likely received messages similar to this: “Your orders to enter the cities and kill innocent civilians are unlawful and must not be followed. Lay down your arms and your lives will be spared.”

²⁶ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Executive Summary*, 12.

²⁷ Con Coughlin, “Libya: Why we’re using brains not brawn,” *The Telegraph*, 1 April 2011.

²⁸ Coughlin, *Libya: Why we’re using brains not brawn*, *The Telegraph*.

A successfully organized STRATCOM plan can also affect regime leadership. Given the complex nature of introducing military forces in and amongst civilians, communication of intent is critical to a MARO's success and its legitimacy. This was discussed earlier with respect to an intervener's impartiality. In any given MARO, transparency to multiple audiences is critical, and facilitates international pressure on the regime. In Libya, for example, the rapid transition of command of the air campaign to NATO signaled that this was not a US play for domination in the region. Additionally, international media displayed constant images of civilian death and strife, using the "power of witness" to pressure the regime into re-establishing the social contract and regaining legitimacy. Failure to communicate with all of these audiences can result in misinterpretation of intentions, and a potential compromise of the operation.

In contrast, "The great advantage of waging cyber operations is that the enemy has no idea what is going on," said a senior coalition officer.²⁹ "You won't see it, you won't hear it. It just keeps you guessing the whole time, and makes you question everything that's going on around you."³⁰ The Armed Forces made use of their newly acquired cyber skills to increase the Gaddafi clan's sense of disorientation.³¹ "Key units for electronic infiltration would have been the 32nd and 9th Special Brigades under Gaddafi's personal command."³² These units likely received emails or digital communication telling them to resist orders from the regime and defect.

The critical infrastructure ring should be a last resort in the target prioritization. The infrastructure is necessary to move the system essentials and the fielded forces. Although targeting the infrastructure may impede the perpetrators' movement toward major population areas, it may also hinder civilian escape. In addition, previous US experience has demonstrated the "if you break it you buy it" mentality requiring the intervention force to rebuild following the conflict.

The four-ring MARO targeting model borrows from Warden, builds on, and synthesizes the lessons from the Balkans and Libya. It offers a targeting philosophy, a basis for prioritization, and a solution to General Short's critical assessment that, "We

²⁹ Coughlin, *Libya: Why we're using brains not brawn*, *The Telegraph*.

³⁰ Coughlin, *Libya: Why we're using brains not brawn*, *The Telegraph*.

³¹ Coughlin, *Libya: Why we're using brains not brawn*, *The Telegraph*.

³² Fulghum, *Libyan Leaders, Soldiers Face Cyber and Information Attacks*, *Aviation Week*.

need to have agreed how we intend to employ our forces from the start.”³³ It also offers military leaders and planners the critical link between targeting, its effects, and the broad overarching strategy so that it does not just happen by chance or political restriction. Indeed, exposure to Warden’s five-ring model throughout all levels of Air Force professional military education effectively indoctrinated these ideas into the minds of US and NATO airpower planners. Armed with this critical assessment and the changing character of MARO, military planners are in a better position to make solid planning decisions and create realistic options for political leaders in the future. These options also become critical to the political calculus of *when* to intervene.

Intervention Within the “Process of Violence”

Amid the escalating “process of violence,” complexity and risk increase as the violence progresses through each phase. Recalling the “process of violence” framework used for the historical case studies reveals that the earlier an intervener can act, the more likely that lower levels of force will be required to solve the problem. Intervention is possible at any time during this process. However, history illuminates a relationship between the points of entry and the risk and complexity necessary to de-escalate the “process of violence.” This relationship is based on the legitimacy, capability, and risk across the spectrum of the process. Three primary reasons emphasize this relationship and hint at an optimal point of entry for airpower options that requires less force, risk, and reduces the complexity of perpetrator identification and targeting. This occurs somewhere between the end of the “group mobilization” phase and prior to the “mass killing” phase. Intervention is still possible after this point, but it will likely involve more risk and force.

First, at this time it is not too early to present a legitimate international case for intervention. Legitimacy, defined as “conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules or standards” is a cornerstone of R2P.³⁴ Although a MARO acquires its legitimacy from the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, codified in the 2005 UN Summit, no situation involving R2P will have crystal clear conditions for intervention. However, a

³³ Short, *Coalition Air War*, 1.

³⁴ Merriam-Webster Electronic Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/legitimate>, (accessed 30 April 2012).

worthy indicator for intervention develops when regime leaders impose ideologies upon, manipulate, and mobilize potential groups of core members that take up arms and possess the organizational and physical capability to kill.³⁵ The massing of PGF forces outside Libyan cities undoubtedly indicated the culmination of the “group mobilization” phase. Gadhafi’s “group mobilization” combined with the overt threat of violence against his own country’s civilians clearly indicated his intent to escalate toward the “killing and mass atrocities” phase. These two indicators provided the authority and international legitimacy under R2P that were, and still are, crucial to the success of a MARO intervention force. In addition to international support, legitimacy provides theater coalition basing support as well as the domestic support required by a military intervention.

Second, during this crucial time between the end of the “group mobilization” phase and prior to the “mass killing” phase, the core perpetrators willing to take up arms have massed, but not yet merged, with the civilians. Engaging the perpetrators during this unique time offers airpower a fleeting opportunity to easily identify and effectively target perpetrator concentrations with little to no collateral damage.

Distinguishing civilians from regime forces and avoiding civilian casualties became a significant intelligence challenge in Libya. Timely intervention allowed the limited ISR and strike aircraft to positively identify threats outside the cities, before they became embedded in congested urban environments.³⁶ From the air, coalition forces engaged massed artillery sites firing non-prescriptively into Benghazi and columns of tanks massing to enter the city with little difficulty. When perpetrators merge with the civilians in the “killing and mass atrocities” phases they blend in with the civilian population. The lack of ground forces makes perpetrator and civilian identification much more difficult. Conversely, when the intervention in Kosovo occurred well into the “mass atrocities” phase, the merge of civilian and perpetrator had already occurred. Targeting fielded forces required significantly more airpower for intelligence and precision strike, to minimize civilian casualties. A timely intervention requires less force, facilitates easier airpower targeting, and decreases the risk of civilian casualties.

³⁵ Albright and Cohen, *Preventing Genocide*, 82.

³⁶ EUCOM and AFRICOM senior leaders, (panel, MARO Conference, Oberammergau, Germany, 8 November 2011).

Finally, early intervention offers a potential to limit the military instrument of power solely to the objective of “stopping the killing.” By focusing diplomatic, economic, and informational pressure on the regime while using the military to stop atrocities, the intervener gives the regime an “out” short of regime change that could be considered as a “win” for both sides. In effect, it places the ball in the regime’s court and forces them to either reclaim their legitimacy by re-establishing the social contract or step down.

The environment and timing in Libya created an ideal opportunity for this situation. Gadhafi had the chance to claim a “win” and reclaim legitimacy when his forces were expelled from Benghazi and Misrata. Unfortunately, he chose to continue fighting. Conceivably, the non-military instruments of power might not have had enough time to effectively pressure the regime. Arguably, however, the further the process of violence escalates, the more a compellent force is required to cause the regime to capitulate. There could be times when regime change is the only option to achieve protection of civilians, but early intervention may offer the regime an “out.” In the end, if the regime fails to capitulate, nothing is left but regime change.

In Libya, the US and its international partners intervened decisively and with unprecedented speed to mobilize a broad coalition following the “group mobilization” phase of the “process of violence.” The coalition secured an international mandate to protect civilians, established a no-fly zone, stopped advancing forces as the process escalated toward the “mass killing” phase, and prevented a potential massacre. In contrast, both interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo began well into the “mass killing” stage of the “process of violence.” The war in Bosnia raged for nearly two years before the first NATO military operations took place, and three years before NATO began ground strikes to protect the civilian population. Delaying intervention until after the “mass killing” phase begins diminishes airpower options and increases risk and complexity.

Conclusion

We will never know how horrific the siege of Benghazi may have been, and that is exactly the point. While one cannot prove a negative, a large mass atrocity, as threatened by Gadhafi, did not occur likely due to the considerable effects of airpower. Studying humanitarian intervention as a concept relies heavily on an appreciation of hindsight. However, if Libya provides a model for "intervention on the cheap," we are likely to see this template emulated in future situations and the complex environment of a MARO may not offer the same results.¹

There is no doubt NATO air strikes affected Gaddafi's forces. They were unable to execute the systematic destruction of rebels and civilians Gadhafi had threatened. Therefore, one could argue that the US and NATO executed a successful airpower intervention in Libya and achieved the goal of protecting civilians from a mass atrocity, thus validating the MARO concept.

Indeed, the Balkan and Libyan interventions have elevated the consciousness of the MARO concept to political leaders and military planners. In particular, airpower's decisive effects have had a lasting influence on the political and military calculus. The risks are extremely high if military and political leaders fail to study and learn from the successes and mistakes of these undertakings.

As all eyes turn to the challenges of protecting civilians in Syria, military planners must prepare for a potential MARO. However, leveraging airpower for a low-cost intervention must be done with caution. Not surprisingly, "success" in Libya has produced calls for an encore in Syria. At the moment of this writing, an estimated nine to eleven thousand, mostly unarmed, protesters have been killed by unrestrained use of force against pro-democracy crowds.² Dangerous political airpower rhetoric summoning images of Srebrenica continues as leaders such as Senator McCain spoke to the crisis in Syria on the Senate floor: "Time is running out. The ultimate goal of airstrikes should be

¹ Nikolas Gvosdev, "The Realist Prism: Making Sense of the New' U.S. Interventionism," *World Politics Review*, 16 September 2011.

² "U.N. notes cease-fire violations from both sides in Syria," *CNN*, 1 May 2012.

to establish and defend safe havens in Syria, especially in the north, in which opposition forces can organize and plan their political and military activities against Assad.”³

It is important to remember that every MARO is different. Context matters, and a MARO in Syria would be far different than the intervention in Libya. First, the history and politics in Syria are very different from Libya and the Balkans. Second, Syria is already well established in the “mass killing” phase of the “process of violence,” inevitably eliminating a deterrent airpower option. Third, Gadhafi had relatively few friends and little regional strategic significance. In sharp contrast, Syria has close ties to Iran and complex ties to Russia and China. In addition, Syria lies in the heart of the Middle East, where an intervention may look like another Western war against a Muslim nation. Finally, Syria’s far larger, more modern air force and integrated air defense system would pose a far greater threat to airpower than Libya. Indeed, establishing a NFZ in Syria would be very different from establishing one in Libya.

Defense Secretary Pannetta appears to be looking at the situation in Syria with the necessary cautionary approach. “As secretary of defense, before I recommend we put our sons and daughters in uniform in harm's way, I've got to be very sure what the mission is, if we can achieve that mission, at what price and whether it will make matters better or worse.”⁴ Nevertheless, the military must be prepared to execute a MARO if called to do so.

Airpower and its technological capabilities are a powerful capability, and they are essential in today’s conflicts, but they are not a substitute for a solid military plan and strategic concept. Airpower does not change the nature of war. However, airpower expectations often outrun political and military reality, creating strategic conditions that neither are prepared to deal with appropriately. Decision makers and military planners must avoid the belief that one capability fits all situations and think about airpower options within the context of a MARO. The execution of operations by the Airmen flying the aircraft may not significantly change, but political and military leadership must grasp the overarching dynamics and indicators of mass atrocity situations, and be able to

³ Douglas Stranglin, “McCain urges US to lead effort for airstrikes on Syria,” *USA Today*, 5 March 2011.

⁴ Laura Rozen, “Pentagon chiefs say US should not act alone in Syria,” *The Envoy*, 7 March 2012, <http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/envoy/pentagon-chiefs-u-not-act-alone-syria-183611313.html>, (accessed 1 May 2012)

translate those concepts into executable orders with an achievable end state and clear rules of engagement.

Mass atrocities situations are more likely now than ever before. Naval War College professor Tom Nichols concluded, “Humanitarian interventions are here to stay and are going to be driven more by moral calculation and military opportunity than by ‘national interest.’ This, it seems, is the new American foreign policy consensus; despite the costly US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the anti-interventionist coalition has lost the policy debate.”⁵ It is my hope that military and political leaders find the history and concepts described in this thesis fill a temporary gap in airpower options for Mass Atrocity Response Operations while others, wiser than I, delve deeper into the complexities of this issue. If nothing else, the thesis provides a departure point for future debate.



⁵ Gvosdev, *The Realist Prism: Making Sense of the New' U.S. Interventionism*, *World Politics Review*.

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